

AN INTRODUCTION TO ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

[A Critical and Systematic Exposition of
Sankara School of Vedanta]

BY

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"UPANISADEE UPADESA," "THE ADWAITAVADA,"

"OUTLINES OF VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY,"

&c &c. &c.,

AND

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अद्वैतवाद-मुकुरः किल शङ्करस्य
गाढं कदर्यं-रजसा तमसानुलिप्तः ।
तस्यैव भाष्यमवलम्ब्य मया कृतोऽस्मिन्
कामं मलापनयनेऽस्य महान् प्रयत्नः ॥

परिचिन्तितमत्र 'तत् पदं'
ग्रथिता ब्रह्मकथा पुरातनी ।
द्वन्द्वमद्य करे समर्पितं
भवतां सादर मात्मवृत्तये ॥

nearly all of which have tended to fall into a groove—an undesirable state of things which cannot but demand serious and careful consideration on the part of those who are desirous of seeing the Adwaita philosophy preserve its original features untouched by such elements as are likely to prove inconsistent with its special lines of thought and reasoning. It is now clear to the scholars who take real interest in this system that the Adwaita philosophy has of late been presented before the learned world in forms which are different from the ideas of its original interpreters.

The main object of this book is to consider all the new forms in which this system has been sought to be presented and it has been the author's attempt to form an estimate of these with a view to finding out if they really come into a line with the original form in which Sankarāchāryya himself presented it. The time seems almost ripe when a clear note of warning should be sounded for all those who wish really to study the Adwaita system. They will have to utterly forget all preconceptions and pre-imbibed ideas and to approach this system of philosophy with an open and unbiassed mind which enables them to make for themselves a correct estimate of the positions adopted therein.

rendered, in the case of this system, more intricate by the unfavourable criticisms directed against its main theories.

In this book an endeavour has been made at the very outset to furnish the student and the general reader with the right views about the teachings of Sankara on each of the topics treated herein, and to equip them with the help needed to reach a proper solution of the difficulties they are likely to experience when diving deeper into the subject. No pains have been spared to make the work a suitable introduction to the proper study of the originals, and the subject-matter has been arranged in such a way as to make the book an indispensable companion for any full understanding of Sankara's position. It presents also to beginners an opportunity of making themselves familiar with antagonistic views on various points, and supplies them with reasons to combat those views, from Sankara's works. The whole of the book is expository and contains the essentials of Sankara's teaching in as simple a form as the subject-matter allows, no principles being left out which a student ought to keep in view in the systematic study of Sankara's original works.

The author's experience as a lecturer in the Indian branch of philosophy has convinced him of the necessity of help in the shape of a book like this for the student who may have drifted from the old moorings. It has been his special study to present the expositions as faithfully as possible in the lines adopted and pursued by Sankara himself, and with a view to establishing the various positions, the author has quoted innumerable extracts in the footnotes from Sankara's writings, in support of those opinions. In this respect all the commentaries of Sankara have been treated as of equal importance. For this purpose, the ten *Upanishads* he has commented upon have been laid under contribution as also his commentaries on the *Brahma-Sutra* and the *Gita*.

Considering the intrinsic difficulty in getting at the right sense of Sankara's position from his voluminous

writings on the subject,—writings whose style, though admirably lucid and impressively attractive, is not always easy of comprehension on account of long polemics against his opponents, and considering also the difficulty in putting the most abstruse of the reasonings of Sankara in a foreign tongue, the readers, the author trusts, will look upon this work with a kind indulgence.

Suggestions for the improvement of the book from sympathetic critics and scholars will be most gratefully accepted.

Lastly, the author takes this opportunity to express a very deep debt of gratitude he owes to the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee who almost from the beginning of the author's college career has always fostered his literary aspirations and has very liberally helped him. It is needless to say that but for such generous help from him, the desire that impelled the author to undertake this work would have been baffled.

May, 1924.
CALCUTTA :

} KOKILESWAR BHATTA'CHA'RYYA

PREFATORY NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In the preparation of the second edition which was called for within a few months of the appearance of the work last year, the book has been minutely and carefully revised. A few mistakes have been detected and corrected. An effort has been made to re-think the entire subject and to throw some more light upon it. Those texts which demanded a larger measure of attention and those also to which ample justice could not be done when the book first saw the light, have in this edition received more adequate treatment and for this purpose considerable new matter has been added to the first three chapters in appropriate places of discussions and the authorities more extensively quoted at the footnotes in support of each position. To make the citations of the authoritative passages as full as possible, all the commentaries of Sankara have been carefully read and re-read and the author hopes that his primary object to place in the hands of the philosophical student a complete and right exposition of the system of Sankara within the scope of a single volume has now been adequately realised. No pains have been spared to give a connected and complete view of the system of Sāṅkara-Vedānta ās that view appears from the writings of Sankara himself and to present his philosophy as he himself thought it. The material has been all drawn straight from the fountain-head, and the author ventures to hope that this fact has given to his work an abiding value and its usefulness has thus been greatly enhanced.

To get a fairly adequate and a correct idea of the essentials of the whole Vedānta doctrine which is admittedly a complicated one, it is necessary to master at least the ten

XII PREFATORY NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

or twelve big commentaries of Sankara which cannot but prove a formidable task to a student. And even then, without such aid as this book is intended to supply, to connect together the widely scattered utterances of Sankara and to arrange them under different topics the student will find his task a very hard one, if not impossible. And even if he is prepared to labour at the actual texts of Sankara, he will find many of his difficulties cleared up and his path smoothed, *hitherto* considered thorny, if he reads this book side by side with Sankara's own deductions and conclusions. It has therefore been the special aim of the author to state Sankara's essential thoughts as easily and methodically as possible.

The author avails himself of this opportunity to acknowledge a deep debt of gratitude which he owes to those *savants* of the East and particularly of the West who have given a warm reception to the book and furnished him with their valuable appreciation. The author also desires to return a grateful acknowledgment to the Board of Higher Studies in Philosophy composed of a body of those veteran scholars of philosophy presided over by that reputed Professor of Philosophy—Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, for selecting this work as a text book in philosophy for the M.A. students of the Calcutta University. It is gratifying to note that this recognition from such quarters amply shows that the interpretations which the book contains, though they may appear new, have the approval of the learned world. The author fervently hopes that the reading public will accord to this edition the same measure of sympathy which its predecessor gained.

Any suggestions for the improvement of the book in making it a more efficient help to the study of this difficult subject will be gratefully accepted.

SENATE HOUSE,
Calcutta University }
May, 1926.

KOKILESWAR BHATTA'CHA'RYYA.

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AUTHORITIES QUOTED :

ABBREVIATIONS

- ब० भा० — Brihadāranyaka-Bhāṣya
 छा० भा० — Chāndogya-Bhāṣya
 दे० भा० — Vedānta-Bhāṣya or Brahma-Sutra-Bhāṣya
 गी० मा० — Gītā-Bhāṣya
 प्र० भा० — Prasna-Bhāṣya
 तै० भा० — Taittiriya-Bhāṣya
 ऐ० भा० — Aitareya-Bhāṣya
 मा० भा० — Mandukya-Bhāṣya
 मा० का० भा० — Mandukya-Karika-Bhāṣya
 के० मा० — Kena-Bhāṣya
 के० भा० — Kena-Bhāṣya
 क० भा० — Katha-Bhāṣya
 ब० — Brihadāranyaka-Bhāṣya
 तै० भा० — Taittiriya-Bhāṣya
 ऐ० भा० — Aitareya-Bhāṣya
 ई० मा० — Isa-Bhāṣya
 मा० भा० — Mandukya-Bhāṣya (A'nandagiri)
 वे० — Vedānta-Bhāṣya
 मा० का० — Mandukya-Karika-Bhāṣya
 मु० भा० — Mundaka-Bhāṣya
 क० भा० — Katha-Bhāṣya
 श्वे० भा० — Śvetāśvatara-Bhāṣya
 उप० मा० — The Upadesa-Sahasri (Sankara's work)
 सत्प्रदीपिका — Sankara's work
 वाचस्पति — " "
 स्वामिनिरूपण — " "
 पञ्चदशी — Vidyāranya's work
 अद्वैतप्रकाश — " "
-

AN INTRODUCTION TO ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

ON BRAHMAN AS CREATOR

1 It is laid down in the Advaita System of philosophy that the *Prana-spandana*—the universally diffused vibratory Prana is the revelation of Brahma's 'nature' which involved the creative activity of Brahma. From this *Prana Spandana* or external nature (विषय), gradually, stages after stages, step by step, the human organisms with their external and internal elements (कार्य करण सघात) have been built up, as the last stage of the process of manifestation. Had there been no such revelation of the 'nature' of Brahma, we could not know its real nature, and it would remain for ever an abstract and remote being. That Brahma is a self conscious power (प्रज्ञानधनाख्य रूप) would have remained shut up from our knowledge.¹ Elsewhere, we find this

1 “स प्राणमसृजत। तत्र च आत्मचेतन्यज्योति सत्त्वदा अभिव्यक्तवत्” (उ° भा°, 4 4 2)। ‘नामादिप्राणानानि सचरोत्तरविशिष्टानि तत्त्वानि, अतितराश्च तेषामुत्कृष्टतमं भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं (कृ° भा°, 7 1 1) यदि हि नाम रूपे न व्याक्रियेते, तदा अस्यामनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं न प्रतिव्यायेत। यदा तु पुनः कार्यं करणात्मना

fact stated still more distinctly. It is stated that in order to reveal, by degrees, what she contains in herself, nature has gradually assumed the form of human organs—external and internal ;—so that she may, through these organs, reveal the infinite treasure she contains within her to the human selves.¹ The organs are merely the different phases of herself, which nature has assumed, and in which she is present herself. This description shows that the building up of the human organisms, or in other words, the evolution of the beings with their cognitive and active organs² through which the rational human beings become variously conscious of the external world and can act in diverse ways within it,—is the goal—is the final fulfilment, to reach which nature strives. Thus, Brahman has manifested itself as external nature, with a view to reveal to the human beings its own immense and infinite riches through her. The organisms of the different grades of beings³ are but the differentiations—

नाम-रूपे व्याकृते भवतः, तदा अस्य रूपं प्रतिख्यायितुं ” (ब° भा°, 2.5.19) ।
(कार्य = Physiological and करण = functional side of the organisms).

✓ There was the revelation of Brahman as the rarefied, universally diffused *Prāna-spandana* or *Sūtra*. It gradually became more and more integrated, and it differentiated into five classes of elements (पञ्चतन्मात्र), which became, as the result of combination in different proportions, gross (स्थूलभूत) out of which the organisms were built up in accordance with the inner ‘nature’ or स्वरूप of the individuals “इन्द्रियादीनां यत् स्वरूपधारणं, तत्तु ‘पारार्थ्येन’ निमित्तभूतेन, चैतन्यात्मकतमेव ”—गी° भा°, 13. 22).

¹ “ विषय-समान-जातीयं करणं मन्यते श्रुतिः । विषयस्यैव स्वात्मग्राहकत्वेन... स्वात्मविशेषप्रकाशकत्वेन संस्थानान्तराणि करणानि ” (ब° भा°, 2.4.11) ।

² “ विज्ञान-क्रियाशक्तिद्वयसंमूर्च्छितात्मा (जीवः) ”—This is the Rational and moral self (क्वा° भा°, 8.12.3).

³ The Individuals are classified under four typical divisions—स्वेदज, अग्नज, सङ्घिज्ज and जरायुज ।

it retains, behind them, its own unity or identity which it does not lose in them.

In the *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, the world, *i. e.*, the active common medium (प्राण-सन्धन) and the finite individuals—these two are called as the two *Prakritis* of God, and they are held to be eternal (नित्य). Sankara here remarks that unless the elements to be controlled by God are eternal, God the controller of these two would himself turn out to be non-eternal (अनित्य), and thus his 'God-hood' (ईश्वरत्व) would fall to the ground.¹ In the *Vedānta-Bhāṣya*, he calls ईश्वर to be eternal (नित्यसिद्ध), in several places.² The creative act of Brahman has also been declared as eternal (नित्य)—

✓ तस्य नित्य-सिद्धस्य ईश्वरस्य सृष्टि-स्थिति-संहति-विषयं
नित्यज्ञानं भवतीति ” (वे० भा०, 1.1.5)

That is to say, “ the idea, of creation and maintenance of everything in existence, is eternal in Brahman.” These gradually-revealed *nāma-rupas* (नाम-रूपस) have also been declared to be the ‘ object ’ to which Brahman stands related as the ‘ subject. ’—

“ किं पुनस्तत् ‘ कर्म ’ यत् प्रागुक्तं तौ ईश्वरज्ञानस्य ‘ विषयो ’ भवतीति ?
...नामरूपे...व्याचिकीर्षिते इति ब्रूमः ” (वे० भा०, 1.1.5).

And कर्त्ता pervades its कर्मस—the latter are taken up into the life of the former—not simply isolated. They are permeated by the action of कर्त्ता ।

/ In the face of such distinct and unmistakable expressions, how can the revealed differences (changes) be severed

✓ “ नित्येश्वरत्वात् ईश्वरस्य तत्-प्रकृत्योरपि युक्तं नित्यत्वेन भवितु ” (गी० भा०, 13.19).

² Vide वे० भा०, 4.4.17, 18, 21, etc., etc.

altogether from the underlying Brahman, making it a "remote, difference less being?"

3 In the commentaries of Sankara, the Nāma-rūpa (नाम रूपा)—the evolving and emerging changes—are always described as *accompanied* by the underlying causal Power, i.e., Brahman

Brahman—not a solitary and remote being, but ever present behind its manifestations

"Whenever and wherever the changes emerge, they can never emerge *separated* or detached from their underlying Atmā or Brahman"—

‘यदा नाम रूपे जायते, तदा नाम रूपे चावगच्छापविर्भावः,
ब्रह्मोपविभक्तं द्वैतत्वे, सत्त्वादिब्रह्मासु जायते’।

“न हि चात्मनोऽद्यत तत्-प्रविभक्तद्वैतत्वात् भूतं भवतु भविष्य
वस्तु विद्यते” (ते° भा., 2.6।

i.e., “Nothing can be there, *separated* from the Brahman’s ‘nature’—either in time or in space”

“चेत्तदावतिरेकेष्वेव हि कलाः जायमानास्तिस्रस्तु प्रतीयमानाश्च गम्यदा
मृत्युमे” (प्र° भा., 6.2)।

“When the *kalas*, i.e., the emerging differences or changes are created, are maintained in existence, and then will merge in their final end—they do so *not separated* from the underlying *chaitanya*, i.e., the ‘nature’—*svrūp* of the self”—

Again—

“All the emergent effects or changes are never *severed* from their underlying cause on which they stand. When they emerge and are sustained in existence after their emergence,—they are always grounded in the underlying *sat* (सत्) or the Causal Power”—

“ प्रजाः न केवलं सम्भूताः एव, इदानीमपि स्थितिकानि सदायतनाः सदाग्रया
एव ” (छा° भा°, 6.8.4) ।

“ Can घट, *viz.*, a transformed state of मृत्तिका stand even for a moment, if severed or disconnected from clay, from the underlying मृत्तिका ?—

“ यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभो भवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृढः, यथा घटादीनां
मृदा ” (व° भा°, 1.6.1) “ what is produced by something remains inseparably connected with it ; it cannot be separated out of it.”

If such be the case ; if under all circumstances, the emergent changes, the náma-rupas, are found to be accompanied by their underlying causal reality, and if this causal reality maintains its unity in the successive changes,—it follows that the underlying Brahman, which is the source of all these varieties of the evolving changes, can never be looked upon as *purely* transcendent and as unrelated to, and cut off from, these changes.

In the Vedānta, Brahman, as well as the finite individuals are held to have a ‘ nature ’—a स्वरूप, of their own. This ‘ nature ’ or स्वरूप of Brahman or of the individual beings, is never, in the Bhāṣyas, regarded as a *solitary* nature standing *alone* on its own account, remote from, and unrelated to, the emerging states and activities produced from that nature. It is always looked upon as *adhīsthāna* (अधिष्ठान)¹ because it has a ‘ nature,’ a ‘ character ’ of its own which *sustains* all.

¹ “ चैतन्यस्य एकत्वेन, नित्यत्वात् जगद्भिन्नत्वेन, तस्य ‘ अधिष्ठान ’ लोपपत्तेः ” (आनन्दगिरि) । “ न च असतोऽधिष्ठानत्वं आरीपितानुवेधाभावात् ” (मा° भाष्ये, आ° गिरि, ३३२) । “ यस्य यत्-सम्बन्धितया वर्त्तमानं तत्—‘ सत् ’—9.19 गी° ” “ सर्वानुस्यूतस्यापि असङ्गस्वभावतया निर्विशेषत्वं ” (उप° साह°, 8.3) । “ सद्बुद्धानुवृत्तेः सत्ताऽनिवृत्तिरिति ”—इत्यादि (छा° भा°, 6.2.1) । अधिष्ठान = sustaining ground.

† It is indeed true that sometimes, the prior condition—*मायवस्था*—of the world, where then were supposed to be no changes as yet created or emerged, has been described, and Brahman has also been described as standing alone, without a second, during that condition. And this apparently solitary being, *viz.*, Brahman has sometimes been likened, in the Bhāṣya, to the individual self during its dream-less sleep (*सुषुप्तवस्था*) when all its states and activities disappear in the self, and the self thus stands *alone*, as it were, at that time. Now, it may be asked, what explanation can be suggested to clear off this situation. Apparently this is a condition described in the Sankara-Bhāṣya, where the *pure* transcendence of the self or of Brahman—cut off from all relations with the world—seems to be made quite evident.

OUR ANSWER TO THIS ENQUIRY IS TWO-FOLD —

- (i) Firstly. When the dream-less state of the finite self is described, it will be seen that the self is not actually *solitary* or *alone* even during this condition. Sankara tells us that the self is not an 'empty subject' even then. The subject has for its 'object,' during that condition, the presence and operation of the *Prāṇa* (*प्राणशक्तिः*). When the action of the external environment upon our sense organs ceases to operate, during the time when we fall asleep, there are no functions of the organs excited. In the absence of these, our mind (*manas*) also ceases to act. Necessarily, all the external and internal functions, says Sankara, merge in the *Prāṇa*—the source of all kinds of activities of the human

Prāṇa-sakti—never absent from the finite self and—

organism.¹ All activities lie latent in the Prána now. This latent प्राणशक्ति, though its functions as differentiated in time and space-orders have ceased, is actually present within the organism, as is evidenced by the heat of the body and the other actions during our dream-less sleep.

The self is not solitary and alone even now. It controls the Prána-sakti ("प्राणाच्च"). When we again wake up, all the latent activities of this Prána will again go on, as before, as soon as they are elicited from the Prána by the actions of the external environment upon our sense-organs. This emergence again of these activities proves the presence of the Prána within our organism during our sleep.²

Similar is the condition of Brahman when the varieties of the changes of Náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) are merged in the universally existent *prána-spandana* or *sutra* (vibratory tremor of the diffuse Prána); and this Prána is the source of all subsequently developed activities emerging after the creation. It appears there-

never absent from
Brahman also.

fore that this Prána-sakti or the नाम-रूप-शक्ति was *existent in Brahman during the प्रागवस्था, i.e., at the time of first manifestation (after the last pralaya).* Thus we find that Brahman was not *alone* or solitary even then. Sankara took sufficient care to observe—

“आत्मस्थे अनभिव्यक्ते नाम-रूपे” ।—

i.e., the नाम-रूप—the root-cause of all differentiations existed in Brahman; and it was an 'object' in relation to

¹ “देहे चैतात्मक-जीवनहेतुत्वं प्राणशक्ति 'आयुश्च-निर्द्देशः' (वे० भा०, रत्नप्रभा)।

² “मनन-दर्शनात्मकानां चलनात्मकानाञ्च 'क्रियासामान्यमात्रे' प्राणोऽन्तर्भावः” (वृ० भा०)। “दर्शन-श्रवणे एव हि मनः-स्पन्दिते, तदभावे ह्येव अविशेषेण प्राणात्मना अवस्थानं...वीजात्मकत्वं सपरित्यज्यैव प्राणशब्दत्वं सतः” (सांका० भाष्य १)।

which Brahman was described as its 'subject' Brahman was, therefore, not alone and solitary and objectless, even then to show the presence of this Prāṇa śakti in Brahman, the Katha-bhāṣya thus expresses the idea —

"As in an almost imperceptible tiny seed of a fig-tree, its final end, viz., the immense and gigantic tree itself is existent as a *future-power* (बोद्धव्यं), so in the 'nature' of Brahman is interwoven the subsequently developed world with all its varieties, as a latent *future power*! Otherwise, the changes or differences are to be imagined to have been produced out of nothing (चमत्) "

‘ अथ च भवत्य जगती बोद्धव्यं च व्याजत नाम-रूपमस्य सञ्ज्ञका’
कारणं तन्नि समाहारं रूपं परमात्मनि चातमात भावेन समाहितं,
वटकदिकार्यानि च वदोक्तं तन्नि ’ (कठ भा०, १ ११) ।

In the Chāndogya-Bhāṣya also, the presence of this nāma-rupa (नाम रूप) in Brahman and its control by Brahman are beautifully expressed thus—

"Brahman is distinguished from the nāma-rupa contained within it, and *untouched* by it, but yet it controls its activities"—

त नाम रूपं यस्य ब्रह्मणो मध्ये वर्तते यत् नामरूपायामसूतं
नाम रूपं विनश्यत् तद्यपि तयोर्भिन्नीकृतं च लक्ष्यं ब्रह्म ’

(चान् भा०, ४ १११) ।

१ "इदमेव जगत् प्रागवस्थायां बोधगतवस्थं च अज्ञतवस्थोऽयं" (चान् भा०, १ १२) । ' प्रत्येकं सञ्ज्ञकार्थं करणगतोर्नाम सवस्थानमभ्युपगम्य, शक्तिरूपस्य नियतनिष्ठायाः (कठ० भा०, चान् गिति) । 'प्राण चेदा'—is a distinguishing property of ॥ चतन (चान् भा०, ३ ३५३) ।

Exactly similar observations occur in the Vedānta-Bhāṣya also.¹ We find then that Brahman has nowhere been really described as a *solitary* being without anything for it to control, *i.e.*, as 'object-less' or 'difference-less subject.'

(ii) We shall now come to our second answer—

The individual self, according to Sankara, has a distinct 'nature' or स्वरूप of its own, and this स्वरूप cannot be resolved into its states and activities evoked from it through its interaction with the external environment. This nature or स्वरूप maintains its unity or identity in all its evolved changes or states. Brahman too, in this system of philosophy, has a distinct 'nature' or स्वभाव of its own, and this स्वभाव maintains its unity, as distinguished from the infinite varieties of the changes of nāma-rupa (नाम-रूप)—ever evolving from this स्वभाव.² The importance of this truth cannot be too highly emphasised. Most people are liable to resolve this unity into the visible multiplicity of the changing states and to take the aggregate of the states to be the only self. It is therefore necessary to impress the mind of the seekers of truth with this great principle, so that the people may not forget this स्वरूप of their own, as well as of Brahman itself,—as underlying all the diversities of the changes.

During our dreaming and waking states, our real 'nature' or स्वरूप becomes utterly obscured by our

¹ "ईश्वरस्य आत्मभूते इव...नामरूपे...मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति च अभिलष्येते । ताभ्या 'मन्यः' सर्वज्ञः ईश्वरः " (वे° भा°, 2.1.14).

² "नहि उपाधियोगादपि अन्यादृश्यः वस्तुनोऽन्यादृश्यः 'स्वभावः' सम्भवति " (वे° भा°, 3.2.11) । "तदव्यक्तमनिन्द्रियग्राह्यं—सर्वदृश्य-साचित्वात्" (3.2.23) । "उपाधिभूतेषु सविशेषा इव अवभासन्ते, न च 'स्वाभाविकौ' अविशेषात्मतां जहति (3.2.25) ।

to detect the presence of this 'nature' unaffected by the changes, when the diversities of náma-rupa (नामरूप) perpetually work, as at present. The सुषुप्तावस्था of the individual self and the प्रागवस्था of the world both help us in easily detect-

Prior state of world and *susupta* state of finite self—meant to show the 'nature' of Brahman and self respectively.

ing the presence of the 'nature' or स्वरूप of both the individual self and Brahman respectively, and in becoming convinced of a unity amidst diversity.

It has been thought advisable, on account of this very difficulty, to select or rather to imagine a condition of the world when the changes as yet did not appear to emerge, but just on the point of emerging into the view. This condition is named as *Prágabasthá* (प्रागवस्था) of the world. It would be far easier to grasp the undisturbed true nature (स्वरूप) of Brahman in the absence of any emerging changes or विकारः. (During the प्रागवस्था, there is no possibility to resolve the nature of Brahman into, and to identify it with, the empirical changes—taking the aggregate of these changes to be the only reality.) It is for this that we find the प्रागवस्था (*Prágabasthá*) of the world described in the commentaries of Sankara. Its real purpose is not to show that there can ever be a state when Brahman can exist *without* any differences, as a *solitary* being self-sufficient without the created world—an object-less subject. To imply this fact, the náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) has been expressly stated, in the beginning of the Vedānta-bhāṣya, as the 'विषय' or the 'object' of Brahman—the 'subject.'¹ It

¹ "किं पुनस्तत्कर्म, यत्प्रागुक्तं: ईश्वरज्ञानस्य 'विषयो' भवति?...नामरूपे व्याप्तिकीर्षिते इति ब्रूमः" (६० भा०, 1.1.5)। "तत् दर्शनस्य विषयो भवति—कर्मतामापद्यते इति। तत् कथं कर्मभूतंसत्, कर्तृस्वरूपदृष्टिविशेषणं स्यात्?...कर्म हि कर्तृक्रियया व्याप्यमानं भवति; अन्यच्च व्याप्यं, अन्यत्व्यापकं; न तेनैव तद्व्याप्यते" (६० भा०, 4.4.6)।

is therefore an erroneous attempt to interpret Brahman as 'object-less,' as Dr Paul Deussen has done in his *Philosophy of the Upanishads*. This Prior state or *avasthā* has been chosen to show that Brahman has a 'nature' of its own and this nature must be existent *prior* to its manifestations and that Brahman is not an 'abstraction.'

That Brahman in its own character is invariably to be found *present* behind all the changes of the world and that the latter can never exist without the underlying Brahman—is everywhere repeatedly

Illustration of the above fact from *brahmasūtra*

shown in the commentaries of Sankara. How carefully and beautifully the above fact is stated will appear from the following passages which we have selected with a view to support what has been stated in the preceding page.

In the *Māndūkyā-bhāṣya*, in describing the nature of the Transcendental (॥१॥) Brahman, Sankara states—

(1) If, it may be asked, Brahman is to be taken as something which lies *below* / what has been manifested in the world, if it be *apart* from all changes, all states, all actions which are visible in the empirical world,—then it necessarily follows that no speech, no language, no word can describe its nature, in as much as the speech, the word and the language are included in the manifested things of the world. Then go a step further. That which cannot be expressed by a word, to which no thoughts—no words can be applied,—we may very well take that to be a non-entity, a mere void (॥२॥) Raising this objection, Sankara thus meets it—'No, Brahman is not a void, never a non-entity. Brahman always *underlies* the changes and sustains them. All manifestations come out from that underlying sustaining ground. The ground which gives support to these changes and constantly sustains them cannot prove to be a mere void or non-entity

It must have a positive nature of its own. Even when a snake, a silver, a mirage appears to arise,—all these appearances are invariably found to be supported, in each case, by a sustaining ground upon which they appear, *viz.*, a rope, an oyster, and the surface of a desert; unsupported by which, these appearances cannot for a moment stand. Hence the Brahman's 'nature' is the sustaining ground of all changes, all manifestations,—in the absence of which the latter cannot stand, cannot live. If the sustaining ground is held to be a non-entity,—nothing; then, can mere 'nothing' give birth to the positive things of the world? ¹

- ✓ (ii) Our life begins with our *experiences*. These experiences are of two kinds. Those which we experience in our waking state and those which are experienced in our dream. All our experiences are various, successive, and they change their aspects always. But underlying these changing experiences and unaffected by them, there is our true self which experiences them as they arise. This self is the sustaining ground of all our experiences, in the absence of which the latter cannot stand and operate. The experiences are, as noted above, successive, multiple in their nature and transitory. But the underlying self which lives in them and sustains them is a unity and it maintains its identity unaffected by these changing experiences. Our self is in touch with the transcendental (तुरीय) Brahman, which is our real self.

¹ “ सर्वशब्दप्रवृत्ति-निमित्तशून्यत्वात्, तस्य शब्दानभिधेयत्वमिति, विशेषप्रतिषेधेनैव ‘तुरीयं’ निर्दिष्टमिति ।..... शून्यमेव तर्हि ? तन्न । मिथ्याविकल्पस्य निनिमित्तानुपपत्तेः । न हि रजत-सर्प-पुरुष-भृगुलणिकादि विकल्पाः शक्तिका-रञ्जु-स्थाणूषरादिव्यतिरेकेण अवस्थास्यदाः शक्याः कल्पयितुं । एवं तर्हि प्राणादिसर्वविकल्पास्पदत्वं तुरीयरू ” (मा^० भा^०, 1. 7).

There is no other way left to us to comprehend the nature of the self, except as the sustaining ground of our experiences, through which that nature realises or expresses itself. It cannot be a non-entity.¹

No further quotation is necessary. These will suffice to prove the position of Sankara. From what has been stated above, it is evident that Brahman is regarded in the Vedānta, as perpetually present and operative, as an inexhaustible source, *behind* the changes or transformations evolving from it. It is thus intimately related to the nāma-rūpa, the vikāras or changes, as their ever-present ground and controller. It is therefore impossible to regard Brahman as *remote* and *solitary* and as an 'abstract void.' And as the creation is perpetually going on—

“मादायि बहुभवं प्रयोजन निरतम्” (६^० भा^०)—

and newer and newer differences are emerging continuously,

“उत्तरीतर-सर्वकथ्येषु” (गी^०)—

how can these be *separated* from Brahman, making Brahman a difference-less abstract?

5. The conclusions we have drawn above will appear more clearly if we show how in the Sankara-Vedānta the production of this world, of nāma-rūpa, from the Nirgun Brahman, and the relation subsisting between them have been described. The observations made by Sankara in this connection are of immense value for a clear

¹ “आयदादिभ्यानेषु एक एवायमात्मा इत्यव्यभिचारो यः प्रत्यय, तेन अनुसरणीयं ...सुरीयं ब्रह्म ।...निर्विशेषे एव आत्मनि सुखित्वादि-विशेषाः कल्पिताः । आत्मा एतेषु अनुगत, सर्वत्र अव्यभिचारात्” (भा^० भा^०, 1. 7) । “वाक्यस्यैव आत्मनः सुरीयत्वेन प्रतिपिपादयिषितत्वात्” ।

comprehension of the [✓]Máyá-theory of Sankara. We have therefore thought fit to elaborate the idea of Sankara in these respects here.

(1) In an important passage occurring in the Bháśya on the Taittiriya Upanishad, (Brahman is defined as Sámánya) (सामान्य)—
Being (सत्) and Non-being (असत्) i.e., as the universal.

सामान्यं हि ब्रह्म ।

अपीदसर्वविशेषत्वात्...सर्वसामान्यत्वाच्च ब्रह्मणः (तै° भा°, 2.6.)

This universal, this Sámánya is the idea of Being in general, pure being—सत्। It is obtained by abstracting from all specific determinations (विशेष) whatever. We are to think its Being which it has in common with every other object of the world (सर्वसामान्यत्वात्)। This being has no specific determinations, for we have abstracted from all determinations (अपीदसर्वविशेषत्वात्)। As it is the absence of everything of all determinations, it is undetermined. Apart from its Being, its “isness” (सत्ता), it has no character. It is pure “is,” without any further determinations. This being, this “isness,” cannot be removed; for in that case, Sankara points out, it would be pure nothing, it would lose its nature altogether. ¹

But a doubt may arise that what is devoid of all determinations is merely a non-existent thing—

तस्मात् विशेषतोऽग्रहणात् नास्तीति ?—(तै° भा°, 2.6.)

Sankara resolves this doubt by remarking that as Brahman is the Cause (कारण), it cannot be said to be non-existent. In the Vedanta, Brahman, the Universal, the

¹ सर्वविशेषरहितोऽपि जगतो मूलमस्यैव, कार्यप्रविलापनस्य अस्तित्वनिष्ठत्वात्।
(—कठ° भा°)। परिशिष्यमाने कस्मिंश्चिद्भावे अवकल्याते, गूढवादप्रसङ्गात्...
अन्यथा निरात्म्यदत्वात् नोपलभ्यते—(वे° भा°, 3.2.25.)

Being—is held to be the *Cause* of the world. It has no other cause beyond it, is its own cause¹. And as a cause, it is not determined by something else (अन्य), but it determines itself, the whole of its determinations rises out of its own resources. Hence it is not undetermined, it is self determined. All determinations can therefore be removed, excepting “isness”, for, Brahman being the Cause of the Universe, this cause underlies hidden behind this universe².

Now, as Brahman is held to be the cause of the universe, the universe is produced out of it. It is a fixed tenet of the Vedānta that prior to their production, the effects (कार्य), the nāma rūpas—existed in the cause. But in what form the effects, the differences of Nāma rūpa, existed in Brahman? Did the actual diversities of Nāma rūpa, the actual determinations (विशेष) exist in the cause? No, there was not yet any differentiation, there was as yet no separation of nāma-rupa into space and time³. Within the Being (सत्), no differences have yet disclosed themselves (अनभिव्यक्ते नामरूपे): There was nothing to distinguish the जगत् from Brahman in that stage. Differentiations were all implicit, hidden

¹ यथाय जायते किञ्चित् तदस्तीति दृष्ट लोके । आकाशादिकारणत्वात् ब्रह्मण, न नास्ति ब्रह्म—(न^० भा^०, 26।) न च असतो जात किञ्चित् गृह्यते लोक काव्यम् ।

² ब्रह्मण ‘सत्ता नचथ स्वभाव आकाशादिषु अनुवभमानो दृष्ट —वे^० भा^०, असतयत् नामरूपादिकाव्ये निरामकत्वान्नोपलभ्येत—ते^० भा^०, 26

³ ‘आरमभ्ये अनभिव्यक्ते नामरूपे व्याक्रियते । अव्याकृतनामरूपे आत्मभ्ये अनगतेन आत्मना व्याक्रियेत’—ते^० भा^०, 26 । सञ्चभावानाञ्च तेनाविभक्तदेश कालत्वात् कालाकाशादिकारणत्वाच्च” (21) ।

The जगत् existing in Brahman prior to its manifestation is called in भा^० भा^० as प्राण्यज्जि or बीजज्जि । Sankara here says that the qualitative

in सत्; differentiations were all inseparably, indistinguishably, blended in Brahman. Sankara has very beautifully described this condition by illustrations—

मधुनि रसवत्, घृते साधुर्यवत्, स सुद्रप्रविष्टनद्यादिवच्च
नखले मरीचिवत्—एकीभवन्ति विवेकानहंत्वमविशेषतां
गच्छन्ति (सुषुप्त-प्रलययोः) ¹

—प्रश्न° भा°, 4.1.


But, it may be asked, if there were, in that stage, no differentiations of Náma-rūpa, if there were no specific determinations yet appearing in the सत्, if जगत् could not be separated from Brahman, if there was nothing to distinguish náma-rūpas from Brahman,—may not the universe be called non-existent in that condition? How do you know that náma-rūpa, जगत्—existed in Brahman? In fact, there are passages in the श्रुति itself where the universe, prior to its production, is called as असत्—non-existent.—

असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् ।

असदासीत् ततः सृजयत । (तै° उप०, 2.7.)

How do you know then that जगत् existed in the Being ?

differences exist blended in Brahman; otherwise the differences could not issue from it afterwards. आनन्दगिरि remarks here—“सर्वस्य कार्यप्रपञ्चस्य...एकसूचित्वं न वास्तवं, पुनर्यथापूर्वं विभागायोग्यत्वात्” (मा° भा°, आग° प्र°, 5) In वेदा° भाष्य, 2.1.9, this बीजशक्ति is called अज्ञानप्रतिवद्धा विभागशक्ति (Power of potential distinction). This is साया, the potential बीज existing hidden in Brahman. It is objective, not merely subjective.

 ¹ As the sweetness existing in honey cannot be separated from it; as the flavour exists indistinguishably blended in the clarified butter (घृत); as the different rivers flowing into the ocean exist there with their differences merged, etc., etc. So all differences exist in Brahman inseparably and indistinguishably merged in it. There is yet no separation of the नामरूप from ब्रह्म । Under no circumstances, नामरूप can remain separated—divided—from the underlying cause (Brahman).

universal, the being, the *sat*, as totally *excluding* all determinations, for it had its own differentiations implicitly present in it. Because it contained the *अगत* in it it has become possible for the *अगत* to come out from it.

Now, we shall see how the *अगत*, how the diversities of *Nāma-rūpa* came out—

“एक बीज बहुधा य करोति” (वे० उ०) ।

The Being distinguishes itself from itself and becomes its *other*. The unity suffers self differentiation into diversity.

As the differentiations come out, there is some *distinction*, some *वैलक्षण्य* which now appears.¹ For Sankara remarks—

अव्यक्तसादृश्ये प्रकृतिविकारोऽहं दमसङ्ग ।—गहि

असति अतिशये प्रकृतिविकारताव इति भवति (वे० भा० 216 & 239)

“प्रकृति विकारयो भेदेन व्यपदिशतः”—(वे० 2127)

It was simply *कारण* before, now the *कारण* comes out in the form of *कार्य*.² And this *कार्याकार* is the *other* of the *कारण*.

¹ Vide Vedānta Bhaṣya, 216 and also 2211 where some *वैलक्षण्य* of this *अगत* from its cause *कारण* (ब्रह्म) has been established. In another way this *वैलक्षण्य* has been shown by Sankara when he describes the relation between *कार्य* and *कारण* in वे० भा० 21 where *कारण* is described as *अव्य* from the effect.

² ‘कार्याकारिणः कारणं व्यवस्थापयतः कारकव्यापारस्य अर्थवत्त्वमायाति (वेदा० भा० 2118). But in the case of Brahman, *कारकव्यापार* is not necessary of निमित्तान्तरानपेक्षात्, अचरात्, सम्भवति (सु० भा० 117). कारकभेदाभावेऽपि प्रवृत्तिर्दर्शयतः—हंभा० 2120। परिपुण्यशक्तिस्तु ब्रह्म—अनपेक्ष्य वाच्य साधनं स्वयमेव परिणमते—वे० भा० 2124

There was सामान्य (universal) before, now विशेषावस्था (particulars) comes out.¹ And this विशेषावस्था is the *opposite* of the सामान्य.²

It is well-known that all determinations are regarded by Sankara as negations.³

The कारण therefore produces its own *negations* from it which it contained within it.

We find therefore that the Being or Brahman produces its other, its opposite, its negation from it. In this way there is, according to Sankara, some distinction, some वेलक्षण, some भेद, between the cause and its effect.⁴

¹ सामान्याद्धि विशेषा उत्पद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते, मृदादेः घटादयः—वे० भा० 2.3.9. “...अपास्तविशेषं सामान्यात्मकं कारणं विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानं 2.1.15, and also तदेव तु द्रव्यं विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानं कार्यं नाम अभ्युपगम्यते, 2.3.8 ।

² व्याकृतनामरूप-विशेष-विपरीतं (opposite) अविकृतं ब्रह्म (वे० भा० 2.7 ।

³ It is remarkable that here in this point there is complete agreement between Sankara and Hegel. Determinations are विशेषण, and विशेषण operates by negation (निवर्तक, व्यावर्तक) । We quote the whole passage from Sankara-bhasya :

यदा हि अनेकानि द्रव्यानि एकजातीयानि अनेकविशेषणयोगीनि, तदा विशेषणस्य अर्थवत्त्वं । विशेष्यं विशेषणान्तरं व्यभिचरत् विशेष्यते, यथा नीलञ्च रक्तञ्च उत्पलम् । समानजातीयेभ्य एव निवर्तकानि (negations) विशेषणाणि (determination) विशेष्यस्य । तद्विपरीत-धर्मवद्भ्यो विशेष्येभ्यः ब्रह्मणो विशेष्यस्य नियन्त्रित्वम्—ते० भा० 2.1 ।

“To determine a thing is to limit it, to cut it off from some sphere of being. To say that a thing is green limits it by cutting it from the sphere of red, blue and other coloured things. The differentia (विशेषण) is that which carves out a particular class from the general class, by negating, excluding, the other species. Whatever is said of a thing *denies* something else of a thing. All determination is therefore negation.” (W. T. Stace.)

⁴ Sankara shows there is some अतिशय, some आधिक्य, some new element appearing in the effect (कार्यं) . cf. ‘जीवनादधिकं’ आकुञ्चन-प्रसारणादिकमपि कार्यान्तरं निवर्तते (वे० भा० 2.1.20). Also ‘कारणावस्थ’

As the Being (सत्) splits into particulars, as the Being, of its own accord (संख्य), by its own act, has undergone self-differentiation into diversity in which it manifests itself, it is *now* सत् and something more; it is *now* सत् and diversity of nāma-rūpa.¹ The universal is therefore inflated² with a determination, a difference, a negative element—nothing. This is the particular (विशेष or विशद). The being, the universal, the सत्—as determined by particularity and difference appears as the universe. It is evident from these that Sankara did not altogether deny distinction or भेद between the cause and its effect.³

But is this distinction an *absolute* distinction?

The particulars and determinations which are produced are, in reality, not utterly and absolutely different,

‘अव्युत्थ’ (undeveloped) सत्... व्युत्थ’ (Developed) ‘व्युत्थ’ सद्भावे (वि० भा० 21.10). In explaining “वदन्त्यो प्रजापतेः,” Vidyaranya, thus remarks—“प्रकल्पेन जनिः सत्ता। ‘प्रकर्षा’ नाम पूर्वोक्ता ‘दाधिरा’। अधिका न या, सा माया” (चतुर्भूति प्रकाश)। There is thus some new element, some *अधिरा*, some *lift* in the कार्य। Hence there is *भेदव्यवस्था*; i.e., it is distinct from the cause. It appears therefore that सद्भर has not altogether abolished the भेद। भेद is there, but it is not ultimate and absolute.

¹ कदा ‘सदेव’दमासीदिति सत्यमेव ? अये, जगतः प्रागुत्पत्तेः। किं न इदानीं सदीदमदिव ? इदानीमपीदं सदेव, किञ्च नामरूप-विशेषवदितदंश-वृद्धि-विषययेति इदं च भवतीति। प्रागुत्पत्तेस्तु—केवलमव्युत्थ-वृद्धिमप्यनेवेति—
छा० भा०, ०21.

Also ‘प्रागुत्पत्तेः’ अव्याहतनामरूपभेदम्... आग्रे कश्चिद्-प्रत्यय-गोचरं जगत् ; इदानीं व्याहत-नामरूप-भेदत्वात्, अनेक-गण-प्रत्ययगोचरं आग्रे कश्चिद् प्रत्यय गोचरश्च इति विशेषः” छ० भा०, 1. 1.

² Cf. ब्रह्म—उपचीयते, उत्पादयिष्यति जगत्, अद्वैतमिव बोध—‘उत्पन्नता’ गच्छति।—प्र० भा०

³ The distinction is there, but it is not absolute and ultimate. See further on.

absolutely and utterly other (अन्य), from the Being (सत्) । Sankara observes that it is our Avidyā—अविद्या—which sees absolute distinction, absolute separation and opposition between the cause and the effect, between the विषयी and विषय । Avidyā looks upon the diversities of nāma-rupa, the effects, the जगत्—as absolutely different, as absolutely separate (अन्य) from Brahman.¹ Sankara has thus characterised the अविद्या—

जागरिते स्वप्ने वा 'अन्यदिव' आत्मनो, 'वस्तुन्तर'मिव
अविद्यया प्रत्युपस्थापितं भवति ।.....असति
आत्मनः 'प्रविभक्ते' वस्तुन्तरे, असति च आत्मनि
ततः 'प्रविभक्ते' अन्यः अन्यत् पश्येत्—(व° भा° 4 3.3.)
न चासा 'वन्त्यः' ब्रह्मविद आत्मकामस्य अस्ति । ²

Sankara has repeatedly shown that it is not possible and proper at all to *separate* nāma-rūpas, the particulars,

from Brahman, and to regard them as *एक*, as so many self-sufficient independent entities. There is distinction, but also identity.¹

Sankara thus brings out the identity, the non-separation (*अनन्यता*) between the universal and the particular:—

It is Brahman, the Universal, the Being, which evolves all its determinations and differences of *nāma-rūpa* out of the depth of its own being; what it has put forth from itself is only itself. (For, it is the Being which distinguishes itself from itself and appears as its other. In putting forth its own particular, it has not lost itself, nor has it become something else (*अन्य*).) For, its other, its opposite, is only itself, as Sankara declares—

‘नदि विमेषदङ्गेनमतिव ‘ब्रह्मसत्त्वं’ भवति

...‘स एवेति’ प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्’ ।

काष्ठांकादीनि कारयन् ‘आत्मभूत’ एव ।

(वे० भा० 2.1.18)

It is the self-differentiation of the *कारण* itself² into its other, its opposite—

परमेश्वर एव तेन तेन आत्मना (*i.e.*, काष्ठांकारेण) अवतिष्ठमानः...

...एवमिति ।—(वे० भा०, 2.3.13).³

¹ But both are not of equal importance. We must cultivate the *अभेददृष्टि* even in our ordinary practical concerns of life (*व्यवहारिकावस्था*) ।

Cf. ‘एव विमेषो विदुषां, पश्यन्तोऽपि प्रपद्य संसारं, ‘पश्यता’त्मनो न पश्यन्’
—Sankara’s ‘व्याख्यानद्वयम्’ । *Cf.* भेदज्ञानस्य सत्यम् आमेन बाधितत्वात्

(वे० भा०, 2.1.23).

² “स्वात्माऽप्यतिरिक्ता एव प्रभवति”—सु० भा०, 1.1.6.

³ एक एव अवस्थानान्तरयोगात् अमेकमद्वयव्यभाक्भवति । (2. 2. 17, वे० भा०) ।

Hence, in passing out into its opposite, it remains *identical with itself* (स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्)। As it has put forth its opposite from itself, the Being (सत्) remains, even in its opposite, *identical with itself*. It is the कारण itself which embodies itself in particular shapes—

“अपास्तविशेषं ‘कारणमेव’ तत्तद्विशेषवदवस्थापनं

‘कार्यं’ संज्ञां लभते” ।—वे० भा०, 2.3.7.

Hence the कारण finds in its own कार्य—not an *alien other*, but its own very being (कारणमेव)। For, the कार्य is, in reality, no other but the mere form, the guise, the shape, which the कारण *itself* has assumed for its own manifestation—

कारणस्य ‘संस्थानमात्र’ मिदं कार्यं (वे० भा०, 2.2.17.)

It follows therefore that the *other* is only itself; part of कारण; the manifestation of its nature¹; it is, in reality, only *itself*—

न कार्यं नाम कारणाद्व्यतिरिक्तं नस्ति किञ्चित् ।

—ह० भा०, 1.6.1.

It is the universal itself which has gone forth into its particular. In passing from one to the other, nothing has been added from outside; new material has been put forth from the womb of the being itself.

Hence, the universal sunders itself into its particularity, yet remains universal. Hence, the distinction which it gives rise to is no distinction. Therefore the world is at bottom no other than Brahman.² Therefore the universal,

¹ Cf. ‘आत्मस्वरूपावगमाय च आकाशादि अन्नमयान्तं कार्यं’ प्रदर्शितं (टि० 2.6)। “दर्शयति च सृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थतां, वे० भा०, (1.4.14) न चास्मा ‘वच्यः ब्रह्मविदः आत्मकामस्य अस्ति’—ह० भा०।

² “आत्मानं ‘आत्मानन्तरत्वेन’ जगद्गुणेण परिणमयामास”—ऐ० भा०। The Universe is nothing but the आत्मा in reality. This is पारमार्थिक दृष्टि। Cf ‘निखिलं दृग्गविशेषं, दृग् पत्वेन पश्यतां विदुषां’—Sankara, ‘स्वात्मनिर्दूषण’।

while going forth out of itself, yet all the while abides unchanged within itself.

“एक”मिव द्रव्यं तेन तेन ‘विशिष्यतेन’ “अनेक” मय-
 द्रव्यभाक् भवति.....द्रव्यात्मकता गुदसं ।—वे०, 2.2.17.

The true **कारण** is therefore *identical* in all its diverse forms, which remains hidden behind (**कार्याकारणं निरोदितम्**) ।

Under the influence of **अविद्या**, we absolutely separate and thus forget or ignore this underlying being and take the mere forms as so many independent objects—as **मृत्पिण्ड**, **कपान्**, **घट**, etc. But the one **मत्ता** (being) which is identical in all its diversity of forms, as **एत**, is not itself any single individual thing or phenomenon. The ‘multiplicity’ is not therefore something different (**अन्य**) or separate altogether from the ‘unity.’

We find from this discussion that there is distinction as well as identity or more properly, *identity in difference*, between the **कार्य** and the **कारण** ।

Sankara has therefore concluded thus—

✓ “समस्य विवक्ष्यते”.....अचरात् सम्भवति...समत् जगत्” (सु० 1.1.6.

Elsewhere we find him remarking that every finite individual object is a compound of *two factors*—**सत्** and **असत्**;

1 Vide also मायूकभाष्य, गौड० कारिका, 6 Sloka.

* In Vedānta Dhasya where Sankara shows the relation between **कार्य** and **कारण**, he shows the *distinction* between them by holding **कारण** to be **अन्य** from the **कार्य** । He has shown the *identity* between them by holding **कार्य** to be **अन्य** from the **कारण** । The reader should bear this in mind.

In वे० भा० 2.1.13, Sankara distinctly says that although the differences are non-different (**अन्य**) from their cause, still they remain—they are not abolished. “न च समुद्रादन्यत्वेपि...केनतरादीनां रतरतरभावावतिर्भवति ।...न च तेषां...अन्यत्वं भवति ।

of which सत् is abiding and constant, while असत् is ever-changing.¹ The readers will note that असत् does not mean here 'unreality.' What is variable;—the perpetually changing and succeeding forms—are called असत्. And what is constant amidst all these changing forms or appearances is called सत्.

These discussions unmistakably show that it is not at all possible for the जगत्, for the nāma-rupas to break loose from the कारण, i.e., from Brahman—

न तत एव 'निर्भिय' गृहीतुं शक्यते (ब्र° भा°, 2.4.7)²

The distinction of nāma-rupa is developed *within* the unity of the cause—

¹ विशेषाः सामान्ये अन्तर्भवन्ति ।—ब्र° भा°, 7.4.1.

सामान्यं विशेषान् आत्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन विभक्तिं ।—ब्र° भा°, 2.4.7.

Hence, under no circumstances, can the नामरूप be separated from Brahman and regarded as अन्य. As soon as they are separated, they become unreal, false—कदलीसमभवदसारं। It is in this sense alone, Sankara has called जगत् to be unreal. सदात्मना विकाराणां सत्यत्वं, सतोऽन्यत्वेन अमृतत्वं (ब्र° 6.6.2).

By ignoring or forgetting the Reality of the ever-constant, underlying, hidden, Brahman of which the process of the world is a gradual manifestation or appearance and by

¹ “सत्त्वं च वे बुद्धी सर्व्वरूपलभ्यते समानाधिकरणे...सन्धटः सन्धटः सन्धकीति । तद्योधंटाटि बुद्धिर्व्यभिचरति, नतु सद्बुद्धिः” (गीता° भा° 2.16) असत् is what changes—‘यदिपया बुद्धिर्व्यभिचरति’ तत् ‘असत्’। This is also called ‘अमृतं’। अमृतं means—‘यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं व्यभिचरत् ‘अमृत’ मित्युच्यते (ब्र° 2.1). It does not mean unreality.

² “यज्ञ यजिन् अन्तर्भवति, तत्तस्य व्यापकत्वात् ततो भूयो भवति” (ब्र° 7.3.1.) The effects are subsumed under their cause and are pervaded by it. It runs on into each of the effects.

severing the connection of *वस्तु* with the underlying Brahman, if you occupy yourself with merely *this continuous process*, imagining a sort of causal relation among the changing antecedents and consequents ¹ and a relation of means and end ² among them, it would be a futile and useless occupation on your part. For, you would take that to be real which is unreal, in as much as, severed from their connection with Brahman, the *nāma-rūpas* become at once *अव्यवहार्यः*—*unessential*.³ We cannot resist the temptation of quoting, with the permission of our readers, the beautiful lines in which Sankara has embodied this idea—

“...सर्वोक्तिः साध-साधन-व्यवहार-विद्या-कलात्मक
संज्ञानैव--सावि-कर्मवासनावदभिलाषा—अविद्योऽमरीच्युदो
मदीयोनः-सदोपममलकम्पः कदलीपत्रवद्वारः क्षिप्तमादा-
मरीच्यः-अप्रादिगमः । तदात्मस्त-दृष्टीनामविचोदमानो—
निवः शारवानिव नन्दते”—४ भा, 1 3.2

(2) In this connection, we now desire to place before our readers some very weighty observations made by Sankara while explaining the term *अनन्त*—Infinite, and showing its relation with the finite things of the world. These observations, properly understood, will

¹ विद्या-कलात्मकः । Elsewhere it is called ‘विद्या-कारक-कल व्यवहारः’ ।

² साध-साधन व्यवहारः ।

³ Cf. also “आत्मसत्त्वान् ‘अव्यक्त’...‘वस्त्वन्व’...अप्रमायामरीच्युदकसम-
मवारम्”—४ भा, 3.5. Also अप्रमरीच्युदकमात्रमव्यवहारसमत्वात्,
दृष्टमदृष्टरूपः”—गी, 15.3. Severed from Brahman, this world becomes
unessential (अव्यवहार), since—“अहि निरात्मकं किञ्चित् व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते.”

Cf. also योहि ब्रह्मवादिनां जगत् आत्मनोऽव्यक्तं, ‘स्वातन्त्र्यं’ लभ्यमानं
पश्यति, तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं । (इ, 4 19)

show that to separate the Vedantic Nirgun Brahman completely from the world and to treat it as vacuum and empty is to go directly against the views of the Bhāṣya-kāra.

All finite objects, Sankara observes, are limited. We can only know the limit of a thing by knowing what lies beyond the limit. We can only be aware of the *end* (अन्त) of a thing by being aware of something which stands beyond the thing. A finite is that which has a limit. If something is limited, it follows that beyond the limit, there is another something. Therefore to be finite means to be limited by something else. Sankara says :—

“अश्वत्वान्तं गोलमिति अन्तवदेव
भवति । स च अन्तो (limit)
भिन्नेषु वस्तुषु दृष्टः” (तै° भा° 2.1)

✓ But limit always involves negation (निवर्त्तकत्व). A horse is a horse and not a cow, because it possesses the determinations or qualities of a horse and not those of a cow. Its being a horse is just what limits it, *prevents* it from being a cow. It is in its *negative* aspect that quality is limit. Sankara says—

✓ यतो यस्य बुद्धेर्निवृत्तिः (negation),
स तस्य अन्तो (limit) भवति ।
यथा गोलबुद्धिरश्वत्वात् ‘विनिवर्त्तते’ ।¹—तै° भा°, 2.1.

In this way, one determinate thing *negates* its opposite, negates another determinate thing. This is what keeps one thing *separate* (भिन्नेषु वस्तुषु) from another thing. Each one *excludes* or *negates* the other ones from it. They are thus *different* from one another. मृच्चूर्णं is मृच्चूर्णं for it negates (निवर्त्तयति) its opposite पिण्ड; पिण्ड is पिण्ड for it negates its other घट. Thus one finite object negates

¹ “वस्तुलक्षणबुद्धिर्हि प्रसक्तादस्तन्नात् ‘निवर्त्तयति’ (negates)—तै° भा°, 2.1.

another finite object.¹ This is Sankara's description of the relation between finite objects.

Now can any of the finite objects exclude or negate the Infinite? No; it cannot. Why? Because, according to Vedānta, the Infinite is the Cause of all finite objects. Hence, none of the finite objects can negate their cause. Sankara has declared—

“अदि कार्यं नाम बहुतीक्ष्णं,

यतः कारणवृद्धिः विनिवर्तते” ।—१^० भा^०, 2.1.

For, कार्यं (the effect) is not something really different from the कारण (the cause). Had it been different from the cause, the cause could not have produced it from it-self. For, Sankara remarks—

यद्यद्व्यक्तं यद्य न वर्तते, न तत्तत् सत्पद्यते ।—१^० भा^०.

What is not contained in a thing cannot be produced from it. The cause, the Infinite, contained its effect, the finite, within it which it has expelled from it. It is the Infinite, the cause, which has differentiated itself as the effect, the finite. For, what is an effect (कार्यं)? It is the cause (कारण) itself which has taken the shape of an effect—a कार्याकार ।—

कार्याकारोपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव ।—१^० भा^०, 2.1.8.

Really, the effect, the finite, is no other than the cause, the infinite itself. For, the कारण in becoming its other, has not, in reality, become something different from it. For, Sankara says—

न विशेषदमनमाद्येव वस्तुत्वं भवति...

स एवेति प्रथमिज्ञानात् ।—१^० भा^०, 2.1.18.

Hence, as the finite is not something different from, other than, the Infinite, how can it negate the idea of its

¹ “वस्तुनवृद्धिं प्रथमावस्तुनरात् ‘निवर्तयति’ (negates)—१^० भा^० 2.1.

कारण^१ । It is the cause (कारण) which has distinguished itself from itself in the forms of फल, etc., etc. Hence we see the justification of Sankara's remark—

नहि कार्यं नाम कारणोक्तिः ।

उपनिषद्भाष्ये—ह्युक्तं २१

The *कार्य* is not something *different* from the *कारण*; hence it cannot negate the idea of the cause. We have already seen that what stands at the *end* of a thing, what is *outside* of a thing, can negate it. But the Infinite being the cause runs through all the effects, underlies each of the finite effects, hence how can *कार्य* be treated as standing *outside* of, or at the end of, its *कारण*? It is therefore clear that no finite effect can negate or exclude the idea of its cause, the infinite. For, it is the cause itself which has issued from it as its effect, has differentiated as its effect, has manifested itself as its other—as particular effects. Hence the Infinite does not exclude but *include* its effects within it. For it has not become something else, in assuming a mere form.

The readers will remember that in the Vedānta Sūtras (II.1.11-20) where the relation between the effect (*कार्य*) and the cause (*कारण*) finds an elaborate discussion, it has been shown that the effect cannot be *separated* from, and placed outside of, the cause and regarded as utterly other (*व्यतिरिक्त*) from the cause. It is really ^२ *अन्य* from the *कारण*. For, there is *distinction* no doubt, but the distinction is not absolute, not ultimate^३; for (the *कारण* itself appears as *कार्य*, as its other). It is therefore not really other, but *कारण* itself.

^१ I.e., mere shapes, forms, means—for its manifestation.

^२ I.e., From the पारमार्थिक stand-point.

^३ It is our *व्यतिरिक्त* which makes it utterly distinct (*व्यतिरिक्त*). It is our *व्यवहारिक* दृष्टि.

In this way, it is impossible to separate the effects from their cause, separate the नामरूप from their underlying Brahman. Yet, under the influence of Avidya, we separate the effects and treat them as outside of the cause, as something अन्य. This is a wrong view of the case.¹ It is done in either of two ways: by separating Brahman from the world altogether as an unknowable and unknown something, or by entirely reducing the nature of the cause (Brahman) to the Nāma-rūpas, taking nāma-rūpas as self-subsisting independent-things,² and ignoring the underlying hidden³ Brahman altogether.

6. We now come to consider the important question of the alleged *unreality* of the

Iswara or creator is not a different being other (अन्य) than Brahman and consequently not *unreal*.

Creator—the Vedantic Iswara (ईश्वर). Several writers on Vedanta maintain the view that “Sankara was unable to rise to a higher conception of

Divine character and that ईश्वर as creator is recognised by the wise as *unreal*.” This is indeed a very serious allegation against Sankara and, we confess, there are passages in the Vedanta bhāṣya which are responsible for this hasty conclusion formed with regard to the unreality of the nature of *Iswara*. We shall consider these passages presently. But before we do so, a remark or two on the subject is necessary.

(a) Sankara has made no distinction between the two—Brahman and Iswara. The act of creation, he says, ought not to be regarded as a *separate* and distinct

¹ Cf. “एष विशेषोविदुषां, पश्यन्तोपि प्रपञ्चसंसारं। पृथगात्मनो न किञ्चित् पश्येयुः। Sankara's ‘स्वात्मनिरूपणम्’.

² This is Sankara's अध्यास.

³ कार्याकारि सिरोहितम्।

act, by which Brahman has become something *other than* its own self ;—as if it was Brahman *first*, and *then* became a creator. Such manner of thought would introduce a false difference in the 'nature' of Brahman which is always a real unity. The act of creation is but the *revelation* of its own nature. As the revelation cannot be exhaustive and must necessarily be partial, every fresh act of creation must be regarded as the revelation of its nature *so far forth*. The nature of Brahman being infinite (ॐ) and inexhaustible (अक्षय), no act of creation can be the exhaustive expression of its nature. Sankara observes—

“एतन्नि ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्म तद्विन्दते, तद्विन् विवर्तयन्

पुनरं तद्विन्दते । पुनरं तद्विन्दते (१^० भा०, ५. 1. 1.)—

i.e., as Brahman is inexhaustible in its nature, it is eternally making (तद्विन्दते) itself—creating itself—to realise its own nature. If Brahman, creating the world, were to exhaust its nature, the world, in that case, would have to be regarded as a complete and finished whole. But such cannot be the nature of Brahman which is inexhaustible and infinite. Sankara has told us that—

“येन ब्रह्म, i.e., *Isvara* can never really be an aggregate of many parts—भिन्नमाकुलं चनेकरम्” (१^० भा०, ५. 1. 1.)¹

In the *Gītā-Bhāṣya* he observes that—

“the being which has revealed itself as the world is *no other* than the 'nature' of Brahman itself.”²

¹ “नदि...समस्तसमिद्धसमाकुलं समुद्रवनादिषु (i.e., a whole—aggregate of parts: mere unity of collection) चनेकरम् ब्रह्म—येनैवेन विष्टेयैवेन वा—दृष्ट्वा उपदिश्यते” (१० भा०, ५. 1. 1.). “एकस्य चभेदस्य भाव-त्वानुपपत्तेः” (१० भा०). Otherwise a false difference would be introduced into the 'nature' (स्वभाव) of Brahman which is always a unity (एकः स्वभावः).

² “यत् ‘पदं’ सर्वस्य अवभासकमपि, यस्यादित्यादिकं ज्योतिर्भावमायते... यत्-प्राप्ता समुत्पत्तः न निवर्तते... ‘तस्य पदस्य’ ‘सर्वस्यवहासात्पदत्वं’ विवक्षुः... विभूतिर्लक्ष्यमाह” (गी० भा०, 15. 11.).

In the Kena-Bhāṣya, a similar remark is recorded—

“तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः...सगुणत्वेन उपासनम् । ब्रह्मेति परः, लिङ्गात् ।
न हि अन्यत्र परादीश्वरात्...दृष्टं वज्रीकर्तुं सामर्थ्यमस्ति” (3.1.).

That is to say—the immanent God is really the same as the transcendent Brahman. Sankara is still more explicit and expressive there in the sentence—

“ब्रह्मशब्दवाच ईश्वर इति अवसीयते” (के० भा०, 3.1.)

Elsewhere, the same fact is stated expressly thus—

“It is the same transcendental Paramātmā who sustains everything in the world by His Power.”¹

In the Mundaka-Bhāṣya, he observes that—

“the immanent God is in reality nothing but the transcendent Brahman”

“अक्षरं निर्विशेषं पुरुषं सत्यं.....

मन्त्रेण उक्ता, पुनस्तदेव ‘सविशेषं’ वक्तव्य-

मिति प्रवहते” । (मु० भा०, 2.1.3.).

Sankara has definitely condemned those who would make the slightest distinction² between ब्रह्म and ईश्वर—

✓ “भेददृष्ट नीचराष्ट्रं, तदेव ब्रह्म,
अल्पमप्यन्तरं कुर्वन्ती भयं भवति” (ते० भा०, 2.7).

1 “क्षरेषु अक्षरेषु ‘अस्यैव स्वरूपम्’ (निर्गुणम्) या या अभिव्यक्तिः, सा सा अस्या ‘विशिष्टरूपं’ ।...स्वरूपसद्भावमात्रेण सर्वं विभक्तिं” (गी०भा०, 15.19). ईश्वर
✓ is only the विशिष्टरूप of Brahman itself, not something separate or अन्य ।

2 Iswara is not to be really looked upon as identified with the world; for Brahman has not really and actually been reduced to the created elements and thereby has become something else. It is really the same Brahman still. Hence, Brahman and Iswara are not distinct, but the same being. This is the पारमार्थिकदृष्टि; i.e., true view of the case.

“स्वरूपसद्भावमात्रेण सर्वं विभक्तिं—न तु ‘व्यावृत्तया’” ।

Thus, it is wrong to ascribe to Sankara the view that in his system, his *Iswara* is something *other than* (अन्य) and distinct from Brahman, that *Iswara* is a *lower* and empirical Brahman. It is the Sankara's established theory that, in revealing itself as the world, Brahman has not become something *other than* its own nature.

It is not possible to regard the निर्गुण and the सगुण as two *separate* entities. We have already seen that behind the multiplicity of Nāma-rūpa there is the underlying unity (एक). With a view to show that this unity is not to be reduced to the multiplicity, the निर्गुण aspect has been emphasised, which shows that ब्रह्म is unaffected by the changing Nāma-rūpas. As this unity is the indwelling spirit working in the world, as it is the impelling force—energy which makes things move or change, its सगुण aspect has been mentioned, which shows that it controls and directs all movements—changes—in the world. To show this two-fold ¹ relation of Brahman with the world, viz., standing unaffected yet controlling

N. B.—Col. Jacob in his introduction to his edition of the *Vedānta-sāra* is wrong in pointing out 'inconsistencies' in the writings of Sankara. The reader will see that he has failed to grasp the true sense of the relation of ब्रह्म and ईश्वर।

¹ (a) यस्य नेति नेतीति अन्य-प्रतिषेधद्वारेण (Negative) ब्रह्मणो निर्द्वैतः कृतः, तस्य विधिसुखेन (Positive) कथं निर्द्वैतः कर्त्तव्य इति मूलं च जगती वक्तव्यं (३^० भा०, 3.1.27)।

(b) सर्वमेतत् येन नियतं (i.e. regularly controlled) यच्चिन् प्रतिष्ठितं आकाशान्तं श्रोतं प्रोवच—तस्य निरुपाधिकस्य 'नेति नेतीति' निर्द्वैतः कर्त्तव्यः (3.9.26).

(c) कार्य-करण व्यतिरिक्तं—कार्यकरण संधातानुपादिकस्य तज्ज्योतिः (4.3.6).

(d) स्वतः कार्यकरणादिसंसर्गरहितः विविक्तः स्वेन रूपेण—(किन्तु) कार्यकरणानि तदवभासितानि कर्मसु व्याप्रियन्ते (4.3.11.).

and acting—the निर्गुण and the सगुण aspects are given in the Vedānta.

(b) Without taking into consideration the foregoing passages of Sankara, much emphasis has been laid upon certain passages which occur in the Vedānta-bhāṣya (II.1.14). One of such passages runs to this effect—

“It is only in the practical concerns of life that there is Iswara and the idea of a Controller and the Controlled. But when the real knowledge will dawn, where is the creation and where is the creator ? ”

“परमार्थावस्थार्या ईशीवीशितव्य-

व्यवहाराभावः प्रदर्श्यते ।

व्यवहारावस्थायान्तु उक्तः श्रुतावपि

ईश्वरादिव्यवहारः (वे० भा०, 2.1.14).

The true idea of the passage, as it appears to us, has not been correctly grasped and Sankara has been unjustly ridiculed as “recognising a pinchbeck deity” and his system has been thought “to have no place in it for theism.”

We shall here try to arrive at the right view of Sankara's remarks from his own standpoint, and we crave our readers' particular attention to this important point.

The world is the manifested form of Brahman. We have already seen that Brahman, of its own motion, has manifested its ‘nature’ in the form of the universe. This is its *immanent* aspect. Ordinarily, people take this aspect of Brahman as *Ishwara*. In our everyday व्यवहार, in our all practical concerns of life, we are quite satisfied with taking the world—the nāma-rūpa—as the manifested

form of God—ईश्वर¹ : As Iswara is the cause of the world, the world is regarded as His manifested form. We do not care to direct our thought to the deeper implications involved in this view of Iswara.

That this is the people's conception of Iswara was known to Sankara quite well. For, we find him remarking in his Vedānta-bhāṣya thus—

“सर्वकारणात् विकारधर्मेऽपि केचिद्विशिष्टः”

परमेश्वरः सदात्मनेन निदिग्गते ।

—सर्वकर्मोऽस्य सर्वकर्मसु मन्त्रसु इत्यादिना²

—वे³ भा०, 1.1.20.

Iswara, then, is ordinarily [restricted] to the विकारधर्म as He is the cause of the विकार, the Nāma-rūpas, the world. This is the विशिष्ट-form, of Brahman.³ Brahman, in this view, is taken to be entirely manifested in this world. That there is still a transcendental form is not at all thought of. It is assumed that because the world has been deduced from Him, He becomes the world, He is the world. That, in reality, He is indeed the world, but yet something more is quite forgotten.³ People think that

¹ Cf. ‘एतावानेव आत्मा परमेश्वरी वा, नातः परमस्तीति—इदं ज्ञानं तानमानानेव भवति’—गी⁰ भा०, 18.22.

² It is the notion of the Divine immanence. It is the pantheistic idea of “All is one”. “सर्वकारणत्वात् सर्वव्याप्तकल्पोपपत्तेः” (वे⁰ 1.1.20) पादोऽस्य सर्वव्याप्तानि—इति “सर्वव्याप्तोपपत्तेः”—वे⁰ भा०, 1.1.26. As it is the cause itself which transforms itself into various forms of effects, so God is taken to be an all-inclusive whole. “परेषु चचरेषु वा वा अभिव्यक्तिः, सा सा अस्य (निर्गुणस्य) विशिष्टरूपम्”—मधुसूदन in गी⁰ भाष्य ।

³ Compare—“सर्वव्याप्तत्वात् सर्वव्याप्यकारणैः ‘तद्वान्’ भवति । किञ्च ततोऽपि ‘अधिकतर’ मेतत् भवति”—तैत्ति⁰ भाष्य, 1.6.1. “सर्वगतस्य तु सर्वदेशेषु विद्यमानत्वात् परिच्छिन्नदेशव्यपदेशोऽपि कदाचिदपेक्षया सम्भवति”

ईश्वर is the only Reality existing on his own account, and that there is no other Reality (ब्रह्म) beyond God (ईश्वर)।

We have already seen that under the influence of Avidya (अविद्या), people quite ignore the *separate* being of the cause and regard the effects as something quite distinct (अन्य), as self-subsisting objects. This is called by Sankara as व्यवहारिक-stand-point. Thus, we quite forget the *transcendental* aspect of Brahman and restrict it to its immanent aspect alone. In this way, the विशिष्ट-रूप of Brahman, i.e., Iswara is looked upon as quite sufficient for the purpose of worship. This is our ordinary view of Iswara.¹ This view has been emphasised by Sankara when he declares Iswara to be—"सर्व्वगन्वः सर्व्वरसः," etc., quoted above.

But, although, we admit, this view of Iswara is sufficient for the ordinary purposes of life, still there is the other side which, philosophy demands, can never be lost sight of. As Brahman is perfect and transcendental, as it is inexhaustive and inexhaustible (अव्यय and पूर्ण), no one of its determinations, no one of its definitions can exhaust its potentiality, no one of its actualisation can fix it in a rigid form and be regarded as final.²

(वे० भा०, 1.2.7.)। "उपाधिषु 'सविशिष्टा' इव अवभासन्ते, न च स्वाभाविकीं 'अविशिष्टात्मा' जहति, तद्वत्" (वे०, 3.2.25)। " 'सर्व्वगतः' परमेश्वरः, एकः 'स्वतन्त्र' च" and "रूपं रूपं 'प्रतिरूपी', 'बहिष्' " (कठं भाष्य)। In Vedanta, परमेश्वर is everything, yet he is *more*. This is the true view.

¹ "एतावानिव आत्मा, परमेश्वरो वा, नातः परमस्तीति—ईदृशं ज्ञानं (तामसानामिव भवति)—गी० भा०, 18.22.

² To restrict the cause to its particular manifested effects and to regard these as its complete and final expressions is wrong. गीता has denounced this view as तामसिक।—

"यत् कृत्स्नवदेकस्मिन् कार्ये सक्तमहेतुकं.....तत्तामसमुदाहृतं" (18.22.)।

But, we have seen, it is our Avidya (अविद्या) which makes us forget this transcendental aspect of Brahman and to reduce or restrict it to a particular manifestation. For this reason Sankara has described Iswara—God—as—व्यवहारिक and also as अविद्यात्मक.¹ The readers will see that by this, Iswara does not become an unreality. Sankara remarks—

मायामात्रमेतत् यत् परमात्मनोऽवस्थावधानावभासनम्—(वृ° 2.1.1), i.e., It is माया which conceals² the transcendental and inexhaustible nature of Brahman and entirely reduces it to, or identifies it with, the three manifested states of activities (viz., सृष्टि, स्थिति and प्रलय). But the true view of the case is that Iswara (God) though the creator or the cause of the world, has not and does not necessarily become restricted or entirely reduced to the effects (कार्य or विकार) created ; but He has also a transcendental nature which remains unaffected by these.³ This is the true view of God. Sankara has declared for this reason that—

‘निष्प्रदेशगामि’ ब्रह्मः उपाधिविशेषसम्बन्धात्...प्रदेश-
विशेषपरिपक्षी न विरुध्यते ।—(वृ° 1.1.21)

✓ 1 “व्यवहारावगत्यान्तु उक्तः सुतावपि ईश्वरत्वादिव्यवहारः” (वृ° 2.1.14).
and अविद्यात्मक-नामरूपोपाध्यनुरीधौ ईश्वरो भवति ” ।—इत्यादि ।

“Of. उपाधि सम्बन्धात् तदाकारतामिव प्रतिपद्यते, तदालम्बनं ब्रह्मण आकार-
विशेषोपदेशः उपासनाद्यो न विरुध्यते” —वृ° 3.2.15

‘ब्रह्मणो अनेकरसत्वं अनेकधात्वं.....न द्रष्टव्यं । यत्तु एकरसत्वं तद्द्रष्टव्यं
प्रयत्नत्वात्”—वृ°, 5.1.1.

2 “उपाधिकृतस्वरूपतिरोभावात्” (वृ° 3.2.35). Also ‘कार्यगतं न
विविधं मांसां सत्यं भा’-रूपत्वं व्यतीतव्यम्यते” (कठ° 5.15). “उपाधिवारेणैव
विज्ञानादिशब्दैर्निर्दिश्यते” (केन, 2.1) ।—इत्यादि । ‘ममसः संकल्पमृत्यादि
प्रत्यये ‘रमिष्यज्यते’ ब्रह्म (केन, 4.5) ।

3 पर्यायेण विवक्ष्यमानत्वात्, सोऽहमिति श्रुत्या प्रतिस्म्भानाच्च स्थानमव्यतिरिक्तत्वं
निकलच्च सिद्धं” (मा° का° भा°) । “आकारब्रह्मविषयाणि वाक्यानि न

For, although Brahman assumes particular forms or aspects, it remains all along *identical with itself*, For—

“ न विशेष-दर्शनमात्रेण वस्तुन्यत्वं भवति
.....स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्”—वे° 2.1.18

and also

“ न हि उपाधियोगादपि अन्यादृशस्य वस्तुनः
अन्यादृशः स्वभावः सम्भवेति ।”—वे° 3.2.11.

It is clear therefore that although Iswara has assumed the manifested forms—although He is विकारधर्मः विशिष्टः, still it is *in reality* nothing but Brahman; that is to say, although Brahman appears acting in the world in its immanent aspect, yet it remains unaffected in its transcendental nature. It is wrong to take the immanent aspect *alone* as an independent reality and to *ignore* the transcendental aspect which is the real aspect¹.

For, the fact is that—

यद्यपि कार्यात्मना उद्विच्यते,
तथापि यत् पूर्णस्वरूपं तन्न जहाति,
पूर्णमेव उद्विच्यते”—ब° भा°

प्रधानानि, आकाररहितमेव ब्रह्म अवधारयितव्यं”—वे° भा°, 3.2.14. दर्शनश्रवण विज्ञानाद्युपाधिधर्मैः ‘राविर्भूतं’ सत् लक्ष्यते—सु. 2.2.1.

¹ “ प्रत्युपाधिमेदं अभेदमेव ब्रह्मणः आवयति शास्त्रं । ” “ भेदस्य उपासनार्थत्वात् अभेदे तात्पर्यात् ”—वे° भा°, 3.2.11 Also ‘उपाधिनिमित्तस्य वस्तु-धर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः’—वे°, 3.2.15.

Cf. ‘अव्यक्तं व्यक्तिमापन्नं मन्यन्ते मामबुद्धयः।

परं भावमजानन्तो ममाव्ययं मनुषमं । ‘गी°.....)

It is the ignorant (अबुद्धयः) who regard the inexhaustible Brahman as entirely reduced to its manifestations (व्यक्ति) ।

From these discussions, the readers will find now that —the immanence of God must not be taken in the sense of Divine identification with the process of the finite world, and the transcendency also ought not to be taken in the sense of *absolutely separating* God from the world as an unknowable something, without recognising His activity as indwelling spirit. It is the immanence of transcendence, in reality. ✓

(c) Now, we shall come to explain some other passages in the Sāṅkara-bhāṣya which have produced the erroneous opinion about the unreality of the Vedantic Iśvara. It will be seen that Sāṅkara begins his discussion about Iśvara in this part of his commentary with the sentence—

✓ “अविद्यात्मक नामरूपोपाश्रयद्विही ईश्वरो भवति” (वे° भा°, 211)

“अविद्यात्मक-नामरूपोपाश्रयकारणवत्त्वात् ईश्वरः”—(Ibid)

Finding that the word अविद्यात्मक has been used in connection with ईश्वर, the conclusion has been hastily formed that ईश्वर must be unreal, false.

Now, what does the word अविद्यात्मक really mean? We have carefully examined the various commentaries of Sāṅkara and have found that in connection with नाम रूप, he has used these words—अविद्याकल्पित, अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापित, अविद्याध्यारोपित and अविद्यात्मक. In a passage in the Taittirīya-bhāṣya, Sāṅkara has concluded that the Nāma-rūpas cannot be regarded as the essential property (धर्म) of the self; that they are the property of our intellect. Our intellect (understanding) falsely ascribes Nāma-rūpa to the self as its essential property¹. If we follow this explanation,

¹ “विद्याविद्ययोस्तद्वर्त्मत्वमिति चेत् ? न । विवेकाविवेकी रूपादिवत् प्रत्यक्षा-
वृत्तयश्चेत्तन्न कारणव्या. . . तथाप्यनामरूपपक्षस्यैव विद्याविद्ये, नामरूपे च नामधर्मो”
—इत्यादि (वे° भा°, 28) । It is also found in जी° भा° ।

we come to see that wheresoever he uses the epithet अविद्याकल्पित in connection with नामरूप, the enquiry would naturally arise to the effect—अविद्याकल्पित *on what?* and अविद्याकल्पित *how?* That is to say, are the नामरूपs imagined by अविद्या *on the self?*;—and are the नामरूपs imagined by अविद्या on the self *as its essential property?* This disposes of the enquiry about the ‘on what’ and ‘how’? The two phrases अविद्या-प्रत्युपस्थापित and अविद्या-ध्यारोपित convey the same sense with अविद्याकल्पित¹. Only one phrase, namely,—अविद्यात्मक now remains to be explained. The readers will see that when this phrase invariably occurs in connection with the term नाम-रूप, as in the case of the three other phrases, it must also convey the same sense and significance which those other phrases convey. We therefore would not be wrong, if we say that the नामरूपs are ‘अविद्यात्मक’, because they are imagined to be the essential property of the self. This is the sense of ‘अविद्यात्मक’ here.

In the famous Introduction to the Vedānta-bhāṣya, Sankara has taken care to explain the sense of the term अविद्या which it would convey in his commentaries. From the explanation given here, it will appear that under the influence of अविद्या, men ignore the distinct presence of the underlying unity and *identify* it with the changing states and activities evolved from it. Men, under the power of Avidya, *identify* the underlying ब्रह्म with the manifested world. In this way, the manifested Nāma-rūpas, *i.e.*, the world becomes the only Reality standing

¹ The readers will see therefore that wherever Sankara would employ such phrase as अविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे, it would mean that नामरूप is always erroneously imagined by अविद्या as the धर्म or the essential property of the self; (whereas it is really the property of the intellect itself).

on its own account, and beyond this reality there is no other Reality (ब्रह्म) at all. In this way, ईश्वर is regarded quite an independent reality, absolutely *separate* and *different* (व्य) from ब्रह्म. Now, Sankara has declared such view of ईश्वर as unreal, false and *परिग्राम्य*. For, Brahman in appearing as creator—as ईश्वर—has not in reality lost its own nature, neither has it passed out of itself into something else—

नहि विज्ञेयदमनमात्रेण, वस्तुत्वं भवति,

....न एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ।—(वे° भा° 2.1.18)

The fact is that if you look upon ईश्वर as a *different* being, as *other than* (व्य) Brahman, you are wrong. But if you regard Him as an aspect of Brahman and therefore nothing but Brahman itself—this is the correct view.

Thus the readers will find now that Sankara has not denied ईश्वर :

(d) The created elements have been evolved from the 'nature' of Brahman for its own realisation. Brahman has not sundered itself into these elements; it has not actually passed into, or been converted into, these elements and thereby has become something *other than* its own nature. It expresses itself through these. We have therefore no right to *separate* these from it and take them as 'something' distinct and complete in themselves. Hence is Sankara's remark—

“परमाद्यावस्थायी कुत एव वा सृष्टिः ?”

(वे° भा°, 2.1.22)

The evolving changes—the diversities of emerging Náma-rûpa—are not something other than (व्य) Brahman's nature. We can not sever their connection with the

underlying Brahman, but they must be looked upon as really the further and further *revelations* of this nature ¹.

When we come to truly realise the unity of Brahman as untouched and unaffected by the evolving changes, we will then look upon the world and all the changes evolving therein as mere *means, medium, symbols*, ² through which Brahman is realising its own nature—is expressing itself. Everything will appear as incorporated ³ in Brahman as its necessary *expressions*. This is the correct interpretation of the passage under notice, in the light of the Sankara's entire theory. No other view is possible. One who has declared Iswara to be eternally existent (नित्यसिद्ध) cannot declare him to be *unreal*.

That this is the case will appear also from the illustration ⁴ recorded by Sankara which we now desire to explain. To express the idea of the letters, we employ certain points, lines, strokes, etc. The letters do not themselves pass into or become actually

Illustration in
proof of the above
position.

¹ *Vide* दुन्दुभिदृष्टान्त in ४० भा०, 2.4.7. “सामान्यस्य ग्रहणेनैव तद्वताविशेषा, गृहीता भवन्ति। न तु त एव निर्भिद्य गृहीतुं शक्यन्ते”। *Cf.* ‘न वृषगनुभवः किन्तु तत्-साहचर्यात्’—शतश्लोकी, 63.। “तद्व्युक्तमखिलं वस्तु, व्यवहारश्चिदन्वितः। तस्मात् सर्वगतं ब्रह्म, क्षीरे सर्पिर्निवाखिल” — । “उपर्युपरि आविस्तरत्व-मात्मनः आत्मप्रकाशनाय”—६० भा०, 2.1.3.

² “दर्शयति सृष्टिप्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थतां।...उपायः सोऽवताराय” (६० भा०, 1.4.14). ‘जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादि ब्रह्मदर्शनीपाश्वलेन विनियुज्यते’ (६० भा०, 2.1.14). ‘नामरूपादि...उपलब्धिदारं भवति (६० भा० 7.17.1.)। सत्संस्थान-मात्मनिदं सर्वं’ (6.2.2.) &c.

³ “सामान्यस्य ग्रहणेनैव ‘तद्वता विशेषाः’ गृहीता भवन्ति...तवैवान्तर्भावात्” (४० भा०)। ‘सामान्ये तद्विशेषाः प्रोक्ताः।

⁴ “यथा एकप्रभृत्यापराद्ध-संख्यास्वरूप-परिज्ञानाय, रेखाध्यारोपणं कृत्वा... एकैकं रेखा, दशैकं शतैकं इति ग्राहयति, अवगमयति संख्यास्वरूपं केवलं; न तु

converted into these points, lines, strokes. These merely express the nature of the letters. These are merely symbols standing for the letters which find their expression in them. Such is the case also with the numbers. The numbers—one, two, three, etc.—are expressed through certain lines and points. They do not actually pass into, or are converted into, these lines and points. These are merely symbols which are employed to express the nature of the numbers. Separated from the numbers which find expression in them, and taken as independent things,—the lines, points, etc., lose their value and become unreal.¹ So long as they are taken in connection with the numbers which they express, they have their value. But sever them off from the numbers, they at once become useless. Such is the case with the created elements, and Brahman. As soon as they are separated from the underlying Brahman which expresses itself through them, they lose their value and are quite useless. Hence these cannot be regarded as something independent—*व्यत्य*—self-sufficient and complete in themselves; but they are *व्यत्य* from (i.e., not really other than) Brahman underlying them. In the third chapter of this book we have tried to explain the relation of the cause and the effect elaborately. We need not repeat here the arguments used there. It will suffice to say that "The first part of Sankara's causal theory implies that the causal reality is *distinct* from its effects or its successive manifestations, because it has a 'nature,' a स्वरूप, a स्वभाव (swarūpa or swabhāva) of its own, and it cannot therefore

संख्याया रेखाश्रितमेव । यथा च अकारादीनि अपराणि विजिघाहयिषुः, पदमसौ-
रेखादिसंयोगोपायमाख्याय, वर्णानां सतत्त्वं चावेदयति ; न पञ्च-महात्मकताम-
पराणां यादयति । तथा चेह उत्पत्ति-व्यति-सत्यादनेकोपायमाख्याय, एकं
ब्रह्मतत्त्वमावेदयति " इत्यादि (३^० भा^०, 4.4.25).

१ "तथा अकारादिमहत्वापरप्रतिपत्ति र्हेतुः, रेखादृतापरप्रतिपत्तेः"
(३^० भा^०, 2.1.14).

be resolved into, or identified with, the effects or the changes emerging from it. Sankara expresses this idea in—

“न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं” (वे० भा०, 2.1.9) ।”

“The second part of the theory implies that the cause is no doubt distinct from, and independent of, its effects or the emergent changes; but the effects cannot be *separated* from their underlying cause and regarded as independent and self-sufficient ‘things’ (वस्तु), each complete in itself. The effects must therefore be regarded as *ananya* (अनन्य) from their cause; i.e., the real ‘nature’ of the cause expresses itself gradually, or becomes realised in, these successive effects.¹ The latter are therefore mere forms, means, instruments for the realisation of the nature of the cause which underlies them. It is not therefore possible to *separate* any of the effects from the underlying cause which expresses itself in them. Separated from it, they would lose their value and become useless.”

We find therefore from the illustrations quoted above that the successive changes are *inseparable* from their underlying cause which gradually realises or expresses its own nature in and through them. The underlying causal reality has not actually passed into, or been converted into, these evolving changes,—thereby becoming something else *other than* its own nature (अन्य).²

7. It follows from this exposition that what gradually expresses its inexhaustible nature in its changes, cannot exhaust itself in them and so become *identical* with them. Yet translating the word *ananya* (अनन्य) as absolutely “identical,” Sankara’s theory

Finite individuals
and their responsi-
bility for their works.

¹ “तारतम्येन आविर्भावः” (वे० भा०, 1.1.11). Also 1.3.30.

² Cf. “भूतमात्रासंसर्गजं ‘अन्यत्वा’वभासं ‘तिरस्कृत्य’”—इ० भा०, 5.1.1.

has been reduced to a kind of 'Pantheism' which he took so much pains to refute in various parts of his commentaries.

✓ Taking Sankara to be a Pantheist, it has also been supposed that he has, in his theory, not only abolished Iswara but also abolished or negated the 'Individuality' or the 'personality' of the finite individuals, making them merely parts of an all-inclusive abstract whole, viz., Brahman:—"ascribing to this Brahman alone the agency of all works." Many critics of Sankara's theory believe that in the Advaita philosophy as expounded by Sankara, the finite individuals are *not responsible* for their works, that all activities proceed from the agency of Brahman alone.

There are valuable arguments by which Sankara has established the 'individuality' of the selves which we have discussed elsewhere. Here in this chapter, we shall content ourselves only examining the position whether the individual beings are not responsible for their works in this system of philosophy, so far as the 'theory of creation' is concerned.

We find in our daily observation that the *experiences* of one individual man differ in their character from the experiences of another individual. Your experience and mine are not of the same character. Even the individuals born and brought up under similar circumstances develop different experiences, exclusively belonging to each. If Brahman—the only Individual—be reduced to the relations of the world, he alone can be held responsible for this unequal distribution of the experiences or fortunes of different individuals, and the finite individuals would thereby be absolved from their share in the responsibility for their experiences. Sankara appears to remark in the Vedanta-

bhāṣya (II. 1. 34) that for the inequalities of the experiences, the *works* of the individuals are to be held responsible. A hasty idea has been formed from this remark that as in this system there are no real individuals at all, these *actions alone* constitute the so-called individuality of men. A western writer has thus written about Sankara's theory—

“Its *resolution* of human life into a *series of acts mechanically related* keeps it at what we must describe at a low level.”

That in the Sankara-system, the actions are but the responses made by the individual to the external environment with which there is an interaction, and that the source of this response is the ‘nature’ of the individual which underlies these actions, and that this nature cannot be resolved into these activities—all these points can be proved without much ado from the pages of Sankara's commentaries. We shall record in this place only one argument employed in the Vedānta-bhāṣya to expose the absurdity of the position held by the critic above referred to, which will suffice for our present purpose.

8. Every individual self, Sankara remarks, has a two-fold

<p>Individuals—their substantive and adjectival modes of existence.</p>	<p>mode of existence—substantive (स्वरूप or विशेष्य) and adjectival (सम्बन्धि-रूप or विशेषण).¹ In his substantive mode, he exists <i>for himself</i>, he belongs to himself. In his adjectival mode, he is related to others,</p>
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¹ “एकत्वेऽपि स्वरूप-वाङ्मय-रूपापेक्षया, अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात् । यथा एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः, स्वरूपं सम्बन्धि-रूपञ्च अपेक्ष्य, अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाक् भवति.....सनुष्यः ब्राह्मणः.....युवा स्थविरः.....पिता माता जामाता इति ” ।

“यथा एकापि सती रेखा, स्थानान्यत्वेन निविशमाना, एक-दश-शत-सहस्रादि-शब्दप्रत्ययभेद-समुभवति ” ।

“द्रव्यस्यैव तेन तेन विशेषणेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्, न द्रव्य-गुणयोर्भेदप्रतीति-रस्ति ” (वे० भा० 2.2.17).

he exists *for others*. His substantive existence or स्वप्न cannot be resolved into the adjectival existence; for, the individual is always *more* than his mere relations. His स्वप्न (Swarupa) is permanent and transcendent (व्यवस्थित); but his व्यवस्थित-स्वप्न, i.e., his relations with others depend on the things with which he comes into interaction, and these relations therefore are always liable to changes. Thus, there is a Swarup (स्वप्न) belonging to each individual being which underlies the relations or the activities elicited from this स्वप्न (Swarupa) through its relation with other objects.

How is it possible, in the face of such clear arguments, to come to the conclusion that the system of Sankara has left no place for the 'individuality,' and that the individuals are mere aggregate of their actions or relations? It follows irresistibly from this discussion on the subject in question that when Sankara apparently makes the *works* of the individuals responsible for their inequalities, he really makes the underlying 'natures' or स्वप्न (swarupas) of each individual responsible for the special character of the works issuing out from him. This will be evident, if we consider the character of the collateral arguments used by Sankara in this very place (ब्रह्मसूत्र, II. I. 34). He illustrates his position here by showers of rain and the germination of distinct kinds of crops from their respective seeds. The peculiar and the distinct nature inherent in each class of *seeds* is the true cause, says he, for the visible inequalities in the development of different plants, each distinguished from each class;—though the general and common cause for the growth and germination of crops must be held to be the showers acting upon the

seeds.¹ It is well-known that Sankara has used the term 'seed,' i.e., बीज with reference to the four different types of individuals distinguished from one another in their nature and character. We would refer our readers to a passage in the Bhāṣya on the Chandogya Upanishad where this line is to be found—

“तथा स्वस्तीषां मृतानां शरीरेषु ‘बीजानि’ भवन्ति,

—पञ्चभेदां, जीवजमुद्भिज्जनिमिति । (जीवजं

—includes स्वेदजं and जरायुजं) ।” (छा० भा०, 6.3.1.)

The seed (बीज) therefore includes in it the living ‘natures’ of the individual selves, each distinguished from the other class.² The difference in experience therefore is to be accounted for by the difference in the respective ‘natures’ or भवद् of the individuals. The result reached here will be far more evident if another passage is considered in this connection. [In the Vedānta-bhāṣya (111. 2. 9), a discussion runs to the effect whether, when a man wakes up after a deep sleep, it is the

tion
up

same identical individual who had slept has now wakened up or it is a different individual. It is shown here that it is the same identical individual to whom both the *past* and the *present* belong. Among other arguments used to prove this fact, we should like to refer to only two arguments given there. The first is about the works done by the individual and the second is the fact of recollection. To prove the identity of the same individual both before and after his sleep, Sankara argues that otherwise the man waking up could not have begun again the same works which he had left unfinished before he went to sleep. Here we would request our readers to carefully examine the nature of this argument employed by Sankara to establish the identity of the individual. If the idea of Sankara were, as our opponents hold, really to resolve the individual self into his actions or works, how, we ask, could he employ this argument, and how could the argument establish the identity of the Soul? The works the man had left off when he fell asleep, are a thing of the past. Those works have vanished already because they belonged to a *past time*. How can the man who now wakes up begin again the works which are *now* non-existent? What is the link here to connect the past work with the present? It must be, therefore, Sankara's inner purpose to show that it is the identical inner 'nature' of the man to which both his past and present works must belong, which 'nature' must be the underlying link here, connecting the works. This line also brings to light what was really working in the mind of Sankara when he wrote this commentary—

“न च अनेन समिहृतस्य कर्मणो, अन्य प्रयत्नक्रियाया प्रवर्तितुमर्हति” —

i.e., A piece of work half done by one man, cannot be brought into completion by a different man

Again, Sankara speaks of 'memory' (स्मृति) here. The man exercising his memory, recollects where he left off his past work and where he is to begin now. The works themselves cannot exercise the memory.¹ It must be the underlying self which does it and recollects his past work and connects it with the present. It is therefore to this self that both the works must belong, and it is not the *works* themselves which can recollect *themselves*. Here again, by the phrase—

“ अकृताभ्यागम and कृतप्रणय ”—

Sankara makes the underlying self *responsible* for his works. By holding the individual man responsible for his works done by him (or left undone by him), Sankara clearly establishes the fact that behind the works done, there is the underlying 'nature' or स्वरूप (Swarupa) of the man which is really accountable for its works. Otherwise, if the man be simply an aggregate of his works, then his present work being the necessary outcome of his antecedent work in time and predetermined by it,—you cannot make *the man* responsible for his present works.

9. It may not be out of place here to refer, in this connection, to the arguments used by Sankara in the Vedanta-bhāṣya, which will also show that difference in the works or activities really implies difference in the deeper 'natures' which underlie the works or activities. The argument is originally used

Every individual has a distinct 'nature' of its own.

¹ स्मृति (memory) is the distinguishing characteristic attribute (धर्म or स्वरूप) of the self. “ प्राणचेष्टाचैतन्यस्मृत्यादयश्च आत्मधर्मत्वेन अभिमतः आत्मवादिनां ” (वे० भा०, 3.3.53).

to expose the absurdity of the theory of *And-
kṛya-rāta*. It is everywhere observed that certain
definite changes or activities are invariably accompanied
by a definite 'nature' behind them. Certain other
definite changes or actions are invariably accom-
panied by another definite 'nature' which is utterly
distinct and different from the 'nature' mentioned
above. In all the successive transformations or
changes of *मृत्तिका* (say, a lump of earth), the 'nature' of
मृत्तिका is seen behind them (but not the nature of a *tree*).
Again, in all the successive transformations or changes of
a tree, the nature of the tree—but not the nature of the
earth—is seen behind them. Why, it may be asked, is
such the case everywhere in connection with all kinds of
definite changes or activities? ¹—Simply because, these
definite changes or transformations are determinations of
the *nature of the earth*, and not of *any other nature*. This
proves the fact that definite changes or actions belong to
definite 'natures,' and these natures are distinguished, one
from the other.² A similar argument, slightly changed,
is given elsewhere. If a man wants to produce an earthen
vessel, he must collect some *earth* for the purpose. But
milk must be collected, if he wants to produce curd. The
collection of earth will not serve his purpose in the latter
case. Thus, definite 'natures' only, can produce definite
works or changes. If there are not definite natures

¹ "न च मृदन्विता. गवाद्यादयोभावाः, मत्स्यादिविकारा इतिचिदभ्युपगम्यते ।
मृदिकागनेव तु मृदन्विताम् भावान् लोकं प्रयेति ।...चीरादिव च दुरो जायते,
चीरादिव दधि=इत्येवंजातीयकः 'कारणविशेषाभ्युपगमः' अर्थवान् स्यात्...मथेष्ट च
वस्तुनः 'स्वेन स्वेन कथेन' (१८, स्वकथेन=Their own natures) भाषागनेव
उपगम्यमानताम्" (वे० भा०, २२२६).

² Cf. "गवादिभ्यस्याभ्युपगमः, मत्स्यादि गवादयः." इत्यादि (गो० भा०, १८६६).

actually present in the world, anything could be made to produce any work indiscriminately. There would have been no *difference* in the works at all. For, there would be nothing to distinguish one kind of work from another.¹ These arguments very clearly prove that every finite individual possesses a definite *nature* of its own which cannot be resolved into the works or activities produced from it. We fail to understand how Sankara's system can be held to negate the individualities.²

- ✓ 10. "The creation," according to Sankara, "is but the gradual manifestation of diverse
 (सामान्य) and the Particular (विशेष). Universals (सामान्य) in the form of individual objects (विशेष) produced from them."³ All finite individual objects are a compound of two factors—the universal and the particular. The universal or सामान्य stands to the individual objects (विशेष) as unity to multiplicity. There is but one universal cow, while there are many individual cows. There is the clay, while there are its many particular differentiations—मृच्चूर्णं, पिण्ड, घट. Thus the world of the Universals (सामान्य) manifests itself in

¹ "दधिघटरुचकायर्धिभिः प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि क्षीर-मृत्तिका-सुवर्णादीनि उपादीयमानानि दृश्यन्ते। न च दध्यर्धिभिः मृत्तिका उपादीयते, न घटार्धिभिः क्षीरं। अविशिष्टे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः, सर्वस्य सर्वत्र असत्त्वे, कस्मात् क्षीरादेव दधि उत्पद्यते, न मृत्तिकायाः ?" (वे० भा०, 2.1.18.) [Does not the expression —'प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि' imply the different grades of Individuals ?]

² Besides the arguments given in this chapter, there are other valuable arguments used by Sankara to prove the existence of the 'nature' of different individuals.

³ "सामान्य-विशेषवानर्थोनामव्याकरणवाक्ये विवक्षितः" (वे० भा०, आन०, 2:4.9).

"सामान्यम् आत्मस्वरूप प्रदानेन विशेषान् विभक्ति" (वे० भा०, 1.6.1).

the multiplicities (tējas) of the sense-world. Thus, the truth of all particular things we find in the Universals.

The true *śābda* is thus used in the Vedānta-bhāṣya to denote the Universals or the deeper

Each individual is
a compound of *śābda*
and *śēṣa*.

'natures' of the single individuals, and the term *śēṣa* to denote the states and activities (which constitute the finite

individual beings) produced from these 'natures' through interaction with the environment¹ (*kāraṇakāraṇa*). The readers should remember that in his theory of causality as explained by Sankara (वै भा°, 2.1.14—20) the term *Sāmānya* stands for the causal reality; and the term *Vidēyas* stands for its effects which are but its appearances or forms or shapes or its modes of acting in which the causal reality reveals its nature.² The same reality appears in many different forms. The true causal

¹ "अद्वयविशिष्टं सामान्यादिकं कारणं विविधवद्वयानुसंगमापद्यमानं कार्यमंशं भवति" (वै भा°, 2.1.15 and 2.3.7).

"कार्याकारेण कारणं व्यवस्थापयति: 'कारकक्यापारण' अर्थवस्तुपपद्यते" (वै भा°, 2.1.18).

² *Vijñāna-bhikṣu* very clearly explains these terms and agrees with Sankara entirely in this respect. He explains—

"सामान्यं 'अद्वय'-शब्देन परिभाषितं । अद्वयपरिभाषा च व्यिरतामात्रेण ।"

Sankara also says—

"व्यिरत्यभावात्...कारणभावदर्शनात्" (वै भा°, 2.2.6).

Vijñāna also explains—

"विशेषा हि आगमापयितव्या न द्रव्यस्य अद्वयाच्च ।"

Sankara also says—

"विशिष्यत्तु विक्रिया" (वै भा°, 2.8).

reality is therefore identical in all its diverse effects or forms, but is not itself any single individual thing.¹—

“सामान्याद्धि विशेषा उत्पद्यमानाः

दृश्यन्ते, मृदादेर्घटादयः” (ब^० भा^०, 2.3.9).

“नामसामान्यात्...विशेषनामाणि

यज्ञदत्तदेवदत्त इत्येवमादि-

प्रविभागानि...विभज्यन्ते उत्पद्यन्ते”

—ब^० भा^०, 1.6.1.

That the causal reality (सामान्य) is *active* points to something beyond it with which it interacts. The term कारक-व्यापार stands for stimulating conditions which make possible its interaction, evoking its responses and activities (i.e. विशेषs).

“न हि कारकमन्तरेण क्रिया सम्भवति” (ब^०, 2.4.14).

Elsewhere in this connection Sankara has written—

“There are in the world diverse universals (सामान्यs) involving their particulars (विशेषs) which they produce—both sentient and insentient. All these Universals form a hierarchy and in their graduated series (पारम्पर्यगत्या) are included and comprehended in the one highest universal, i.e., in Brahman. It is Brahman which contains and connects with it all these universals.” Brahman is the central controlling unity of all

¹ Cf. “यः कश्चन शब्दो वागेव सा...शब्दसामान्यमात्रम् ; एतदेतेषां नामविशेषाणां ...कारणम् ।...विशेषाणाञ्च सामान्ये अन्तर्भावात्”—ब^० भा^०, 1.6.1.

universals, so that the whole form an organic unity in which all *vyavasthās* are fused.¹

Now, it is clear that in the Sankara system, the *de per se* 'natures' or *svabhāvas* of the finite individuals are not denied. It is in this way then that the difference of experiences or works implies difference in the deeper 'individual natures' which underlie them. Brahman is thus absolved from any share in the inequalities or differences of the works for which the inner 'natures' (*svabhāvas*) of the individuals are solely responsible,—Brahman being looked upon as a general controller or director of all the activities set a-going in the world. It proves also that Brahman has a distinct 'nature' (*svabhāva*) of its own which cannot be resolved² into the evolving changes, and neither can

¹ अनेके हि विवक्ष्यमानावैतन्महात्मा आभास विरहा । शिवां पारमार्थ्यं
एव। एवमिदं महाभाष्ये ब्रह्मणो वदन्ति (३^० भा^०, 249)

² 'सर्वे सर्वमिदं—भूतानि सर्वे एव च नृणां च (३^० भा^०, 77) । चतुष्टय
—i.e. Each universal runs on continuously into every other; not a
mere aggregate. We have seen before that भूतानि=जीवानि=living
individuals (जीवा) । भूतानि=जीवाविहित जीवानि (1032 and 710)

³ B.—These *vyavasthās* are elsewhere (३^० भा^०, 26) called as Divine
Ideas—*सत्या ज्ञाना* —(३.६.२) and these are not different from (चतुष्टय)
the nature of Brahman. There is the *Śāṅkarā* says a causal relation
between these Divine Ideas and the manifested individual things in
the world (३^० भा^०, 854)

Also of "ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्य हि विशेषाणि व्याप्तिरिति—तद्विद् एतं अभिप्रायं
प्रतिपद्यते —(३^० भा^०, 117)

⁴ B.—The 'Universals' may be called as the *Ends*. Brahman is the
absolute End to which all beings strive. Each being has its own end
in itself. But Brahman—as absolute End—includes all lower ends
(चतुष्टय)

[I do the terms *व्याप्य* and *पराय* explained in Chapter II of this book.]

⁵ एवमनेकात्मकत्वान्नपत्ते, यथा समुद्रात्मना एवमस्य किं सरस्वात्यात्मना
अनेकत्वम्—(३^० भा^०, 2114. Also see ३^० भा^०, 611)

the individuals be treated, in this system, as mere *parts* of an all-inclusive abstract whole. We have found that Brahman is a Reality which maintains its unity and identity in the multiplicity of the ever-changing, but inseparable, elements of the universe—which cannot therefore be taken as a “difference-less, empty, pantheistic void.”

11. We shall now proceed to show how Sankara has characterised the ‘nature’ of Brahman.

Brahma’s ‘nature’
—It is (a) self-conscious
and (b) self-determining
power, and (c) is the
supreme good.

In many parts of his commentaries, Sankara has made a very valuable observation which, we regret to note, seems to have escaped the attention of many critics of his Adwaita theory.

He has repeatedly stated, and drawn our special attention to, the important truth that ‘unity’ and ‘multiplicity’ cannot *both* be held to be equally true in respect of the same thing. If a particular object be ‘one,’ it cannot also be held to be its opposite, *i.e.* ‘many.’ Because, ‘one,’ and ‘many’ are of opposing characters and contradict one another. One cannot be put as a rival to the other ; for, the claims of both cannot be adjusted. If a thing be possessed of several qualities or states, it cannot also be devoid of all qualities.¹ Brahman is a ‘unity’ and,

¹ “न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मवत्त्वं, तद्रहितत्वञ्च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं” (वे° भा° 2.1.14).

“विशिष्टशक्तिमत्त्व-प्रदर्शनं, विशेष-प्रतिषेधश्च—इति विप्रतिषिद्धं” (गी° भा°, 12.1).

“न हि एकं वस्तु परमार्थतः कर्तादिविशेषवत्, तच्छून्यञ्च—उभयथा द्रष्टुं शक्यं” (तै° भा°, 1.11).

“न निरवयवेषु अनेकात्मकता शक्यते कल्पयितुं एकस्य” (वृ° भा°, 4.3.30).

“ननु एकत्वं नानात्वञ्च—उभयमपि सत्यमेव ? नैवं स्यात्” (वे° भा°, 2.1.14).

as such, it retains that character, throughout, under all circumstances¹. It cannot be reduced to the multiplicity of the transformations which are produced out of it. Such being the case, the multiplicity which is working in the world indicates the *presence* of a unity behind it and this unity cannot be phenomenised. For, it is the presupposition of the 'many,' and its presence and operation are necessary to connect the 'many' to it². The multiplicity of transformations issuing out of the 'unity' is not, therefore, of *equal* value,³ though inseparable⁴ from it. The 'many' are the expressions or manifestations of the 'one,' without which the real nature of 'unity' could not have been comprehended⁵.

✓ ¹ "यद्वर्त्मको य पदार्थं प्रमादेन चरमतो भवति, न दीप्तकालावस्थानरेषपि तद्वत्प्रक एव भवति"—(बु°भा°, 2 1 20)

² "सामान्यं हि विज्ञेयान् आत्मस्वरूपमदानेन विमर्शितं।" (बु°भा°, 1 6 1)
 चन्द्रविद्रव्यमिव सर्व्वं कारणं भवति—सर्व्वेषु विकारेषु चन्द्रव्यविच्छेददर्शनात्।
 "न हि कारकोपष्टभमन्तरेण अविद्य संमानं कार्य्यप्यातुमुच्यते"। (का°भा°, 6 7 1
 and (बु° 2 3 14)

³ "न चायं समानाधि भेदाभेदो युतिस्तन्मयत् व्यपदिशति"—(बु°भा°, 3 2 29)
 Sankara elsewhere observes that there can be no co-ordination (सामानाधिकरण्या) between the one and the many 'सर्व्वं ब्रह्मेति च सामानाधिकरण्यात् नानारसं विविधं आमेति आशङ्का भवति, तौ निवर्त्तयितुमाह"
 (बु°, 1 3 1)

⁴ सामान्यं हि तद्विज्ञेया प्रीता (गौ°भा°, 7 7, and ब° भा°)। "यस्य च यथादात्मनाभोभवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां सदा' (बु° भा°, 1 6 1)

⁵ Of "स प्राचमसृजत इति। तत्र हि आत्मचेतन्यज्योति रभिव्यक्ततरम्"—इत्यादि (बु°भा°, 4.4 2) Also vide ब° 11 19 "यथा सख्यास्वरूप परिज्ञानाय रेखाध्यारोपणं कृत्वा अवगमयति सख्यास्वरूपमिव केवलं, न तु सख्यायारेखात्मत्वमिव"
 (बु°भा°, 4 4 25)

Nature of Brahman.

With these general observations, we come now to consider how Sankara has characterised the nature (स्वरूप) of Brahman.

- ✓ 1. Brahman—is a self-conscious subject (ज्ञाता)—
 (a) We can, to a certain extent, learn the nature of Brahman by discovering the nature of ourselves—our own self. The self of man is in essence one, but yet this unity is manifested in several cognitive states and functions. Consciousness is our essence, and it is really the consciousness of Brahman, and it is this consciousness within whose embrace we live.¹ Whenever an object is presented to our senses, we immediately come to be conscious of it. That an object of consciousness is there, and yet we are not conscious of it—is a contradiction.² But the objects of consciousness may change, one object may succeed another, but the subject (ज्ञाता) which is conscious of these changing objects does not change. It underlies, unaffected, all its conscious states, hidden behind them.³

¹ “चैतन्यञ्च अविशिष्टं जीवेश्वरयोः, यथा अग्नि-स्रुतिङ्गयो रेक्यम्” (वे० भा०, 2.3.43). “चैतन्यमेव हि अस्य (जीवस्य) स्वरूपं, अग्रे रिव औष्ण्य-प्रकाशौ (2.3.29). “सुषुप्तौ—प्राज्ञेन आत्मना सम्परिवृत्तस्य” (2.3.40). “ब्रह्मैव तु एकमनपायि सुषुप्ति-स्थानं (3.2.7).

² वेदितुरात्मा ब्रह्मैव इति वेदान्तानां निर्धारितोऽर्थः।—(केन० वा० भा०, 2.1). “सर्ववस्तूनां अज्ञातसत्ताऽभावात्”। “स्वरूपव्यभिचारिषु पदार्थेषु चैतन्याव्यभिचारात्, यथा यथा यो यो पदार्थः विज्ञायते, तथा तथा ज्ञायमानत्वादेव तस्य तस्य चैतन्यस्य व्यभिचारिण्यं। व्यभिचरति तु ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं न व्यभिचरति कदाचिदपि”—प्र० भा०।

³ “यो यस्य विषयः, न तेन हीयते वर्तते वा” (मा० भा०)। “न स्वरूपव्यभिचारिषु पदार्थेषु चैतन्यस्य व्यभिचारात्”—मा० भा०। “न अभिव्यक्ति-साधनावच्छता, नित्याभिव्यक्तत्वात्”—वृ० भा०, 4.4.6. “देहेन्द्रियाद्युपाधिभिः स्वरूपतिरोभावः।”

✓(1) Consciousness which is our essence is constant. It retains its own character always. The particular states of consciousness (विशेषविज्ञान) are the modes which are evoked from it by its connection with the external objects.¹ And whenever these are produced, they appear permeated by, and embraced within the Consciousness,² and what is perceived must be within the perceiver.³ These particular modes or the cognitive states are included within the consciousness itself. They are felt as its objects (विषयभूता वस्तुवदवस्था), and the conscious subject (ज्ञाता) remains unaffected by them (तत्त्वतः विषयः न तन्मोदत न हते ज्ञाता).

(c) The presence of a conscious subject, the "I," thus accompanies each of our particular states whenever they are produced.⁴ This "I" is present in all our acts

¹ 'सर्वथा भूतभीतिवशाच्च' इत्येव 'अहं' इत्यवस्था विद्यते — ३^० भा^०, १३७
 इत्याद्युपनिषद्भिर्वाच्यं 'तत्त्वतः' विशेषविज्ञानम् — ४^० भा^०, १३३। 'अप्यधि
 'सम्बन्ध' विज्ञापकमवयव इत्येव 'कारणाभिप्राय' विशेषविज्ञानं उपपन्नं, आभासिक
 चरित्तरे चान्विषये — ३^० भा^०, २११६ 'वैतन्वदवस्था' चरित्तरे न भूतमात्रा
 'सम्बन्ध' सम्बन्धविज्ञानात् सती — ३१ भा^०, ६३२ 'अविज्ञानं हि
 निदवाधिषे प्रवाच्यपाधि 'ज्ञता विज्ञेया' वस्तुमात्रवदेव हि उपपत्तिरित्येव 'जनितानि
 विज्ञेयानि व्याप्नोति — ३^०, १३७ 'सम्बन्धयोगिनिति' काव्युपनिषत् (३^०, १३६)

² 'आत्मन एवार्थं प्रति । तथापि बहुते चरादिदृशे ये शब्दावाकाराश्च
 भासा ते चान्विज्ञानस्य विषयभूता वस्तुवदवस्था एव चान्विज्ञानेन 'व्याप्ता
 उपपद्यते — ३^० भा^०, २१

³ 'अहं' एव चान्विज्ञानेन व्यापकः । न हि तेनैव तत्त्वतः — ३^० भा^०, १३६

⁴ 'तथादग्निमात्रो, परमात्मैवाहमस्य इत्युचितम् ।' 'तस्यात् सर्वस्योदरे
 'अहमस्य' इत्येव भासते स्पष्टः । य प्रत्यये विद्यते तस्य प्रत्यये भवति सत्योऽयं'
 — 'मात्मनिदवस्थम्' ३७ and ३८ 'सर्वत्र सविनिश्चयः चैतन्यात्मक' 'अहं' इत्येव
 चान्विज्ञानम् (३^० भा^०, ४१२)

'सर्वत्र चान्विज्ञानात् 'सम्बन्ध' सत्यत्वं जायदादिव्यानेषु एक एवात्मा
 चान्विज्ञानी य प्रत्ययेन अनुमरणीयम्' (भा^० का^० भा^०, १७) 'कथमहं'

of consciousness, without being itself an *object* of consciousness.¹ It manifests itself as knower, at the time it manifests its states or its objects.² The cognitive states are variable, being determined by stimulating objects³; but the underlying conscious subject does not change. For, if it were to change itself, who is to know these changing states? ⁴ It is the constant factor in us,

मदोऽद्राक्ष 'मह' मिदं स्युः शमीति...एकस्मिन्नसति प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्ययः स्यात्—इत्यादि (वे० भा०, 2.2.25).

1 “चक्षुरादिव्यापारानुमितास्तित्वं प्रत्यगात्मानं, न ‘विषयभूतं’ चे विदुः” (ब०, 4.4.18).

“‘विषयैकियन्ते’ तु बाह्याध्यात्मिकानि भूतभौतिकानि चैतन्येन” (वे० भा०, 3.3.54).

“सर्वबोधान् प्रति बुध्यते ‘सर्वप्रत्ययदर्शो’ चिक्त्तिस्वरूपमात्रः, प्रत्ययैरेव प्रत्ययेषु अविशिष्टतया लब्धते, नान्यद्वारमात्मनो विज्ञानाय” (के० भा०, 2.4).

2 “अस्ति अनेकार्थदर्शी विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा (ब०, 4.3.7).”

“सर्वे प्रत्यया विषयैभवन्ति यस्य स आत्मा।...सर्वप्रत्ययदर्शित्वे च उपजनापाय-वर्जितदृक्स्वरूपतानित्यत्वं निर्विशेषैकत्वञ्च—के० भा०, 2.4).”

“देहादिलक्षणान् रूपादींश्च...देहादिव्यतिरिक्तेनैव विज्ञानस्वभावेन आत्मानं विजानाति (कठ० भा०, 4.3).” “येषां निराकारं ज्ञानं तेषामपि ज्ञानवशेव (i.e. ज्ञातवशेव) ज्ञेयावगति रिति ज्ञानमत्यन्त प्रसिद्धं—गी० भा०, 18-50).”

“विज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव अविक्रियस्य ‘विज्ञातलोपचारात्’ (गी० भा०, 13.2).

‘न हि प्रदीपः स्वरूपाभिव्यक्तौ प्रकाशान्तरमन्यतोऽपेक्षते स्वतो वा’ (के० भा०, 1.4).

3 कारकव्यापार (vide वे० भा०, 2.1.18).

4 चैतन्याव्यतिरेकेनैव हि कलाः जायमानास्तिष्ठन्त्यः (प्रलीयमानाश्च) सर्वदा लब्धन्ते। अतएव भान्ताः...चैतन्यमेव प्रतिक्षणं जायते नश्यतीति—इत्यादि प्र० भा०, 6.2).

“अन्यथा द्रष्टृ-दृश्ययोरसजातीयत्वाङ्गीकारे, द्रष्टुः परिणामित्वात् धीवत्, साक्षिता न स्यात्। यस्मात् साक्षी एवात्मा...न परिणामी” (उप० साह०, रामतीर्थटीका, 1514).

“अवस्थात्रयसाक्षी एक अव्यभिचारी, अवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यते (वे० भा०, 2.1.9).

not determined by anything else (*śāśvata*) It is our *true* self, and the particular states constitute our ordinary empirical self. The latter is really the 'object' of the former.¹ We are thus finite and infinite in our nature,—a combination of subject and object.² It is the infinite lying hidden in us which, as an End, moves us towards its fulfilment or realization.

From these considerations, we come to the following conclusions —

(i) As Brahman has no other cause of itself and is thus self-caused, so it has no other knower of itself. It is self-knower. As it is the knower of all, its knowability is not dependent on anything else. It knows itself. It is thus the absolute knower.³ If it be an object of a conscious subject other than itself, it would be dependent upon that. Its self-subsisting independence would vanish. It would not be a self-explanatory principle. That which is determined by something other than itself cannot be regarded as the first knower. But Sankara has defined Brahman as 'that

1. 'मनोऽन्तर् 'एवं परमात्मिन' न मज्जातिः—अनात्मन ईदृशदिवादिमयाग चानन्ते 'ह्यसमान' मन्त्र (i.e. its object) यदादिबन्धु, आत्मनेन दर्शनदवसादिकलां प्रति मज्जाति' (अत्र' भा', 3 12)

* (a) "एवं मनोमयादिभिः पूर्वपूर्वमादिभिः प्रत्यक्षान्ते मूले आत्मन्मयान्ते आत्मवत्तु मन्त्रं प्रादिन (b) तथा आत्माविदेनापि अविज्ञानं पश्यतां तस्मिन् आत्मवत्तु (३२, 23) Again—(a) स पुरुष एतत्तु भूतमाया कर्मवशात् प्रविशत् (i.e. अव्यय) (b) स पुरुष भूत आत्माविदेन आत्मना मन्त्र'द्वारा प्रकीर्तु मन्त्रात्मा --न वायु विद्युत् सुयोधादि यद (३२, 13 21) Again—(a) द्रष्टव्यत्वदर्शनाय भूमेव निदिश्यत एवद्वारेण (i) एवद्वारेण ईदृशदिर्नपातोपि आदिग्रन्त अविदेकिमि (अ' भा', 7 25 and 26)

2. Otherwise अनवस्था (regressus ad infinitum) would arise "मनात्मनो मातु मातु अस्मात् " (३२ वा' भा', 1 4)

which is in itself and is conceived through itself.' If it has another knower, it must fail to be a self-determined and self-conscious principle.¹ Sruti has declared therefore—

विज्ञातार मरे केन विजानीयात् ?

(ii) Our knowledge, as we have already seen, is dependent on, and determined by, the object² which is 'other' than us, which is outside³ us. Our ज्ञातृत्व is thus variable and dependent. But the consciousness of Brahman is self-determined and self-sufficient (स्वयंसिद्ध, अत्यन्तप्रसिद्ध)⁴; it is not produced or determined by something *other than itself*. In the earlier part of this chapter it has been pointed out that it produces its object from out of itself, and therefore its object, the world,—is not something *other* (अन्य), but only itself.⁵ It is thus a

¹ (a) यथा ज्ञेयं घटादिलक्षणं ज्ञाता ज्ञानेन व्याप्तुमिच्छति, तथा ज्ञानमपि (i.e. ज्ञातारमपि) ज्ञानान्तरेण (i.e. अन्येन ज्ञात्रा) ज्ञातव्यमाप्तुमिच्छेत् ? न चैतदस्ति । अतः अत्यन्तप्रसिद्धं ज्ञानं, ज्ञातापि अतएव प्रसिद्धएव (अत्यन्त-प्रसिद्ध—Self-sufficient, independent, self-determined and self-conscious)—गी० भा०, 18. 50. “यदा हि सर्व्वं ज्ञेयं.....तद्व्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानं ज्ञानमेव (i.e. ज्ञातैव)—प्र० भा०, 6.2.” “विज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव ‘विज्ञातृ’लोपचारात्—नैषदोषः—गी० 13.2.

(b) तद्ब्रह्म आत्मानमेव नित्यदृग्गुणं...अवेत् विदितवत् । ननु विप्रतिषिद्धं... विज्ञातुर्विज्ञानं ? न ; एवं विज्ञानान्न विप्रतिषेधः । अन्यज्ञानानपेक्षत्वाच्च । न च द्रष्टुर्नित्यैव दृष्टि रित्येवं विज्ञाते, द्रष्टृविषयां दृष्टि मन्यां आकाङ्क्षते (बृ०, 1.4.10).

(c) विज्ञानग्रहणमात्र एव विज्ञानसालिणी ग्रहणकाङ्क्षानुदयात् अनवस्था-ग्रहणानुपपत्तेः । स्वयं सिद्धस्य च सालिणी अप्रत्या ख्येयत्वात्—वे० भा०, 2.2.28.

² “विषय-विषयि-सम्बन्धजनितः” (तै० भा०, 2.8).

³ “देहादिवदेव चैतन्याद् बहिरूपलभ्यमानत्वात्” (वे० भा०, 4.1.2).

⁴ What is determined by something else can not be a self-determined and self-sufficient thing.

⁵ “न नित्यस्य अमूर्त्तरू...‘संयोगज’-दृष्ट्याद्यनित्यधर्मवत्त्वं सम्भवति”

self-determined principle. In manifesting its object, it manifests itself, in thinking of the world, it only thinks itself.¹ It is thus at once the subject and object of its thought.² We find therefore that Brahman is a self-conscious subject—the first knower.

We thus find that in Vedānta, Brahman is a self-conscious, self-determined subject.³ It is not, as many hold, a "homogeneous impersonal intelligence."

✓ 11 Brahman—its Directive Power (व्यवस्था)—

All the activities manifested in the world have behind them a unity which must be the source, of which they are the visible products, and this source or power is realising itself in these activities. Sankara's arguments in proof of Brahman as the seat of power are well-known. They are —

(1) Where regularity (नियमन प्रवचनम्) and adaptability

✓ (रचना)⁴—are visible in any action these marks indicate the presence and operation of a Director (चक्षुषाक्षी)⁵

(७० भा० १) "बोधय आपन्नं विमज्जति च तत्र एवं सति विक्रियारमक सादयव
अनित्य इत्यादयो दाया न परिहर्तुं शक्यन्ते" (६० भा०, २१)

¹ Cf. "वास्तान् मानसा वेदसि, स्रजस्तान्मात्रमा मता At ० ११८ ८^० भा०, १२

² "अभिज्ञा गामाधिक, न विषय विषयिभ्यश्चञ्जित" (१०, २४)

³ In Sankara's *hāṇya*, the terms *अन्यत्प्रसिद्ध स्वसिद्ध*—occur frequently. These terms, as we have already explained, mean—Not dependent on, not determined by something other than itself. It is self-determined and hence self-conscious. For, the world is in reality not other, but itself. In knowing the world it knows itself. Hence it is not determined by anything other, but itself.

✓ B—It is to be noted that this does not mean that Sankara has abolished the world. He simply holds it to be *अन्य* from Brahman, from the पारमार्थिक standpoint.

⁴ i.e. Adaptation of means towards an end—i.e. arrangement in a purposive way (विमिश्रकार्याभिसुखप्रवृत्ति—६० भा०, २२१)

✓ ⁵ "अग्निवायुमृत्वादिषु जगत् अस्मादेव उद्भवो विभ्यत्, नियमेन स्वस्थापारे
प्रवर्तन्ते इति ब्रह्मा एजयित्व मदीयं परमात्मन उपपद्यते, न वायुमात्रम्"
(६० भा०, १३३९)

(ii) Where a combined activity (संहननम्) for a common purpose (एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन) is visible—where parts are mutually related and act in subordination of the whole—it is to be inferred that a purposive power is present and operative behind such activity—which (power—सामर्थ्य) has combined the elements and directs them for its own purpose.¹

(iii) All material object in activity proves the presence of an intelligent principle as the source of these activities.²

(iv) In the Kena-bhāṣya, the true self is proved to be a Prayoktā (प्रयोक्ता) or Prerayitā (प्रेरयिता), and throughout this Upanishad, the real underlying self is regarded as a purpose—a will-power—the supreme End.³

¹ “नहि एषां ‘पराधीनां’ संहत्यकारित्वान् जीवनहेतुत्वमुपपद्यते। ‘स्वार्थेन’ असंहतेन केनचिदप्रयुक्तं संहतानां भवस्थानं न दृष्टम्।...संहतविलक्षण्येन तु सर्वं संहताः सन्तः प्राणादयः जीवन्ति। यस्य असंहतस्य अर्थो..सर्वं व्यापारं कुर्वन् वर्तते संहतः सन्, स ततोऽन्यः” (कठ°, 5.5).

Also “ऐन्द्रियिकाद्येष्टाः संहतैः कार्य-करणेर्निर्व्वर्त्तमाना दृश्यन्ते।—तच्च ‘एकार्थ-वृत्तित्वेन’ संहननं नान्तरेण चेतनमसंहतं सम्भवति” (तै° भा°, 2.7). “नहि मृदादयः...अचेतनाः...चेतनैरनधिष्ठिताः ‘विशिष्टकार्याभिसुखप्रवृत्तयो’ दृश्यन्ते” (वे° भा°, 2.2.2). ‘संहतत्वाच्च पारार्थ्योपपत्तिः प्राणस्य’—बृ° भा°, 2.1.15. [This is the relation of ‘End’ and ‘means.’ As End, it is the organising principle, a Unity. As means, it is the factor of plurality (संहतानामनेकत्वोपपत्तिः)—which are moulded into this End.]

² “अचेतनप्रवृत्तिश्चेतनाधिष्ठाननिवन्धना अचेतनप्रवृत्तित्वात् रथादिवत्” (रत्नप्रभा).

“अचेतनस्य काष्ठलोष्टसमस्य चेतनेनाप्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः” (वे° भा°, 3.2.38). Vide also बृ° भा°, 3.8.9, “तस्मात् (प्रशासनात्) सिद्धमस्य (अक्षरस्य) अस्तित्वम्”—इत्यादि.

³ “संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य ‘इच्छामात्रेणैव’ मन-आदि-प्रेषयितृत्वम्—इत्यस्य प्रदर्शनाय केनेषितमित्यादि विशेषणद्वयमुपपद्यते.” And this purpose cannot

— III Brahman is the supreme End or the supreme Good (सामानन्द्यम्)—

The varieties of pleasure, pain, etc., Sankarā declares, which we find manifested in the world and which the जीवः enjoy show the constant presence of a perfect good which finds higher and higher realisation in them¹

Now, the readers will find from these discussions that all the phenomenal cognitions elicited from the self are premeated and pervaded by the eternal consciousness underlying them², and the self is the source of all its visible activities in which the underlying power is manifesting itself partially. The self is, for this reason,

be resolved into the activities of the organs manas body etc
' किं यद्यपिसिद्धमेव कार्य करण मघातय प्रेषयितवम् ? —इत्यादि Prāṇa is the root cause of all kinds of activities and the soul is the power behind this Prāṇa in activity. The source of all activities must itself be a Power. This Upanishad is invaluable for it holds the soul to be will power.

१ ' परमानन्दस्यैव विषय विषयकारिणः सात्वा प्रसूता परमानन्दस्य सात्वा चययवा ब्रह्मादिमनुष्यपर्यन्तेषु भूतेषुपञ्चीकृत्यते आनन्दमात्राकारेण साविषयमधि जिनमिपति " (३० भा०, 4333) In ३० भा०, this good is called साधु "साधयस्य लोकादिकार्येषु कारणस्य अनुगतत्वात् साधुशब्दवाच्य ब्रह्म वा लोकादिकार्येषु अनुगतम्"—221 Also of "सुखस्वरूपमाका प्रियादीनां सुखावयवानां तेषु अनुसूतत्वात् कर्मणी, नक्षयितत्वात् सुखस्य चणिकत्व '— तै० भा०, 25 Here of "इत्यस्य कारणोभूते आनन्दस्थे ब्रह्मणि सुख्यं प्रवर्तकत्वं दर्शयति" (महाम रते नीलकण्ठ वनपञ्च, Chap. 213)

२ ' आत्मन 'स्वरूप'—अग्निः । तथापि बुद्धे रूपाधिलक्षणाया चक्षुरादिद्वारे विषयकारिणः परिणामिण्या ये शब्दाद्याकारावभाषा (ie cognitions or states of consciousness), ते आत्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता एव उत्पद्यन्ते । तस्मात् विज्ञानशब्दवाच्या, विनाभावभासाय ते " (तै० भा०, ३ 2) Cf also "अन्यच्च व्याप्य, अन्यत् व्यापक, न तेनैव सत् व्यप्यते । कश्चिं हि कर्तुं क्रियया व्याप्यमान भवति (३० भा०, 446) "सर्वं प्रत्यया विषयौभवन्ति यम्य स आत्मा सर्वप्रत्ययदर्शी" (कै० भा०, 24).

characterised as *Sattā-sphurtti-rūpāḥ* (सत्ता-स्फूर्ति-रूपः).¹ It is partially manifest in its cognitions and in its activities, and in varieties of pleasure, pain, etc., and they are therefore regarded as a *means*—द्वारभूतानि—indicative marks—for the presence and operation of the underlying Rational power.²

It is very hard to believe how such broad and clear facts have escaped several writers who have, unjustly, exhibited Sankara's Brahman or the self as a mere "abstract intelligence" to the learned world.

12. We cannot conclude this chapter without recording Sankara's view on the purpose of

The purpose or end of the creation.

the creation of the universe as stated by him in his commentaries. It has

been shown above that in the System of Vedānta, it is held that Brahman has a 'nature,' a स्वभाव, a स्वरूप, of its own; and this nature cannot be resolved into anything else. This nature (स्वभाव) is constant and does not vary

¹ "सकलविकारानुस्यूत—सत्तास्फूर्तिरूपः—विकारोपमई न अनुसन्धेयः" (उप० सा०) (सत्ता=Being; स्फूर्ति=Active Power).

"निष्कलं निष्क्रियं...जगद्बीजप्रवर्त्तकं नियन्तृत्वात् अन्तर्यामिसंज्ञं भवति"—(ऐ० भा०)। "चेतनेनाप्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः" (वे० भा०, 3.2.38.).

² So it is likened sometimes to the reflected image of the sun upon a surface of a lake. As the reflected image is an imperfect and partial expression of the sun which underlies the image; so the nature of the self is imperfectly and partially reflected or manifested in our cognitive states and activities, etc.—

अयं पुरुषः भूतमात्रासंसर्गतः प्रविभक्तः (अन्य इव separate) जलादौ चन्द्रादिप्रतिबिम्बवत्, कार्यकरणे ईह प्रविष्टः" (वृ० भा०, 4.2.21).

"तदन्तःकरणे देहेन्द्रियोपाधिद्वारेणैव निर्दिश्यते 'विज्ञानादि'-शब्दैः।"

"अस्मि...सर्वान्तरतमं कूटस्थं...श्रीत्रादिरपि तत्-सामर्थ्यनिमित्तं। श्रीत्रादेः, स्वविषयव्यञ्जनसामर्थ्यं...चेतनेऽसंभूते सर्वान्तरे सति भवति. नासतीति" (वे० भा०, 1.2). Cf. "सोऽस्मि कार्यकरणं संघातविलक्षणः, यथेष्टयति (वृ०, 3.8.8-9)."

under any circumstances. This nature remains identical, even in its relation with the things of the manifested world (व्यापयोगात्). An object, Sankara remarks,¹ must have always one nature and one nature alone; it cannot have more than one nature. Otherwise, it would be impossible to recognise the object. Brahman is always a unity and it does not vary in its relation to any place, time, object or circumstances.

The diversities of the changing nāma-rūpas (नाम रूपा) which have evolved and are still continuously evolving point, Sankara observes, to something beyond, as their *cause*; they cannot but indicate the presence of some conditioning activity which must have produced them—

— “उदमुत्पत्तं विदमुत्पत्तं भविष्यतीति” (दा० भा०
quoted in वे० भा०, 4.3.14)

Again, these emerging changes point to some *final End* (उद्देशं), towards which they are moving; they indicate the final stage, the complete realisation, of the purpose which has created them—

— “उद्देशं तस्यैव जगन्मूलस्य ‘विशेषतः’ * दर्शयति” ।

(It is thus that Sankara states here the fact that the created world—the emerging changes—always carry with them the idea of a purpose as yet unrealised.² The

¹ “एकस्य धर्मक स्वभावत्वात्तदपत्तेः” (वे० भा०, 3.2.21)

² “न तावत् स्थितेव परस्य ब्रह्मणः सम्यग्निष्ठत्वं मुपपद्यते । नहि उपाधि-
योगादपि चत्वारः सप्तस्य चतुस्रः चत्वारः स्वभावः * कथ्यवति” (वे० भा० 3.2.11)

“उपाधिनिरमिश्रस्य च ‘वस्तुधर्मत्वात्तदपत्तेः’” (वे० भा०, 3.2.15).

* The term विशेय used here and elsewhere means the End (as contrasted with the means). It is explained in the Gita bhasya thus—

“जीयमेव प्राप्तं कर्तुं ज्ञानफल (End) भवति” (गी० भा०, 13. 17)

* “वैवमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनां निराकारार्थत्वं प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति” (वे० भा०, 4.3.14).

readers are requested to carefully mark the arguments employed by Sankara to establish this important position. He speaks of 'ज्ञेय' *i.e.*, Brahman (to be realised), as the *final end* of realisation--

“ज्ञानफलं भवति” ।—

that is to say, Brahman is *completely* realised in the *final* stage, and that is the final purpose or end of the created world.¹

This truth is very distinctly explained in the Gita-bhasya—

“मया अध्यक्षत्वेन हंतुना चराचरं जगत्
विपरिवर्तते सर्व्वासु अवस्थासु” । (9.10.)

What do these emerging changes—परिवर्त्तनसु—परिणामसु of the world imply? Whatever has been manifested in the world—all its व्यवहारसु, *i.e.*, all its states, activities, the objects, in fact, everything of the world—all these are for—

“आत्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात् सर्व्वव्यवहारसु”...

i.e., “all these move towards the *final* realisation of the Atma. Brahman is the final End (अवसान), for the realisation of which, these changing manifestations are perpetually moving on.”²

¹ Vide Gita-bhasya, 13.17—“ज्ञेयमेव ज्ञातं सत् ज्ञानफलमिति ‘ज्ञान-गम्य’मुच्यते.” Brahman is the फल, *i.e.*, the final End. Hence it is that in Vedanta, it is called as पथ्यन्तं, *i.e.*, the last or final End. “अवगति-पथ्यन्तं ज्ञानं, नातःपरं किञ्चित् ज्ञातव्यमस्ति.” When this End is realised, there remains no further end for realisation, and our desires and aspirations get their fulfilment (वे० भा०, 1.1.1). “नातःपरं किञ्चित् आकाङ्क्षमस्ति” (2.1.14). It is the goal where our higher and higher aspirations are finally fulfilled.

² The same idea is expressed in “आत्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात् सर्व्वव्यवहारसु” (गीता भा०, 18.50). All our actions (प्रवृत्तयः) being परार्थे, they are for the realisation of the Power behind them—which is their अवसान, final End.

This is the purport, Śaṅkara goes on to point out, of the creation mentioned in the Śruti-texts. When the *final stage* is reached, then and then alone the changing *nāma-rūpa* (नामरूप) will reach the complete realisation of the purpose working behind them. Hence this वास्तविक, i.e., this realisation of the final end or purpose is inherent—interwoven—into the structure of the created elements of the world. The creation is meant to show this important truth in the Śruti. It is not meant to show that the underlying Brahman is *identical* with the world, as if Brahman has no 'nature' of its own to realise.

We had occasion to point out above that in the Vedānta-System, we find mention of the four *typical* classes of *Bijās* (बीजाः); and that these are characterised by growth and development, and this characteristic feature marks them out to be living individuals (जीवन्).¹ In the Gita-līṅgā, it is stated that they are continuous. This description of the *Bijās* (बीजाः) clearly indicates that by them the different *grades* of finite individuals from the lowest to the highest are meant. Now, these continuously evolving higher and higher grades of the individuals are all interwoven in the Infinite Self (Brahman) which is always present behind them.² In the lower finite individuals, the Infinite is realised unconsciously.

1 "बीजप्ररोहकारणं प्ररोहधर्मिणी । न हि प्रबीजं किञ्चित् प्ररोहति । निवृत्तप्ररोहदर्शनात्, बीज-सन्ततिर्न भवेति इति गम्यते " (गी० भा०, 9.18).

This term बीज is synonymous with the term भूत in the Gita, and the भूत is described as जीवाधिष्ठितानां in 10.32. Cf. "बीजं मां सर्वभूतानां" (7.10). It is clear therefore that बीजः = भूतः = जीवः.

2 "सर्वमिदं..... सर्वं हि भूतानि..... प्रीतमनुविष्टं मनुष्यं मयि परमेश्वरे" (गी० भा०, 7.7). Cf. also "सर्वं प्राणाः..... सर्वं एते आत्मानः..... यस्यात् व्युत्स्रन्ति..... यदात्मकस्य यत्नेन" (इ० भा०, 2.1.20). Also इ० भा०, 2.5.15 "तेषां पारम्पर्यं गत्वा एकयिन् महासामान्ये चत्तर्भावः" (इ०, 2.4.9).

It is only in man that the Infinite is present and is being realised consciously.

According to Sankara, then, this realisation of the Infinite in the world and in the finite human beings in higher and higher forms until the final stage is reached—is the purpose of the creation.¹

¹ Such is the 'nature' or स्वभाव—of Brahman—"स्वभावादेव सन्भवति" (वे० भा०, 2.1.33-34). "परिपूर्णशक्तिकन्तु ब्रह्म—अनपेक्ष्य वाच्यं साधनं—स्वयमेव परिणमते" (वे० भा०, 2.1.24);

CHAPTER II

THE PURE EGO AS ACTIVE POWER

1 The individual ego, as depicted in the Advaita philosophy, has given rise to several controversial points, as regards its nature and character, in certain quarters. Among other points, the most important controversy has gathered round the question of the 'activity' of the pure Ego. An idea prevails that in the Sankara system the Individual Ego, like Brahman, is merely an "abstract intelligence destitute of activity." How the idea arose we shall try to set forth. It was found out from the Bhāṣya that Sankara raised a clear voice of warning against ascribing the objective qualities to the subject, that as soon as it acquires an objective content, the "I" passes over into the Me. The Ego or subject is that through which we know all, it follows from this that it cannot itself become an object of knowledge. And because the self cannot be known, Sankara treated it as an "abstract concept, as pure knowledge or intelligence." This idea was strengthened and received an additional force when it was discovered that there were sentences in the Sankara bhāṣya itself which unmistakably refuse to allow 'agency' to the Pure Ego. Take for instance such sentences as the following —

‘ न स्यादाविकं कर्तुं तं चारमन सम्भवति, चनिर्माच
प्रमज्ञान् । कर्तुं त्वस्यभावले हि चारमनो, न कर्तुं त्वा
त्रिर्माच सम्भवति, चघेरिव चीय्यात् —

i.e., The self cannot be an agent ; it is not active. If there be agency in the nature of the self, it can never free itself from it—no more than the fire can free itself from its heat. The activity does not really belong to the self, and if we could only realise this, we gain a true conception of the individual self.

Now, the natural consequence of these discoveries in the Sankara-bhāṣyas was not slow to make its appearance. The conclusion which the critics of the Sankara system drew from these, resolves itself into such a train of thoughts as this :—

“The idea of intelligence dissociated from the idea of activity is an idea which passes from the subjective order to the objective order. The self thus conceived merges necessarily in the universal and it disappears into a pantheistic void.....We can only be sure of this pure Ego, not as an object, but as a subject *persistently active* so long as we have experience. But this activity Sankara denies to the self.”

But the self which the critics of the Sankara-system have found out is not the true self at all according to Sankara as we shall presently see. Sankara is reluctant to call this a self at all ; he rather wants to call it a non-ego—अनात्मा.¹

Sankara not only refuses to allow *agency* to *this* self, but he has refused to allow it *knowledge* also. For, all the elements which constitute this self are not *free* in their activities ; the next term being given by the preceding

¹ “चलनात्मकस्य कर्मणः—अनात्मकर्तृकस्य—‘अहं करोमी’ति प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्” (गी० भा०, 18.66). “देहादिसंघाते ‘अहं’ प्रत्ययो मित्वा”—*Ibid.* It is called अनात्मा because it is the product of interaction with the Non-Ego “चलिक्रिया तु प्राणस्यैव मन-आदिषु” (के० वा० भा, 1.1).

which determines its action.¹ And the states constituting this self have borrowed their consciousness from the *true conscious self* which is present *behind* them.²

2. We propose in this chapter to consider carefully the view if in Sankara's system, he regards the Pure Ego merely as an

The empirical, actual self and the transcendental, true self. The transcendental self is the true 'agent'.

"abstract intelligence," and whether it is active or not. It is needless to say that there is hardly any justification for this belief in the writings of Sankara himself. Let us now proceed to consider what evidence the Bhāgyas themselves offer which show that the individual Ego has ever been regarded by Sankara as "dissociated from activities."

The finite self is *ordinarily* regarded as a self-contained entity existing on its own account. It is merely a bundle of passive feelings and states, and possesses a fund of impulses and passions which constitute the source of its physical and mental movements or activities. It is continuous with, and a part of, the external nature which has equipped it with its organs of sense and the nervous system. When the organs of sense come in contact with the external environment (विषयिन्द्रिय-सम्पर्कः), the latter evokes certain states and activities in the former, and these actions

¹ "विक्रियावती हि चक्षुः संदृशते सुखयति ; संदृश्य वा 'कर्तृत्वं' व्यात् । न तु चविक्रियस्य चारमनः क्षमयितुं संदृशनमस्तीति, न सुख्य 'कर्तृत्वं' सुखयति" (गी० भा०, 18.17).

² "चक्षुर्ज्ञेयं निचविज्ञानस्य रूपेण—स चाक्षो बुद्ध्यात्मा च निचविज्ञानं चारमा चभूयमनः" (शं-भा० भा०, 1. 4). "देहादिमेषात्मन्य मर्त्यादिस्वरूपत्वाविरोधात् विज्ञेयत्वाविरोधाच्च, न युक्तं 'विज्ञातृत्वं' । तस्मात् देहादिमेषाणां विज्ञानरूपभावेन चात्मना 'विज्ञातृति' (कठ० भा०, 4.3)."

and reactions constitute the self.¹ This is the actual empirical self. According to Sankara, it is not the real self ; and he calls it—

“ कर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्व-विशिष्ट जीवः ”

and

“ आत्मा अपरमार्थः ” ।²

The agency disclosed in its activities is not the true agency at all ; for, all the elements constituting this agency (कर्तृत्व) determine, and are determined by, one another in an unbroken series of mechanical causality.³ What this self does at the present moment is but the necessary outcome of his motive and character (प्रकृति) and habit formed in the past—

“ एषणा...कामः, येन प्रयुक्तः अवश्य इव...यहिर्मुखः,

न खं लोकां प्रतिजानाति ”

(बृह° भाष्य, 1.4.17).

¹ “ श्रोत्रादीनि इन्द्रियाणि...मात्राः । मात्राणां स्पर्शाः—शब्दादिभिः संग्रोगः । ” (गी० भा०) । “विषयेन्द्रियोपाधि-सम्बन्ध-जनितेन अन्तःकरणगता‘भिव्यक्त-विशेष-विज्ञानेन’ विज्ञानमयस्तां बुद्धिं व्याप्नोति” (बृ० भा०, 2.1.17). शब्देन विषयेण श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं दीप्यते...गन्धादिभिरपि घ्राणादिषु अनुगृह्यतेषु...मनसि...प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्त्यादयो भवन्ति ” (बृ०, 4.3.6).

² Sankara calls this self as “भूतमावासंसर्गजनितः ” and “मनोमयादि-पञ्चकोषविशिष्टः.” This is regarded by him as *passive* self, and the real self is what underlies it. “ करणानि हि मन-आदीनि नियमेन प्रवर्तन्ते ; तत्, न असति चेतनावति अधिष्ठातरि उपपद्यते ” (केन० वा० भा०, 1.1).

³ “चक्षुरादीनि एव दर्शनादिक्रियाकर्तृनीति चेत् ? न । भिन्नकर्तृत्वे प्रतिसम्मानानुपपत्तिः । मनसोऽपि विषयत्वात् (ज्ञेयत्वात्), द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिः ।... तस्मात् अन्तःस्थं ‘व्यतिरिक्तं’ व्योतिः (i.e., true Atma)” (बृ० भा०, 4.3.6).

i.e., he is a slave of impulses and instincts which move in him and sway him hither and thither, these impulses move him to act in the direction of their guidance. He has no eye to look to the *other path*.

This self is not free to choose the *end* of his life—

“पुरुषार्थसाधनप्रतिपत्तौ चक्षुरन्य परवर्गीकृतचित्तम्” ।

(ब० भा०, 4335)

But, Brahman indwells and is revealed in man in the form of infinite *ज्ञानैश्वर्य* 'hidden

Brahman is revealed in man as infinite ideal—infinite *ज्ञानैश्वर्य*—and it is the moving power

in him—in the form of infinite ideal of truth, beauty and goodness.¹ These indwelling *ज्ञानैश्वर्य*s—these Ideals—are gradually being revealed in man

in higher and higher form and they are carrying the man to infinite possibilities in future. The infinite Brahman is thus immanent in man and it is for this presence that we do not feel content with our actual situation (*विषय विरक्ति*) and seek higher and higher ends.

The *ज्ञान शक्ति सौन्दर्य*, etc., as we *actually* find them manifested in human nature are all imperfect, broken and fragmentary. But the *ज्ञानैश्वर्य*—which lies hidden deep behind in man is infinite and inexhaustible, and hence the two cannot be identified. Yet we identify the two, and the indwelling infinite *ज्ञानैश्वर्य* which constitutes the *real self* and which is the moving force within us becomes concealed, and the actual human nature as expressed in

¹ ‘जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यं तिरोभावः, देहेन्द्रियं मनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनायोगात्”

(ब० भा०, 326)

‘स्वरूपस्य अनपायित्वात् उपाधिकृतस्वरूपं तिरोभावात् (ब० भा०, 3235)

‘प्राकृतविषयविकारविज्ञाने प्रच्छन्नम्’ (कठ० भा० 212)

deeds and words is all-in-all to us, and future possibilities are shut out.¹

But the pursuit of knowledge more and more, the quest of beauty in higher and higher forms which no finite objects of the world can perfectly satisfy, our infinite capacity and work for higher and higher ends, our dissatisfaction with mundane goods—all these prove the presence of Brahman in us in a newer way, such that it was never present in the lower animals in the same manner. Sankara points out—

“ The supreme self is *revealed* in the spirit of man in a higher and superior form. It is for this presence that man ever wants to *know* more and more, and by mundane means ever to reach what is supra-mundane.”

“प्राधान्यात् । किं पुनः प्राधान्यं पुरुषे ?—कर्मज्ञानाधिकारः । पुरुष एव हि शक्तत्वात्, अर्थित्वात्, अपर्युद्धस्ताच्च—अर्थी, विद्वान्, समर्थः...पुरुषे त्वेव आविस्तरमात्मा । स हि प्रज्ञानेन सम्यग्गतमः विज्ञानं पश्यति शस्त्रनं...सर्त्तुन अमृतमीच्छति ” । अथ इतरिषां पशूनां अशना-त्रिपासे एव अभिविज्ञानं ” ।—

(तैत्ति० भाष्य, 2.1.)

¹ No one of its *actual* expressions can fix the infinite *possibilities* of the self in a rigid and *final* form. The Gita has condemned the idea of fixing or identifying the infinite possibility with its actual expressions—as—तामसिक । “ यत्ज्ञानं कृतस्त्वत्, ...‘ एतावानेव आत्मा ईश्वरोवा नातः परमस्तीति’...तामसानामेव ईदृशं ज्ञानं दृश्यते ” (गी०, 18.22). *Vide* also वे० सूत्र, 3,2,22 “प्रकृतैतावच्च प्रतिषेधति” ।

² The implication of the term शस्त्रनं is that you cannot keep a man satisfied with the knowledge of *to-day*, he will seek for the knowledge of *to-morrow* and so on. सर्त्तुन अमृतं—implies, he will seek the supra-mundane End, through the mundane means;—you cannot keep him content with what is mundane only. We have translated the passage accordingly.

Then again—

"पूयं पूयं-प्रवृत्तिनिरोधेन, उत्तरोत्तरपूयं

प्रवृत्तिजननस्य प्रवृत्त्यामाभिमुख्येन प्रवृत्त्यन्त्याद्यर्थात् ।—

(गी० भाष्य, 18.66).

i.e., "By higher and higher *works* and *pursuits*, man desires to realise higher and higher *ends*, until all his pursuits are directed to the realisation of the supreme End."

And he further adds that—

"to other animals, their knowledge and action are limited to present eating and enjoyment."

Brahman thus indwells in us as an Ideal or End and this End is the 'higher self'—the real 'nature' of man. This 'nature' underlies all his manifested states and activities. This End or Purpose lying hidden in man carries the man to infinite possibilities in future. To quote a typical illustration¹ from the Vedānta—

As गृत्तिका (a lump of earth) moves to realise its future ideal पट (the earthen jar), which lies hidden in its nature; so the ideal which is inherent in man's nature gradually works out its end.

this end is thus the moving force or the *real agent* in man—

"सर्वप्रवृत्तीनामात्मन्यवसानार्थत्वात्"²

i.e., the realisation of Brahman in our self—the ब्रह्मात्मैकत्व—is the पुरुषार्थ or the final end of our life.

¹ Vide Chap. III of this book for an elaboration of this.

² Cf. also—"अन्यमिदं प्रमाणं...जातः परं किञ्चित् 'आकाश' मति" (वे० भा०, 2.1.14).

"ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः, 'अवगतिपर्यन्त' ज्ञानं" (1.1.1).

"नहि एकत्वाद्यवगतौ सत्या...पुरुषार्थसमाप्तिवृद्ध्यान्तेः" (4.3.14).

This is called 'पर्यन्त,' i.e., the final End. "अथ येन ज्ञातं सत्, 'ज्ञानफलं' भवति" (गी० भा०, 13.17)।

Now, this 'higher self' or the End is our real self lying behind our states and activities. It is present as Purposive Power or End of our life.¹ It is not a slave like the empirical self, but is the true determining agent. It is not in time-series, but above it. It can introduce a new element or a difference in the time-series. Its actions are not determined by antecedents in time. It can direct the natural courses of the functions of its organs and lead them to the realisation of its own 'purpose'—

“स्वाभाविकात् कार्यकरणप्रवृत्तिगोचरात्,
विमृशीकृत्य, प्रत्यगात्मसोतस्त्वया प्रवर्त्तयति” ।
(वेदा^० भाष्य, 1.1.4).

“कार्य-करण-संघातस्य स्वभावेन सर्वतः
प्रवृत्तस्य—सन्मार्गे एव निरीधः” ।
(गी^० भा^०, 13.7).

3. Here in this connection, we should like to invite our readers' attention to an invaluable opinion of Sankara which occurs frequently in his Bhāṣyas. We mean how Sankara has drawn out a distinction between the respective characteristics of the Intelligent self (चेतन) and the non-intelligent elements of nature (अचेतन). The readers would do well to bear these characteristic features carefully in their minds. Sankara has characterised the चेतन or the Intelligent Self as स्वार्थ (swārtha), that is to say—it exists *for itself* and it has the *purpose* or the reason of its existence in itself. The चेतन is always described as स्वतः सिद्ध or नित्यसिद्ध,—i.e., it is self-existent and self-sufficient and

¹ These states and activities cannot really conceal it.

“संघातव्यतिरिक्तं यत् स्वतन्त्रं यद् इच्छामात्रेणैव मन-आदिप्रोषयितृत्वं...संहतानां परार्थत्वात्” (केन भाष्य, 1.1).

does not depend for its existence on any other thing. In contrast with this characteristic mark of the वेद, he has called the वेद or the material elements as *वैय* (*Parārtā*),—i.e., existing and working for something else which is distinct from them in its nature, or in other words, which work and exist for the 'purpose' of something other than these elements. Sankara has pointed out the fact that the वेद has no purpose of its own—

“वेदेने भ दौर्गतम् ।” (उ भा 4 17)

He has thus described the nature of 'purpose' inherent in Brahman—

“आत्मोद्भवा वासा ।”

“इ वासादिषु वेदेनमसि ।”

As our uncontrolled human desires and purposes are dependent on, and determined by, their *extraneous* stimulating causes; as these, when produced, master us;—such are not the purposes of Brahman, which are *अन्य* (*ananya*) from its nature, i.e., not distinct or separable from the nature of Brahman.

The desires of living beings do not appertain to self, and require motives like virtue, etc., in the accomplishment of objects distinct from the self. But Brahman's wishes or purposes are prompted by no such motives, nor is Brahman influenced by them, because its purposes are not distinguishable from it.²

¹ “यदा अस्याम् परब्रह्मकथं कामादयः प्रवर्तयन्ति, न तथा ब्रह्मच, प्रवर्तयन्ति; कामाः । कथं तदि ? आत्मभूतत्वादिभ्यः । यदा अस्यात्मनामभूताः निमित्तदेवाः आत्मव्यतिरिक्ताः साधनान्तरादेवाय, न तथा ब्रह्मच, । कथं तदि ? आत्मोद्भवाः ।” (तै० भाष्य, 26)

² These purposes are Divine Ideas which are elsewhere called as सामान्या subsumed under and organised by the highest सामान्य ।—Vide Chap 1, pp 60-61, of this book

To recognise the character of a man—his will—we must find the expression of his will in *action*. Brahman is best apprehended by our mind through its self-manifestation,—through the manifestation and expression of its purposes in the created world. Apart from its self-manifestation, Brahman for human thought tends to become a metaphysical abstraction. A Divine purpose is constantly working out and gradually developing from within and the world is progressively working out a purpose—a plan which is fulfilling itself in and through the order of nature.

Now, manifested nature and its elements, being परार्थ, are not self-sufficient and independent at all, but are constantly dependent on the self whose purpose they fulfil. They have only an instrumental value;—they are mere *means* through which the purpose of the self is constantly realised. If you deny this, “what are really परार्थ in their nature would themselves become स्वार्थ and would therefore be meaningless”—

“स्वार्थाः सर्वान् प्रवृत्तयः व्यर्थाः प्रसज्येरन्”

(गी० भा०, 18.50).

“Pleasure and pain and the like would, in that case, work and exist for the sake of pleasure and pain and the like”—

“न च देहाद्यचेतनार्थत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुं ।

न च सुखार्थं सुखं, दुःखार्थं वा दुःखं” ।

From these observations of Sankara, it irresistibly follows that the world and the differentiations visible in the world are to be regarded as a means or instruments for the realisation of the Divine purpose ; that a Divine purpose is realising itself gradually through the differences or stages of nature.

The important truth just noted can also be gathered from Sankara's comment on the Vedānta-sūtra (4.3.14). In this commentary, Sankara shows Brahman to be the supreme goal or end. When this goal is reached, all our desires are satisfied and no *further* desire arises beyond this—

“न भूयः चाचित् चाकाङ्क्षा उदयायते.

परंपरार्थमस्ति-बहुपक्षः” ।

Here, in Brahman,—the *end* of human aspirations finds its *final* satisfaction. Thus the Vedāntic चेतन ब्रह्म, is to be always thought of as a Purpose or End¹

But Sankara observes in the same commentary that it is otherwise with the created elements of the world—

“नैवमुत्पत्त्यादित्युक्तो नैराकाङ्क्ष-
प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति” ;—

that is to say, the idea of the *final* End, the idea of the final realisation—is not to be expected *within* the sphere of created nature and in its elements. For, this idea lies *beyond* them. As the process of the world is progressively moving² to the final goal which lies *beyond* it, no one of its elements can give us the *final* satisfaction. This remark implies that nature is परार्थ (parārtha)—a *means*—for the realisation of the final goal or end ; for, it gives rise to the idea of something which lies as its *source* and which also lies as its final *goal* towards which it is moving.³

¹ Which is being gradually realised in the changing elements of the world and which is constantly directing them to their final goal.

² “चित्तोद्वाधिविषेयतागतव्यात्.....आत्मनः.....एकव्यवस्थापि.....उत्तरोत्तर-
माविष्कृतस्य तारतम्य कैश्वर्यशक्तिविषेयैः (वे० भा०, 1.1.11).

³ “नैवमुत्पत्त्यादित्युक्तो नैराकाङ्क्ष-प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति । तथाहि...
नैदममूलं भविष्यति इति उपन्यस्य, उद्वेकं सत्येव एकस्य अगम्यस्य ‘विशेष्यत्’

4. The readers perhaps remember that in Chap. I, we have found that our idea of the

The finite self is स्वार्थं
(End or purpose) and
its organism is परार्थं
(A means).

conditioned is composed of (1) some kinds of being (सामान्य) and (2) the conditions or limits (विशेष—विकार)

under which they are known. All

these definite individual beings are *qualitatively* distinct in our consciousness and are all relative realities. These relative realities can be conceived only in connection with an absolute Reality. Sankara has shown that 'those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, jars, etc., employ for their purpose certain *determined causal substances*, such as milk, clay, etc. Each causal substance has a certain *capacity* for some particular effects only and not for other effects;—this capacity is the certain *Power* of the cause.'¹ We have seen that the *effects* are the means for the realisation of the *End* or the purpose working within, and each of the *definite causes* are but the *proximate ends* and these are all subservient to a *single ultimate end*.² It shows an *immanent* unifying power realising purpose;—it is a power *differentiating* its parts

दर्शयति" (वे० भा०, 4.3.14)। i.e., The manifested or created elements invariably involve the idea of a Purpose or End (विज्ञेयत्व) beyond them, which has not been realised as yet.

¹ "दधिघटरुचकाद्यर्थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि चौरमृत्तिकासुवर्णादीनि उपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते । न हि दध्यर्थिभिः मृत्तिका उपादीयते, न घटार्थिभिः चौरं...कस्मात् चौरादेव दधि उत्पद्यते न मृत्तिकायाः?...चोरे एव दध्नः कश्चिदतिशयः, न मृत्तिकायां"—इत्यादि (वे० भा० 2.1.18)।

² "सामान्य-विशेषवानर्थी नामव्याकरण-वाक्ये विवक्षितः...अनेके हि विलक्षणाः सामान्य-विशेषाः—तेषां पारम्पर्यगत्या एकस्मिन् महासामान्ये अन्तर्भावः" (ब्र० भा०)।

"सामान्ये लब्धसत्त्वकानामेव विशेषाणां कर्मणा स्पष्टीकरणम्" (छा० भा०, 7.4.1).

from within and making the parts to serve as *means* for the realisation of a purpose¹

We find therefore, that all the elements of *human organism* also exist and work together for the realisation of the purpose of the self which controls and directs them² Sankara has observed—

"The director is inferred by a logical necessity from the activity manifested by the ear and others combined, such as deliberation, volition, etc., inured *for the benefit* of something distinct from them all (ear, etc.). As things combined and organised for a common purpose or end exists *for the use* of other thing not so combined, we argue there is a *director* of the ear, etc. and *for whose use* the whole lot exists and has been combined."³ Each of these fulfils

१ "इक्षी हि कर्तुं करणं विप्रिया निपचेतयामस्तुष्यं . स्तेव भवति" ।

"तद्य एकाद्वैतत्वेन संवृत्तं

तत्कारणं चेत्तन्मसद्वर्तं न भवति" (सं० भा०, २७) ।

[एकाद्वैतत्वेन संवृत्तं—A central power makes the plurality of parts co-operate as factors of a higher unity]

२ "संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामन्त्रेणैव मनःवादि प्रेषयितृत्वं.. सद्गतानां परार्थत्वात्" (सं० भा०, ११) ।

३ "सर्वं हि कायकरवजातं 'पराधीनं' सद्गतं न सद्प्राप्तक-चेतदेव" (सं० भा०, ४४) ।

We invite our reader's attention to the Bhāṣya on the Kena-Upanishad, १ Here Sankara calls the true self as the Purpose or End which directs our impulses, organs, manas, etc., etc., for the realisation of itself 'सत्त्वस्य इच्छामन्त्रेणैव मनःवादि प्रेषयितृत्वं—इत्यादि' । In the भाष्य of this Upanishad this self is described and proved as प्रेरिता, i.e., a directive or purposive Power

४ न हि एषा 'पराधीना' सद्गत्यकारित्वात् जीवनहेतुत्वमुपपद्यते । 'स्वाधेन' अमद्वैतेन परिचयं कृत्वा 'अद्वयुक्तं' सद्गतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं तथा प्राणादीनामपि सद्गत्यकारित्वात् भवितुमर्हति । अतः.. सद्गतप्राणादिविलचयेन तु सर्वं सद्गता;

a function and in fulfilling it, each contributes to the realisation of the purpose—अर्थ—of the cause within. Sankara says—

“एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन संहननं अन्तरेण चेतनं न भवति”

—(तै० भा०, 2.7).

i.e., Mutually dependent activities for the purpose of a common object are not possible without an independent intelligent power.

The following observations of Sankara will help us in arriving at the same conclusion :—

“We are not told by scripture that the final welfare of man (पुरुषार्थ) depends on the scriptural passages about the *creation* and the like. All the passages setting forth *creation* and so on only subserve the purpose of the realisation of Brahman. The passages about Brahman *modifying itself into the form of this world* is merely to be applied as a means for the realisation of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring about an independent result.”¹

These remarks tell us that we are never to understand the universe of *nāma-rūpa* as mere self-existing (स्वतन्त्रं)

सन्तो जीवन्ति ।...यस्य असंहतस्य ‘अर्थे’ प्राणापानादिः सर्वं व्यापारं कुर्वन् वृत्ते संहतः सन्, स ततोऽन्यः सिद्धः ” (कठ० भा०, 55).

N.B.—This shows that the Vedantic Brahman and the individual self as well are not abstract intelligences, as many seem to hold, but they are conscious organising unities or powers.

¹ “न ह्यर्थं सृष्ट्यादि-प्रपञ्चः प्रतिपादयिषितः ; न हि तत्प्रतिवदः कश्चित् पुरुषार्थः दृश्यते...दर्शयति च सृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थताम्” (वे०, 1.4.14).

Cf. “यत्तत्र अप्रलं श्रूयते जगदाकार परिणामेत्यादि...तत् ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वे न विनियुज्यते, न तु स्वतन्त्रं फलाय कल्प्यते ” (2.1.14).

changes, but as movement to a definite goal—a progress; not as becoming merely, but as being that is becoming. The changing elements (*सत्त्व*) are the *means* serving the purpose of the being of the cause—the Power—working from within. They are sustained by the cause, so that in their evolution and interaction they conspire to realise the Divine Purpose.

The above discussion clearly brings home to our mind the fact that in as much as the self is held by Sankara to be a purposive Power (*शक्त*), and all other objects and elements besides the self are regarded as a means (*वर्त*) for the realisation of the purpose of the self, it follows that we must *see* the actions of our organs, passions, impulses in a way that our highest purpose may be realised through them.¹ The self is therefore the *true agent*.

(a) We have already come to learn² that in the Commentaries of Sankara one fact cannot

Every individual possesses a 'nature' (*स्वभाव*) of its own. Contrast between this nature and its states and activities

fail to stand out prominently. We mean the fact that a finite individual, be it a thing or a self, possesses a distinct 'nature' of its own. It is impossible for an attentive reader to escape this

fact. This *nature* Sankara holds to be permanent or *nitya* in the sense that it maintains its unity and preserves its identity in the successive changes of its manifested states and activities which it underlies. This nature, Sankara is

¹ "आत्मनोपकारकस्य कार्य-करण-संघातस्य, स्वभावेन सम्यक्तः प्रकृतस्य—रक्षणं एव नियोगः" (गी०भा०, 13.7).

[This idea has been further elaborated in Chap. IV of this book.]

² Vide p. 67 of this book.

careful to point out, is not at all dependent on anything beyond, or external to it; neither is it produced, like its states or activities, by an external stimulus or the environment with which it is put into relation.¹ It not only retains its unity in its changing states, it continues to live in each of its successive states evoked from it. But such is not the case with its states and activities. These are transient and impermanent; these are produced on the occasion of the action of the environment.² But they are not produced out of nothing (अस्य); there must be something underlying them, out of which they are produced or manifested.³ This underlying *nature* is called by Sankara स्वप्ति (swarūpi) or धर्म (Dharma) or स्वभाव (Swabhāva). Sometimes the word सामान्य (Sāmānya) is used to denote this nature. Throughout his system, the term स्वप्ति or *cause* invariably refers to this nature. As it transcends its states, it is sometimes called कृतस्थ (Kūtasth).

Here is how he describes this nature, and contrasts it with its states:—

“The Real in a thing is that which does not depend on any other thing and

which is permanent. It does not change its character under any circumstances but maintains it. What appears or is produced by an external operative cause and is thus dependent on it is not the nature of the thing"—

"इत्यत्र हि तत्त्वम'व.उदा—कारणोपनात् । विजिज्ञा न
तत्त्व—उपायेष्वनात् । न हि कारकादेव' व-मुपलक्षणं ।
ततो विदेव;—कारकादेव; , विदेव—विजिज्ञा ।
यदि दत्त म'व.उदा—उपायं, तत् तत्त्व तत्त्व । दद्व्यापेक्षं,
न तत्त्वतः, कारकादेव' उपायनात् ।' तत्त्व तु 'म.भाविजिज्ञात्'
.....मुदाये न विदेव;—"

(तैत्ति० भ.ष्य, 2.6).

Sankara's elaborate discussions in his Vedānta-bhāṣya (2.1) on the relation between the cause and its effects bring into prominence these important truths. The *कारण* or the nature of the individual things or beings maintains its identity and continues to live in their successive effects brought about by the action of the external stimulus (कारण-साधार). These effects or states or activities do not touch or affect the nature of the cause—

"द्वयव्याप्य म'वी एव; दय्यभिचारी,
द्वयव्याप्येव व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यते"

(वेदा०भाष्य, 2.1.9) ।

¹ In the *Gitā-bhāṣya*, Sankara employs similar arguments, and uses the term *सत्* (sat) for the "nature" or *भूत*, and *सत्* (saat) for the changing states. "यदिपया बुद्धि न व्यभिचरति, तत्—'सत्' । यदिपया व्यभिचरति, तत्—'सत्'—इत्यादि (गी० भा०, 2. 16) ।

² "न तु पुनः पदार्था...द्वैतान्तरि कात्यान्तरि वा स्व'स्व' स्वभावं लक्षति" (किन्० वा० भा०, 3.12) । "स्वाभाविको द्वयस्वभावत एव सिद्धा...सापि न कात्यान्तरि व्यभिचरति द्वैतान्तरि वा ।" (भा० का० भा०, 4.9) ।

(b) The changing states or activities cannot, Sankara

The underlying 'nature' cannot be resolved into its activities or states. This nature is the true agent.

takes particular care to observe, constitute the 'nature' of things. For, these are always changing and transient, but the underlying nature is not liable to change.¹ Among other

arguments used by Sankara to prove this nature, the following may be specially noted here. Sankara points out—

Every individual object, every individual self, exists *for itself*, as well as *for others* (स्वरूप and सम्बन्धि-रूप). In other words, each individual has a substantive and adjectival existence. The one, Sankara observes, cannot be reduced into the other. But an individual, in order to exist for others, must first of all exist for itself. If an individual does not exist for itself—has no *nature* of its own—how can it come into relation with others and how can others evoke from it its states and activities? You cannot say that finite individuals exist only by reference to something beyond them. Things cannot

¹ "स्वभावश्चेत् क्रिया स्यात् ; अनिर्भीक्ष्णैव स्यात् ; न तु स्वभावः ; अतो विमोक्ष उपपद्यते" (ब० भा०, 4.3.15) ।

"न च स्वाभाविकीधर्म एव नास्ति पदार्थानां इति शक्यं वक्तुं... न च स्वभावात् अन्यत् नित्यं कल्पयितुं शक्यं" । "न हि क्रियानिर्हत्तः अर्थः नित्योदृष्टः" (ब०भा०, 4.4.6).

"वा प्रकृतिः—स्वभावः—तस्या अन्यथाभावो नास्ति । सांख्यादिभिर्वादिभिः तस्या अन्यथाभावः कल्प्यते—कारणमेव कार्यकारेण परिणमते इति" (भा० का० भा०, 4. 10-11).

be merely adjectival to one another. The same identical *Devadatta* (देवदत्त) comes to be designated differently in relation to different objects with which he comes into connection, but Devadatta does not, says Sankara, lose his own nature, does not abandon his identity, when he is thus designated differently.—

“एकस्यापि स्वरूप-वाङ्मत्तत्वापेक्षया चनेक-
वस्तुप्रत्ययदर्शनात् । एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः,
स्वरूपं वृक्षान्ध्र-वदृक्ष अपेक्ष्य, चनेक-
वस्तुप्रत्ययभाक् भवति”———etc. etc.

(वेदा^० भाष्य, 2.2.17).

Making his position thus secure, Sankara now goes on to argue that the *nature* of the individual cannot be resolved into its states and activities, in as much as the nature maintains its identity and continuity in its changing and successive states and activities. He observes that—

“न हि विवेकदर्शनमात्रेण वस्तुवत्
भवति...स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्”

(वेदा^० भाष्य, 2. 1. 18).

“An individual, simply because a new difference has emerged—certain particular states and activities have been produced in it,—does not lose its own character and becomes something else.”—

Elsewhere, he teaches that—

“You will never meet with any particular successive states which are not interwoven in and

sustained by, the underlying continuity of their real 'nature'—

“सामान्यानुविद्धानां विशेषाणामदर्शनात्”

(ब्र० भा०, 1.6.1 and 2.4.7).

Yet, such is the perversity of the ordinary human mind that it forgets or ignores the presence and operation of the true self which underlies its successive states, and takes the self to consist entirely in its mutually exclusive states and activities connected by a mechanical causal law. Sankara says that this is done by the influence of *avidya* or our natural ignorance. The aggregate of these states and activities is the empirical self of the ordinary ignorant people and this is the *only* self to them. This self is stated by Sankara as the—

“कर्तृत्व-भीक्षुत्व-विशिष्ट जीव” ।

The *nature* or the underlying स्वरूप of the individuals, as we have shown above, is the *real* self and it is transcendental or कूटस्थ, to which its states and activities belong as to a centre. It is *free* in its activities, because it is *above* time and it has no antecedent in time to determine its actions. This *agency* is the true agency in the system of Sankara. Out of its own resources which are inexhaustible, this real self can introduce an entirely new element in time, and it can chalk out a new path for itself, and initiate a new movement. Its vision is kept confined to its future infinite possibilities, and it is moving on and on in the direction of its Divine goal, for which reason it is called by Sankara as ब्रह्मात्मक (*i.e.*, it is *essentially* Brahman in its nature).

Wherever Sankara denies agency to the self, it is always the *passive* agency (if such term can be used) of the empirical self, because all its manifested activities are, as

shown above, mechanically determined in an unbroken series in time. Sankara never denies anywhere the free active agency of the underlying real self.¹

The Self is a Real Agent.

5. We shall now proceed more particularly to show that Sankara regarded the real self

The underlying 'nature' is a seat of power.

(a) It is revealed in sensitive and intellectual activities.

as an *active power*, and its activity is "reflected in all our sensitive, ideational and in other aspects of our experience." The following discussion

will bring out the two-fold sense,

in Sankar's system, in which the term 'agency' has been used, and will, we also hope, bring into prominence the fact that the Pure Ego is an active power, when it gains the perception of the external world.

Sankara thus describes—

"Whenever *any* of our organs functions, there are always two kinds of *activities* simultaneously present there. Of these, the one is visible and the other invisible; one is transitory and dependent, and the other is permanent and independent; the one works in time, the other is beyond time. There are *two visions*—

"हे दृष्टी—दृष्टिरिति द्विविधा भवति,

लौकिकी, पारमार्थिकी च"—

¹ Sankara denies movement or change to the real self. He calls such activity as *चलनात्मक*, i.e., in which the sense-organs, body, *manas*, *buddhi*, etc., etc., actually move. Such activity he keeps confined to the empirical self. "चलनात्मकस्य कार्यस्य: चनात्मकस्य 'च' करोमीति' प्रवृत्तिर्दृग्नात्" (बौ०भा०, 18, 66). These movements he calls *चलात्म*—Non-Ego, object. For, these are really *objects* to the true self which underlies these and connects these to itself as their 'subject.'

the first kind is an action evoked in the mind through the affection of the organ of eye. This activity is transitory in its character ; it appears, it disappears. It is a change produced, when the eye is stimulated into activity by an external object with which it has come into contact; and it vanishes when the contact ceases to operate. But underlying this activity here, there is an eternal and permanent vision of the self, and this vision or activity constitutes its real nature,—as heat and light constitute the nature of the fire. This vision of the self cannot be said to be produced, neither can it be said to be liable to disappear. The former vision of the eye, as soon as it is produced, is found to be invariably *permeated or pervaded* by the latter vision or the permanent activity of the self which is constantly present and operative behind it.¹ Thus the two kinds of vision or activity appear *blended* together, and the ignorant unable to discriminate the one from the other, are liable to misrepresent the activity of the self as actually produced and as actually disappearing, with the appearance and disappearance of the changing activity of the eye. Hence, although the activity of the self is eternal and unchanging, it is held to be seeing

¹ Cf. also : “लौकिक्या दृष्टेः कर्मभूतायाः द्रष्टारं स्वकीयया नित्यया दृष्ट्या व्याप्तां न पश्येः ?”—ब्र° भा°, 3.4.2.

“अयमपि आत्मा अविपरिवृत्तस्वभावया दृष्ट्या नित्यया दृष्टेति उच्यते “न तु आत्मनोऽन्यदर्शनं प्रकारोऽस्ति”—ब्र° भा°, 4.3.23.

when the vision of the eye is excited, and to be not seeing when the vision vanishes. This is also the case with the functions of the other organs of sense."

(*Bṛh. Bhāṣya*, 3.1.2 and *Ast. Bhāṣya*, 1.1.)

Now, what do these remarks show? They unmistakably bring to light the important fact that in the perception of the external objects what really perceives is the true self and that it is this self which exhibits its real *agentship* (*कर्तृत्व*) in its activities of comparison, discrimination and assimilation. Sankara holds that there can be no perception of a definite object unless there is an active comparison of similars and dissimilars—

"निष्कृष्टं समानादसमानादीनाम्" 'एवं तत्' इति (*निरुक्ति*)—

(*निरुक्ति* भाष, 2.6)

In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and in the *Vedānta Bhāṣyas* also, Sankara thus briefly describes the activity of the underlying self in the act of perception :—

"I happen to receive two distinct kinds of sense-impressions when somebody touches me by his leg and next by his hand. There is as yet no discrimination, until the self energetically sets to work to compare one kind of sensation with the other, and differentiate one from dissimilar other sensations. These activities of comparison, reflection, discrimination and assimilation are all operations of our intellect (*बुद्धि*) which is a mere *instrument* in the hands of the self; for all these activities are indeed my present changes; but these activities *discover* or *reveal* the *active* self as the subject from whom they issue. An

activity which distinguishes, an activity which carries the work of comparison and raises the sense-presentations to the level of *discriminative* consciousness cannot be a mere item of passive feelings. By these activities the Ego is *discovered* as the energetic *source* from which the actions issue—

“त्वङ्मात्रेण कुतो विवेक-प्रतिपत्तिः ?” 1.5.3. (ब० भा०)

Then again, so long as the self does not direct its *attention* to the changes received, they can never become the *objects* of our knowledge. It is for this that Sankara remarks—

“अन्यत्रमना अभूवं, नापश्यम्, etc. etc.,” (वे० भा०, 2.3.32.)

All these *reveal* the presence and operation of an *active* self underlying these feelings and activities, which maintains its identity in its constant movement ¹ among similar and dissimilar elements, and to which both the past and the present belong. We find Sankara remarking—

“न हि अन्यदृष्टं अन्यः स्मरति, प्रतिसम्याति

वा” । “तेनेदं सदृशं—तेनेति दृष्ट-स्मरणं

——इति द्वयायत्तत्वात् सादृश्यस्य...

सदृश्यो ह्येवो वैस्तुनोः ग्रहीतु रिकस्य

अभावात्, सादृश्यनिमित्तप्रतिसम्यान मिति

मिथ्याप्रलाप एव स्यात्”

(वेदा० भाष्य, 2.2.25).

¹ Cf. also : “चक्षुरादीनि एव दर्शनादिक्रिया‘कर्तृ‘नौ’ति चेत् ? न, भिन्नकर्तृकत्वे प्रतिसम्यानानुपपत्तिः । मनसोऽपि विषयत्वात् (ज्ञेयत्वात्) द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिः । तस्मात् अन्तःस्थं व्यतिरिक्तं ज्योतिः” (ब० भा०, 4.3.6, etc.)

Cf. “अगमत् मे मनोऽन्यत्र, साम्यतश्च स्थिरौक्षतं ।

एवं यो वेत्ति धौहृत्तिं सोऽहमित्यवधारय (वाक्यवृत्ति, 21)”

The *identity* of the self which persists through its changing states is implied in any exercise of memory. "To know a flower by scent, we must remember a prior experience of it and discriminate it from other appeals to the same sense."

"ब्रह्मदेहितां देहितां नृणां च,
 ब्रह्मदेहितां देहितां नृणां च
 ब्रह्मदेहितां देहितां नृणां च ?"

These observations of Sankara prove that to him, the real character of the Pure I go is not merely "a being," or "a knowledge"—but an "active power" and a source of activities. And this source cannot be phenomenalised; for, in its absence there would be no perception at all.

In connection with this subject, we crave our reader's indulgence for the liberty of quoting a few other passages bearing on this important point.

6. In the Gita (Chap XIII, 12-13), Brahman's nature is described as neither *sat*, nor *asat*—

(6) It is revealed in
 ideal and activities

apparently possessing no definite characteristics. Now, the question arises—Is *Atmā* to be regarded, then, as a mere non-entity, a non-existent something? For, if there is no positive mark to characterise its nature, it is as good as non-existent—*asat*. Now, we invite our reader's attention to the reply which Sankara suggests to this very pertinent question—

"No, you cannot say that *Ātmā* is non-existent or *asat* (असत्). For, there are *indicative marks* by the help of which we are enabled to infer—we are assured of—its nature. What are

these indications? To prevent the supposition that the Ātmā (आत्मा) must be a mere void or non-entity (शून्य) the Gita proceeds to teach that the Ātmā exists as—(1) the inner self (प्रत्यगात्मा) and as—(2) the *source of all activities* of the senses and the like.”

Sankara points out—

“Kṛiṣṇa proves, by way of inference, the existence of Ātmā as the inner self thus:— There must be self-conscious principle (power) behind the insentient elements *in activity*, such as the physical body and the senses; for, we invariably find self-conscious principle underlying all insentient objects *in activity*, such as carriage in motion. Hands, feet and the like constituting the limbs of all bodies in all places, *derive their activity* from the *energy inherent* in the knowable (आत्मा) and, as such, they are the marks of its existence and operation.”¹

Sankara also says—that “Ātmā (आत्मा) reveals its nature through the *upādhis* (उपाधि) of external and internal senses, through the *functions* of all the senses, *viz.*, determination, thoughts, desires, hearing, speech, etc., etc., *i.e.*, the knowable (आत्मा) *functions as it were* through the functions of the senses. But does it *actually* function? The *Sruti* implies the knowable has the power to accommodate itself to the varying functions of all the senses.....not that it *actually possesses* swift motion and

¹ That which is the *source* of these activities must—itself be an *active power*. Sankara calls it प्रयोक्ता । “संहतानां श्रीवादीनां परार्थत्वादवगम्यते श्रीवादीनां प्रयोक्ता । “मनआदीनां च अचेतनानां प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते । तद्धि लिङ्गं चेतनावतीऽधिष्ठातुरसिद्धे” (कै० वा० भा०) ।

such other activities." This is shown also by Sankara elsewhere by his remarks—

“सत्तामात्र एव कर्तृत्वं, न तु व्यापृततया” ।

It does not imply that the self is to be regarded as merely ‘a being.’ It does not mean that the self is not a power. It simply implies that this power cannot be phenomena-
lised or reduced to its manifested activities. This expression has been chosen to guard against the supposition that the self is subject or liable to transient changes or विकारः, and to show that it is a निर्विकार power.¹ This power is constantly *present* and *operative* behind the activities, as their free active *source* or *seat*—of which these are but partial manifestations, and these manifestations can never exhaust this inexhaustible source. These manifested activities are the indicative marks of their underlying power. In the Chāndogya-bhāṣya, the nature of the self is actually called “सामर्थ्यं” or the source of power (8.12.4). And it is characterised as—

“करणव्यापारेषु अव्यापृतः, तद्विलक्षणः”

(शै° भा°, 13.22)

i.e., the source cannot be resolved into the activities of the senses and the like, but is present and operative in and through them, and is above them. This important truth is expressed in the Vedānta-bhāṣya by the expression—

“न कारणस्य कार्योत्पत्तिः” (वे° 2.1.9).

¹ “विक्रियादिविवेपरहितस्य आत्मनो मन आदि-प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तत्वं”

(केन° वा° भा°, 1.2).

Cf. “अनापप्रविकारः सन् श्रयस्त्वान्तवदेव यः । बुद्ध्यादीन् चालयेत्, प्रत्यक्-
सीदृष्टमित्यवधारय” (वाक्यवृत्ति, १८); Vide वे° भा°, 2.2.2.

that is to say, the underlying power (cause) cannot be reduced to, and identified with, its manifested, actual activities (effects), because this *source* is inexhaustible and, as such, no one of its manifestations can fix it in a rigid form and be regarded as final.

It is the influence of *Avidyā* alone which, as Sankara tells us, is responsible for this erroneous identification. If the cause cannot be resolved into, or identified with, its effects; if the true *nature* of the individual self maintains its identity through its successive changes; if it is by *avidyā* that we confound the underlying unity with its multiple states and activities;—it follows, as the night follows the day, that all activities which we find in the phenomena must be traced to their underlying self or the unity—as their *source*. Had Sankara reduced, like the Pantheists, the Causal Reality into its successive activities and states, then of course for the source of these activities we must seek the phenomena alone. But Sankara has repeatedly remarked that when an individual being or thing assumes different forms or phases in consequence of its connection with the things outside it, it does not lose its identity—it does not become something else entirely different from its own nature—

“न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वत्सल्यत्वं भवति

.....स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ;

(वेदा^० भाष्य) ।—2.1.18.

It still maintains its unity, preserves its identical nature in and through these successively changing phases or differences. We must therefore look for the *source* of all phenomenal activities, according to Sankara, to the *nature* of the individual thing or the self which underlies these activities, and continues to operate through them unaffected by them.

7. As in the intellectual, so also in our *moral* experience, the operations of an active

(c) It is revealed in ethical and religious activities.

underlying self cannot be abolished or negated. We, here, briefly describe Sankara's method in the selection

of the ends in our moral sphere

In the Katha-bhāṣya, Sankara explains this method thus :—

In his system, Brahman is both transcendent and immanent. If it be of purely transcendental nature, all possibility of comprehending Him would be shut out for man. He would be a remote and abstract being. But, fortunately, He is also immanent in nature and in man, and through this revelation, man can comprehend His 'nature' to a certain extent. Man seeks the realisation of the End inherent in his own nature. But if he seeks this end merely in the external mundane order, he will not find it there—

“वीहि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्त्तते पुरुषः, इष्टं मे

भूयादनिष्टं मे माभूदिति, न च तत्र आत्मनिकं

पुरुषार्थलभते” ।

(वेदा° भा°, 114) ।

For, outward nature, as it is, cannot be regarded as complete and self-sufficient. The rational and ethical human being seems to be the goal of outward nature.

Sankara teaches—

“विषयस्यैव.....सामायाहकत्वेन

संस्थानान्तरं करणं नाम”— (उद्द° भा°, 2.4.11).

Nature has supplied man with his senses and the nervous system, by which he is put into relation with

the world.¹ The more his organs and his mind are developed, he is able more and more to realise the grandeur of the universe. He must therefore seek his end within his own nature. The infinite Divine ज्ञानैश्वर्य—the Ideal of truth and beauty, etc., is revealed in man, and man is endowed with the capacity to realise it. But if man seeks the ज्ञानैश्वर्य as it is found *actually* present in the human beings, and regards this as the final end, he will be disappointed. For, the in-dwelling ज्ञानैश्वर्य शक्तिसौन्दर्य is transcendental and it cannot be identified with the *actual* ज्ञानैश्वर्य as is working in the human beings. He must therefore seek the अनन्त-शक्तिसौन्दर्य in the future possibilities of man. It is progressively revealing in man and will reach perfection in future.

“Two Ends,” Sankara writes—“one mundane and the other transcendental—come to man indiscriminately for his choice. All men are propelled by these two goods according as one wishes for mundane prosperity, or the supreme happiness. These two are opposed and conflicting in their nature to each other. They are therefore not possible to be pursued by the same individual at the same moment. One who [pursues the mundane good] and regards this as the true end of his life, misses the true end of man. These two are not easily distinguishable by persons of poor intelligence

¹ “भूतानां शरीरारम्भकालेन उपकारात्...तदन्तर्गतानां तेजोमयादीनां करणत्वेन उपकारात्” (व° भा°, 2.5.4). “कार्यकरणैः भूतैः संज्ञेषः रूतस्य ; स तु क्रियाहेतुर्दृष्टः” (४१३, etc.) “संसर्गाभावे विशेषविज्ञानस्य अभावः” (व°, 1.4.22), i.e. The individuals have their *determinate* character and meaning elicited through this interaction within a common connecting ground (मात्र).

and of irresolute mind. The truly wise man examines both the pleasant and the good—the mundane and the supra-mundane ends—as a flamingo separates milk and water; and having considered in his mind the relative weight of the two courses, divides them both and selects only the supreme end as preferable to the mundane ends. But the man of poor intelligence incapable of such discrimination, pursues the lower good, such as—cattle, sons, position, wealth, etc., for the purpose of gratifying his pleasures of sense.”

(Katha. brāh. 2.2.)

Here again, the discrimination between the higher and the lower good, the comparison of the relative worth of the two courses, the rejection of the one and the selection of the other and the pursuing of the same until the supreme end is perfectly realised—all these activities distinctly reveal the presence and operation of an energetic self, not as a “mere being,” or a “mere knowledge”—but as an active power.

In spite of such clear expression of his views, is it not doing a great injustice to Sankara's system to hold that Sankara's pure Ego is not a persistent activity? We shall further speak on this supreme end later on.

8. Plants and trees are looked upon in the school of Sankara as a kind of lower organism.

(d) It is revealed in the construction of plant organism and animal organism.

This school admits the existence and evolution of four kinds of organism, viz.—“*खेदज, अणुज, उद्भिज्ज and जरायुज*.”¹

Now, within even the organism of the plants, says

¹ i. e. Those born in perspiration, etc., that which is born from the egg, that which is born from seed or which shoots out; and that which is born from the womb.

Sankara, is the constant operation of an *active* self जीव and its *Power is to be inferred* from the incessant movement of the sap (रस) within the body (*i.e.*, its plasticity) of the plants and from the gradual growth and development of the plant through its successive stages, till the full development of the tree is reached.¹

Sankara in his commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and in other places has distinctly expressed his views as to the impossibility of regarding any of the stages of the plant development as *separate* and self-sufficient (अन्य) from the process of development of the plant as a whole. The stage of sprout (अङ्गुरावस्था) is seen to arise after the destruction or disappearance of its antecedent stage, *viz.*, the stage of seed (बीजावस्था); but that does not, Sankara tells us, prove that non-existence or असत् is the cause of the sprout (अङ्गुर). The future possibility of the tree which is the *final end*² is present in its seed-stage and other subsequent stages and this it is which is the *real cause* which has successively operated in bringing the plant to its final stage or full development. In the Brihadāraṇyaka bhāṣya (1. 2. 1), he explains his theory of causality with the help of the illustration of मृत्तिका (a lump of earth) and its successive development into

¹ “जीवेन च प्राणसंयुक्तेन अशितं पीतञ्च रसतां गतं जीवच्छरीरं हृत्तुं च वर्धयत् रसरूपेण—जीवस्य सद्भावे लिङ्गं भवति।.....हृत्तुस्य रसस्रवण-पोषणादिलिङ्गात् जीवत्वं.....चेतनावन्तः स्थावराः” (का० भा०, 6.10.2). “यत्र रसस्रव चित्तमनुमीयते”—ऐत० आर०, शङ्करभाष्य।

² That it is present as a *future end* has been expressed by Sankara in the phrase—अनागतार्थिं प्रवृत्तेः (ब० 1.2.1). अर्थ is the end, towards which the अर्थी (*i.e.*, the causal substance, मृत्तिका, in the present illustration) strives. For, the potter for the purpose of “constructing घट, gave the मृत्तिका its successive shapes. [We shall further elaborate the idea in the next chapter.]

घट (Jar). This is to be regarded as a typical illustration which holds good in all cases of causal development, in the light of the rules given in the *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 1.14-20.

“स्वेन भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो विद्यते” ।...

“घटस्य प्रागभाव इति, न घटस्वरूपमेव

प्रास्तुतपक्षे नास्तीति” ।—

(उद् ० भा०, 1.2.1.)

In this way, the *end* is present in the cause from the very beginning and it is this end which gradually carries the real *nature* of the cause through its successive stages, until it is fully realised in the last stage. He says—

“यस्यैव अर्थात्तया प्रवृत्तिर्न दृष्टा” ।—

(*Ibid.*)

To realise this end or *purpose*, the movement of the causal substance had begun in the past and this continues in the present, until it reaches its final realisation in future.

If we keep this teaching before our view, we shall be able to comprehend the real significance of the fact as to why in Sankara's system, the effect or the end is stated to be *अनन्य* (i.e., no other than) from its cause. To understand the true nature of the cause, we must see it realised successively through all its stages of manifestation up till the final stage, and no one of its stages can, therefore, be *separated* from it and regarded as something *अन्य* (other than that 'nature').

9. In the human organism also, in the similar manner, it is the self as an active power which, for the realisation

of its *purpose* inherent in it (पराचर्येण निमित्तमूलेन), has built up the body. It has brought into being certain elements within it and combined and organised them in

(e) It is revealed in the construction of human organism.

such a way that one and all co-operate to realise a common purpose—

“ऐन्द्रियिकाशेष्टाः संघतैः कार्य-करणैः

निर्व्वर्त्त्यमानाः दृश्यन्ते । तच्च एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन

संघननं, नांतरेण चेतनसंघतं सम्भवति ।”

(तैत्ति० भाष्य, 2.7.)

In the Katha-bhāṣya, similar observations are found—

“‘स्वार्थेन’ असंघतेन परेण केनचित्

अप्रयुक्तं संघतानां (i.e., परार्थानां)

अवस्थानं न दृष्टं ।

यस्य असंघतस्य ‘अर्थे’ प्राणापानादिः

सर्व्वं व्यापारं कुर्व्वन् वर्त्तते,

संघतः सन्, स ततोऽन्यः ।”¹

(कठ०, 5. 5).—

that is to say,—the self which is स्वार्थे (self-existing and self-working and having the ‘reason’ or ‘purpose’ of its being in itself) and which is अन्य (i.e., which transcends) from these elements,—has combined them with a view to realise its own purpose through them, and thus the organism has been built up.¹

The elements and the senses (and their activities) are called परार्थे, because these are the means or mere

¹ The terms स्वार्थे (Swārtha) and परार्थे (Parārtha) have been explained before, in the beginning of this chapter. Sankara has laid down this as a general rule that wherever there is a combination and combined activity, there must be an underlying power which has combined the elements for the realisation of its purpose. “स्वार्थेन असंघतेन परेण केनचित् अप्रयुक्तं संघतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं” (कठ० भाष्य) ।

instruments through which the purpose of the self is realised.—

“ ईदृश्विद्यादीनां यत् सत्त्वधारकं.....

पारायणं निमित्तभूतेन...तत् चेतन्यामहममीदृ ।”

(गी० भा०, 13.22.)

पारायणं is the *निमित्त* here; that is to say, the realisation of its final end is the *निमित्त* or the impelling *occasion*, and the building up of the body and its successive developments are *चेतन्यामहममीदृ*, i.e., are brought about by the *agency* of the self.

Can a clearer exposition of the theory go further? That the self is an active power is thus everywhere shown by Sankara.

10. In the Vedānta-Sūtra and in the Upanishads, Brahman is described as *वाच्यं वाचः* (i.e., it is the

Brahman—a seat of power revealed as prime-mover of Prāṇa in which it is realised to be.

Prāṇa of the *prāṇa*). That is to say,—Brahman is the underlying power of *Prāṇa* (वाच), it is the controlling and directing power which underlies the

Prāṇa-Sakti (वाचसक्तिः). This *Prāṇa-Sakti* (वाचसक्तिः), in Sankara's system, has been held to be the first manifestation of Brahman's nature. Held by the underlying power and sustained by it, this *Prāṇa* has differentiated¹ itself into the form of the objects of the world and this differentiation is always going on. Brahman, in Sankara's system, is not a characterless being; it has a distinct *nature*, a character, ■ *स्वरूप* (*swarūpa*), *स्वभाव* (*swabhāva*) of its own, and this nature underlies the differentiations of

¹ This differentiation is in three forms of activities—*वाचिदैविक*, *वाचिभौतिक* and *वाच्यमिदिक*. All these are the interacted relations and are grounded in the various activities of definite individuals which have been brought into closest interaction by the everpresent *Prāṇa*.

the Prāṇ-Sakti (प्राणशक्ति), untouched and *unaffected* by them—

“नामरूपाभ्यामसंस्पृष्टः,” “नामरूपाभ्यामन्यः,”

“नामरूपाभ्यामविलक्षणं ... तथापि तयोर्निर्व्योदितः”—

all these refer to the same truth.

As Brahman is both a transcendental and immanent principle, it is revealed in the world as the differentiations of Prāṇa, but still it is not resolved into or *identified* with them, but maintains its own unity or its own nature in them. This has been beautifully expressed in a passage in the Ishā-bhāṣya.

‘Held and sustained by the underlying Brahman—a चेतन power—the *Prāṇa* has differentiated itself—externally as the activities of heat, light as exhibited by the objects—the sun, the fire, etc., and internally as the physical and mental activities of the sentient beings.’¹

Elsewhere, the underlying principle of *Prāṇa* is called Antaryāmi (अन्तर्यामी), *i.e.*, the sustaining power which controls and directs the Prāṇa-Sakti and its differentiation.

In the Vedānta bhāṣya, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Ātmā is stated as प्राणचेष्टा, *i.e.*, the control and direction of the Prāṇa, or which sets Prāṇa to work.²

It retains its unity, its own character, its separate substantial life, behind these differences. In criticising Vṛittikāra's opinion, Sankara shows that when the unity is thought to be entirely reduced to multiplicity, the former cannot retain its distinct character—the separate life of its own. For, it is now to be found present in the form of many ; it has now become composed of parts—अनेकात्मक.¹ The unity, of which the Vṛittikāra still speaks, is an abstract nothing—a mere empty logical abstraction. For, it has no existence except in the multiplicity, because it has no nature by which it is recognisable apart from the many. It is a contentless abstract idea in general. Hence, argues Sankara, it cannot be held to be real. It is a mere unity of collection, an aggregate of parts. And the parts—the differences—of which the whole is a mechanical aggregate are disconnected parts with no organising principle to connect them. The parts—the differences—the multiplicity cannot also, in this view, be held to be real. For, mere differences with no real organising unity behind them would be an unreality. There are mere differences, haphazard changes—with no purpose, no plan, no end to govern them. And Sankara asks—how can such parts—differences—stand with nothing to connect them ?—

“न हि ‘निरात्मकं’ किञ्चित्

व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते ;

न हि रज्जुसर्पादयोऽपि

‘निरास्पदा’ भवन्ति” ।

“आत्मना ‘विनिर्मुक्तं’ नामरूपादि

असत् भवति” ।

¹ ‘यदा अनेकात्मकी वृत्तिः—शाखास्तन्मोमूलक्ष, इत्येवं नानारसः विचित्र आत्मा इत्याशङ्का भवति ।.....कार्यप्रपञ्च-विशिष्टः आत्मा...(वे° भा°, 1.3.1),

self which in relation with other individuals and the environment ¹ becomes manifested as the qualities and states of the finite self. When these states and qualities are erroneously *separated* from the underlying self and treated as a self-existing and independent reality, these become *unreal*. But under no circumstances can these differences (many) or changes remain *separated* from the self, because they are to be taken as *manifestations* of the self through which it is gradually realising itself.²

¹ Environment—i.e., the differentiations of Prāṇa in the form of Nāma-rūpas of the world under the control of Brahman behind it (see section 10, pp. 111-112).

² This is the celebrated 'Sat-kārya-vāda' (सत्कार्यवाद) of the Vedānta Philosophy. The effects or changes produced reveal the nature of the cause. In the Māndukya-Bhāṣya Sankara has told us that it is the manifestations which throw light on that which is manifested. The nature of the underlying reality is to be read in the manifestations. If, therefore, what is revealed is taken to be *unreal*—non-existent—then it can come into no *relation* with the underlying Reality. For, to be related there must be two terms of relation (द्वयावच्छत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य) which must be *both real* (न सदसतो रसतोर्वा). Otherwise, the causal Reality would, as Ānandagiri explains the idea, itself prove to be unreal, and thus Brahman would be an unreality. "कार्यं हि लिङ्गेन कारणत्रय-ज्ञानार्थत्वं सृष्टियुतीनां । तच्चेदसद्भवेत् न तेन कारणस्य सम्बन्धधीरिति—असदेव कारणमपि स्यात् ।"

For this Sankara has said—"सतोर्हि द्वयोः सम्बन्धः, न सदसतो रसतोर्वा" (वे° भा°, 2.1.18). Hence the future effect (end) exists in the nature of the cause

N. B.—The changes cannot be *separated* from the cause and treated as something self-existing. For this important fact, compare—

"यदा आत्मस्य नामरूपे व्याक्रियते, तदा नामरूपे आत्मस्वरूपापरित्यागेनैव सर्वार्थवस्यास्य व्याक्रियते" (ते° भा°, 2.6).

"धैतव्याव्यतिरेकिनैव कलाः जायमानास्तिष्ठन्त्याः प्रलीयमानाश्च सर्वदा लुप्त्यन्ते" (प्र° भा°, 2.6).

"यस्य च यथादात्मलाभः भवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा" (उ° भा°, 1.6.1).

The connection of the finite individuals with one another shows that they all depend on a common ground—an ever-present connecting principle (सर्वज्ञ) bringing all into closest interaction.¹ Relations imply the interaction of the individuals and, we have seen,² these individuals are something *for themselves* (स्वतः), ere they can be something *for one another* (साम्यतः). The individuals have their *deterministic character*³ elicited through interaction with other individuals and the whole within which they exist. Brahman is immanent in all individual centres, yet does not reduce these centres to mere phases of its own, as it is Transcendental also and therefore distinguished from the elements it connects.

In the theory of Sankara, therefore, unity is not to be reduced to multiplicity, but unity *contains* multiplicity which cannot be *separated* from it. Multiplicity is not self-existing and independent (स्वयं), but is its revelations and hence multiplicity is incorporated (समृद्ध or प्रीत) as its *expressions* in the unity.

There are other arguments advanced by Sankara against Vrittikāra's theory of pantheism, but we have held them in reserve for future treatment. Here, we would place before our readers only one or two other arguments which have a direct bearing on the finite individuals. Sankara has clearly shown that the individual selves cannot be mere parts (अवयव) of an all-inclusive

¹ "यच्च श्रीकेश परम्परीयकार्थोपकारकभूतं तत् एककारणपूर्वकं, 'एक-मामान्यत्मकं'...इष्टं। परम्परीयकार्थोपकारकभूतं जगत् सर्वं पृथिव्यादि" (B^o, 25.2)। "भूतानां मरीचारम्भकत्वेन उपकारात् मधुत्वं, तदन्वयं तेषां करणत्वेन उपकारात् मधुत्वं" (25.4) vide p 111 for प्राणमयि।

² Vide p 84, sec. 3, of this book.

³ Vide p. 91, sec 5, of this book.

whole; for, in that case, the whole, *i.e.*, Brahman would lose its own 'nature' or स्वरूप and will have to come down here to become a mundane jiva (जीव); and Brahman would be affected by the pleasure, pain and other experiences of the parts. The finite individuals also will have to lose their own 'nature' or स्वरूप and disappear in the pantheistic whole.¹

12. Before we conclude this part of the subject, we should like to place on record here in this connection two other arguments found in the Vedānta-bhāṣya from which it would appear that the idea of absorption of the individuals (जीव) in the Infinite whole and treating them as mere phases of that whole—was far from the mind of Sankara.

We shall *first* invite our reader's attention to the passage where Sankara is considering the relation of जीव to ब्रह्म. the relation between the Infinite (ब्रह्म) and the finite individuals (जीव).

The relation is thus expressed—

“प्रतिषिध्यते एव तु परमार्थतः सर्वज्ञात् परमेश्वरात्

‘अन्यो’ द्रष्टा शीता वा ।— परमेश्वरस्तु—

विज्ञानात्माख्यातः ‘अन्यः’ ।” (वेदा° भाष्य°, 1.1.17).

¹ अथ अनेकद्रव्यसमाहारस्य सावयवस्य, परमात्मनः एकदेशविपरिणामो विज्ञानात्मा,.....अथ नित्यायुतसिद्धावयवानुगतोऽवयवो परमात्मा, तस्यैव एकदेशो विज्ञानात्मा संसारो ?...तथापि सर्वावयवानुगतत्वात् अवयविन एव अवयवगती दोषः शुणो वा इति...विज्ञानात्मनः दोषेण परमात्मा संवध्यते—इयमपि अनिष्टा कल्पना” (वृ° भा°, 2.1.20).

“सर्वेषु एतेषु पक्षेषु (जीवस्य) ‘स्वरूप’-नाशप्रसङ्गः” (वे° भा°, 4.3.14).

Also cf. “यस्मात् परमार्थाकाशस्य घटाकाशो न विकारः, नापि अवयवः... तथा नैव आत्मनः परस्य महाकाशस्थानीयस्य घटाकाशस्थानीयो जीवः, यद्योक्त-दृष्टान्तवत् न विकारः नापि अवयवः” (सा°, का° भा° 3.7).

Sankara argues that the individual self (जीव) cannot be separated from the Infinite which is present in him, and treated as a self contained, independent entity (एव) The individual Jivas are always to be regarded as एवम् (really not other than) from the Infinite from which they have derived their knowledge, action everything Neither can they be taken as mere phases of the Infinite, because the Infinite is एव from them, i e, because the Infinite has a being of its own and is thus distinguished (एव) from the individuals. As Brahman is transcendent, there is no necessity for suppressing the individualities of any one of these

(a) We shall now come to another passage where the individual Jivas are described as the *Pratirimba theory* "reflections" (बामास) of the true self behind them —

“बामास एव येव जीव परमात्मन ज्ञानसूर्यकादिवत् ।

न स एव साक्षात् नावि वस्तुत्तरम्’ (वेदा^०, भा^०, 2 3 50)

We all know that the reflected image of the sun is but an imperfect and partial manifestation of the sun in the sky, of which—

“it is a reflection And the image shows that there is something behind it—the original sun in the sky—whose reflection it is In this way, the actual individual Jiva is but a partial and imperfect¹ revelation of the Infinite true self

¹ Of 'न केवल अध्यात्मोपाधिपरिच्छिन्नस्य ब्रह्मरूपस्य 'मत्स्य'वेत्य, यदपि—अधिदैवतोपाधिपरिच्छिन्नस्य अस्य ब्रह्मरूपस्य वेत्य त्व, तदपि नून 'दस्य'मेव वेत्य ।—केन^० पद भाष्य, 21 Of also—“मन उपाधिकत्वाद्भि मनस, सकलवस्तुत्यादि प्रत्यये 'रभिव्यज्यते ब्रह्म' (4 5),

which is behind him. This Infinite cannot be reduced to the individual self, as the sun in the sky cannot be reduced to the reflected image. For this reason, Sankara says—

“ न स एव साक्षात्, नापि वल्लन्तरं ” वे०, 2.3.50.

i.e., neither can the individual Jīvas be *identified* with Brahman, nor can they be regarded as something *other than* Brahman.

(b) In another passage in the Vedānta-bhāṣya, Sankara has explained this relation with the help of an illustration of a Juggler and the tricks exhibited by him. Sankara writes—

Illustration of a juggler (मायावी) and his tricks.

“ A Juggler was exhibiting his tricks before a number of spectators. People saw that a man holding in his hand a shield and sword climbed up to the sky and they all took this man to be the real Juggler. But the fact was that the man whom the people saw playing in the sky was the production of the *माया* brought into being by the real Juggler who stood on the ground invisible to the spectators. In the same way, the true self of the finite individual is Brahman which underlies hidden behind the *actual* Jīva.¹

1 “प्रतिषिध्यते एव तु परमार्थतः...परमेश्वरात् ‘अन्यो’ द्रष्टा श्रोता वा । परमेश्वरस्तु...शरीरात् विज्ञानात्माख्यात् ‘अन्यः’ । यथा मायाविनः चर्म-खड्गधरात् सूत्रेण आकाशमधिरोहतः, स एव मायावी परमार्थरूपी भूमिष्ठः अन्यः ।” (वे० भा०, 1.1.17).

This also occurs in माण्डूक्य-भाष्य ।—“तथैवायं मायाविनः सूत्रप्रसारणसमः सुषुप्तस्वप्नादिविकाशः...सूत्रतदारुद्धाभ्यामन्यः परमार्थमायावी, स एव भूमिस्थः अदृश्यमान एव स्थितः ।” (1.6).

Now, the sum total of the states, actions, passions, impulses, etc., constitute to us the actual finite individual—the “Me” (कर्तृत्व भाङ्गुत्तरविदित विद्यानाम्ना) We take this self to be a separate (स्व) and self-sufficient reality existing on its own account, utterly ignoring the real self which is present behind it unaffected by these states, etc., and distinguished from them. But the states, etc., cannot be separated from the real self behind and treated as an independent reality, they must be viewed in connection with ² the true self as its revelation, through which it is expressing its nature and realising itself. Separated ³ from the underlying self, the states, etc., become unreal ⁴. The readers will note that it is in this sense alone that the finite self has been declared to be unreal in the Sankaravedānta ⁵.

We must change our outlook and think of Brahman or the absolute Reality alone which is revealing in

¹ “भाङ्गुत्तरविदित विकारे भङ्गप्रसङ्ग” (कठ० भा०, 2 12)

² Of “न पृथगनुभव किन्तु तत् सादृश्यत्वात्” (वतप्रोक्तौ) ।

³ “नातीत्य तद्व्यभिचारी, ‘तदव्यय’ इत्येति कथन” —कठ० भा० 4 9

⁴ ‘अथ मङ्गलं यदस्ति, तद्व्यभिचारी ‘विनिर्मुक्त’ मयत् भवति” —कठ० 2 20

[For, they would be mere crass plurality, there would be no purpose, no end in them]

⁵ The illustration of Juggler appears to us to be more appropriate than even the illustration of रज्जु सर्पे. The illusion of a second man (whom the spectators saw) was produced by the power of the Juggler who stood—invisible all along unaffected by this illusion. In the case of रज्जु सर्पे, the illusion of Snake is not produced by any action of the rope, it is simply a subjective idea of the people who see it. [The ‘man’ ought not to be thought of as an independent reality, but only as a production of the Juggler and this would be the real view there]

ourselves, and of our states, etc., as its mere expressions. This is the true पारमार्थिक view. We find thus that the Infinite true self cannot be *reduced* to, and identified with, the actual individual self. Such self is unreal, Sankara would say.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE FALSITY OF THE WORLD.

1. A charge has often been brought against the Advaita system of philosophy to the effect that in this school the world has been treated merely as an appearance and as an illusion; that the object world, in this system, is an "unsubstantial pageant" having no "stuff of reality" in it. And this they say, finds an appropriate and admirable support in the short but significant line of the old Vedantic Professor Govapāda—

“सद्यः सर्वं जगन्निष्ठा, जगद्भ्रम इव यत्नम्।”

The current belief in this respect is that Sankara's theory of Advaitavāda unmistakably teaches us the falsity of the world,—that Brahman being considered to be the only Reality, everything else we find in the world must needs be unreal and false. From a frequent use in the commentaries of Sankara, of the terms 'Māyā' and 'Avidyā'—it has been hastily concluded that everything of the universe must be Māyā-maya—illusory. The employment of some similes, in the works of Sankara, such as the simile of the Juggler and his Jugglery, of the celestial city in the sky conjured up by a magician, of the desert and the mirage, and the like has lent no inconsiderable help in corroborating the idea thus formed of the multiplicity (बहुत्व) in the world as unreal and a mere appearance. It has not been felt advisable to

carefully examine the terms and the contexts in connection with which they occur. No need has also been felt to scrutinise how Sankara himself has explained these terms and similes. Now, we feel it incumbent upon us to test the ground with caution, upon which such dogmatic assertion about the falsity of the world and its diversities of *nāma-rupas* (नाम-रूप) has been founded and to see also if the alleged unreality finds any real support from the writings of Sankara himself.

2. Those who care to go through the commentaries of Sankara will find out that he has

Three classes of objects. Analysis of their fundamental and distinctive features does not favour the idea of falsity.

mentioned three distinct classes of objects, each possessing characteristic features which distinguish each class of objects from the other class. This

important classification can be very easily gathered from various portions of his *Bhāsyas* and it has a most valuable bearing upon the question of the falsity of the world which has gained such a notorious currency in his name.

- (i) The first class includes in it such objects as are generally known as—rabbit-horn (शश-विषाण); barren-woman's son (वन्ध्या-पुत्र); and sky-flower (आकाश-कुसुम)¹—and the like.

We find Sankara employing the term *alīka* (अलीक), *i.e.*, 'false,' 'non-existing,' and the general term *asat* (असत्), *i.e.*, 'unreal' in connection with these objects.

- (ii) The objects falling under the second class are generally known as things like रज्जु-सर्प

¹ These are all imaginary objects conjured up by diseased fancy.

(a rope appearing as a snake) ; मुञ्जि-रज्जु (an oyster appearing as silver ; मरु-मरीचिका (desert-mirage) ; and मग्न-मानिष्य (the sky appearing as blue) and the like.

The term (*asat*) असत्, i.e., 'unreal' is sometimes applied to such class of objects.

- (iii) Then comes the last class which comprises the created phenomenal objects of the world, i.e., the *nāma-rūpas* (नाम-रूप), i.e., the changes (विहारः) in all their diversities which we find in the world.

After enumerating these three classes of objects,¹ Sankara tells us that the objects designated under the first class, viz. the मय-विषाद, etc., etc., have a peculiar nature of their own. They form a separate class distinguished from the two other classes of objects. For, these objects are of such a character that they do not *work* at all in the world, that do not serve any practical purpose of men. We cannot put these objects to any practical use at all. Why? Because, Sankara observes, the things which have nothing to take their stand upon, which have no permanent ground to sustain them and which are not supported by any underlying substratum—must be *false* ; since such things can *do* us no practical good ; they would break down, they would not work—in our varied experiences of the world—

“ न हि ‘निरात्मकं’ किञ्चिद् व्यवहाराय शक्यते ” -गी० १.४.

“ न हि मय-लक्षिकादयोऽपि ‘निरात्मदा’ भवन्ति ”—मा० का० ६, गी० १३.१४.

“ अद्य मद्दहा यदस्ति लोके वस्तु,

‘तदात्मना विनिसृज्य’ ‘मसत्’ सम्पद्यते ”—कठ० २.२०.

¹ Whatever is presented to the consciousness may be called an—
'object.'

In respect of these objects, Sankara's remarks run to this effect :—

The objects like शश-विषाण, etc., etc., have no *prior* cause from which they are produced; neither these objects are sustained or supported at the *present* moment by any underlying cause or 'being'—these have no underlying ground upon which they stand at present. Again, when these objects disappear (in future), they will have nothing—no sustaining ground—in which they will merge. For these reasons, such objects must be pronounced as really false or अलीक. As there is no underlying 'being' (सत् or आत्मद) to support them, they must be 'non-existent' things. Hence they are not true; they are false.¹

But such is not the case with the objects which are subsumed under the second class; viz, the objects शक्ति-रजत, रज्जु-सर्प, etc. We cannot, Sankara remarks, call these things false or अलीक in the same manner as we call the objects शश-विषाण, etc., etc., as false. Why? Because, Sankara argues—

Such things as रज्जु-सर्प, शक्ति-रजत, etc., cannot be said to have no permanent

1 “असतः शश-विषाणादेः ‘समुत्पत्त्यदशनात्’—तै-भाष्य 2.6। Again—

“वन्ध्या-पुत्री न तत्त्वेन, मायया वापि ‘जायते’—सा० का० भाष्य 1.6.

“न हि वन्ध्या-पुत्री राजा बभूव, ‘प्राक्’ पूर्णवर्ष्मणोऽभिषेकात्...इति मर्यादा-करणेन, वन्ध्या-पुत्री राजा ‘बभूव,’ ‘भविष्यतीति’ वा”—वेदा० भाष्य, 2.1.18.

ground to sustain them as long as they appear,—

“न हि मृदुगुणिकादयोपि ‘निराश्रयाः’ भवन्ति” 1—
i.e., none of these is *nirāśraya*; that is to say, the *prior* condition of the snake was the rope, i.e., as the rope appears as a snake, the *prior* underlying ground which gave rise to the form or appearance of the ‘snake’ must have been the ‘rope.’ At the *present* moment too, the ground which sustains the appearance ‘snake’ is the ‘rope.’ Again when in *future* the notion of snake, on the dawning of the correct notion, will disappear, it will merge in its underlying ground, i.e., the ‘rope.’ It is evident, therefore, that these objects do not resemble the objects described above, viz., मग-विषाच, etc., in respect of their ‘unreality’ or ‘falsity.’

These objects, viz., रज्जु-मर्द, etc., cannot, therefore, be declared to be ‘false’ in the sense in which the objects मग-विषाच, etc., can be so declared.

Now, let us consider the character of the third class of objects enumerated above, viz.,—the empirical objects

1 “रज्जुमात्राया अवबोधोपात् ‘प्राक्’ सर्वैः ‘सन्नेष’ भवति” 1-6 ; “सतोविद्यमानस्य वस्तुमो रज्ज्वादेः-सर्पादिवत् लभ्य युज्यते”—मा० का० भा०, 3.27. ।

न हि सर्वै-रजत-पुरुष-मृदुगुणिकादिविकल्पाः रज्जु-शक्ति-स्यासूपरादिव्यतिरेकीय अवस्थापदाः (स्थितिकाले), यस्याः कल्पयितुम् (मा० आगम प्रकरण 1.7.) ।

“रज्जु रवेति निश्चये सर्वविकल्पनिवृत्तौ (भविष्यति काले) रज्जु रवेति” (मा० वैतथ्य प्रकरण 2-18) ।

(i.e, the evolving changes (विकारस) or the nāma-rūpas (नामरूपस). Sankara points out—

these objects agree in an important respect with the objects described above as शुक्ति-रजत, रज्जु-सर्प, etc., etc. These changes (विकारस),—these empirical objects have a *prior* cause from which they are produced ; during their sustenance at the *present* moment, the same identical causal reality underlies and sustains them ; and in *future* also, they will merge in the same underlying ground which sustains them now.¹

Thus, it will appear from a comparison of these three classes of objects with one another that, as regards the underlying sustaining ground, both the last-mentioned classes of objects agree with one another ; but both of these differ from the first class of objects in this respect. It necessarily follows, therefore, that if you call the first class unreal or false (as Sankara has justly called them), the other two classes must, by implication, be *real*

Now, what is the net result of this discussion ? The objects known as अश-विषाण, आकाश-कुसुम, etc., are the only objects which may, as the above discussion shows, be designated, in the system of Sankara, as actually false or unreal. Why ? Because, these objects are the only objects which, as has been proved by the above-mentioned arguments, do not even serve the practical concerns of

¹ “प्रत्यभिज्ञावलेन सर्वेषु विकारिषु ‘अन्वय’विच्छेद-दर्शनात्, अन्वयिद्रव्यमेव सर्वत्र कारणं भवति, न पिच्छादिविशेषः अनन्वयात् अव्यवस्थानाच्च” (का० भाष्ये 6.2.2. आन०) ।

“कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिष्वपि कालेषु ‘सत्त्व’ न व्यभिचरति, तथा कार्यमपि जगत्”—इत्यादि (वेदा० भा० 2.1.16.)

“सत्त्वोक्तैर्न सत्यत्वमुच्यते । यस्माच्च जायते किञ्चित् तदस्तीति दृष्टं लोके” (ते० भा०) 2.6. ।

How can Sankara call the created empirical objects unreal or false? How can their existence be denied? Because, he has laid down the principle that “what is produced from something, from a prior ‘being’ —cannot itself be a ‘non-existent’ thing. For, a ‘non-being’ cannot be produced from a real ‘being.’”¹ As we can know nothing of the Causal Reality (*i.e.*, Brahman) *apart* from its effects upon us, the effects or the products must be ‘real.’

In this way, the empirical objects or the emergent changes have been regarded as *real* objects, in the system of Sankara’s philosophy. Yet, most people have hastily concluded that the world is regarded false in this system.

It will be seen that it is only in comparison with the Absolute Reality (परमार्थ सत्य) which is none else but Brahman, that the phenomenal things may be designated *asat* (असत्) or ‘unreal,’ which therefore means—‘relatively real.’²

It is to be regretted that the critics of the Sankara system have not cared to consider properly these weighty arguments to be found dispersed in the Vedānta-works; but they have, from the mere mention of the terms in the Bhāṣyas, like शश-विषाण, मरौचिका, etc., etc., jumped at once at the conclusion that the world is false in the Vedānta.

¹ “असतः शश-विषाणादेः समुत्पत्त्यदर्शनात्, अस्ति जगतीमूलं।..... यस्माच्च जायते किञ्चित् तदस्तीति दृष्टं लोके, सत्त्वोक्तैरेव सत्यत्वमुच्यते” (तै० भाष्य 2.6) । “कार्येण हि लिङ्गेन कारण-ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थत्वं सृष्टिस्तृतीयां” (सा० आ० 1.6) । “अग्राह्यमेव तत्, असदेव आत्मतत्त्वं ? तन्न ; कार्यग्रहणात्” (सा० का० भा०, 3.27) ।

² “सत्यमुक्तं सत्यत्वं विकाराणां—तत्तु न परमार्थापेक्षया । किं तर्हि ? इन्द्रियविषयापेक्षया उक्तं ।...सत्यस्य परमार्थस्य उपलब्धिद्वारं भवति” (छा० भा०, 7.17.). “सत्यञ्च व्यवहारविषयं.....न परमार्थसत्यं । एकमेव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म” (तै० भा०, 2.6) ।

3. To another reason, the current belief in the falsity of the world may be traced Sankara

Our waking as if dreaming-experiences compared with waking does not suggest the falsity.

has, in more than one place in his commentaries, compared the experiences of our waking life with our dream-experiences. Finding this com-

parison, most people, without feeling any necessity to pause to weigh carefully the observations of Sankara recorded in these places, have run away with the idea that as the dream-experiences are known to everybody to be unreal—to have no objective reality—the waking experiences which have been likened to these, must be equally unreal. But we lag to invite our reader's attention to the two most important passages wherein this comparison occurs and to request the readers to follow us, with a view to find out how Sankara has expressed his own views on the subject.

- (a) First, we should like to refer our readers to the famous passage in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*—in the story of *Ajāta-katsu* and *Bālaki* where an elaborate description of the dream-state and its experiences occurs. And here also is recorded Sankara's view of the sense in which he regards the waking and the dreaming experiences as 'unreal.'

If our readers follow us patiently, it will be as clear as daylight that Sankara never regarded the objects experienced by us to be unreal. What he looked upon as unreal is an altogether different thing.

Sankara thus observes—

When a man falls asleep and happens to dream, he finds himself, say, to be a king

actually sitting upon a royal throne—surrounded by his people, ministers and servants;—with the maids fanning him and himself enjoying various pleasurable and painful experiences. Now, the cognitions he receives, the activities he performs, the states and feelings he enjoys—these are all his dream-experiences. Are these experiences to be taken as constituting the actual ‘nature’ or स्वरूप (svarūpa) of the self? or, is the real nature of the self to be regarded as something which is *distinct* from these, and which maintains its *distinct* identity and unity in and through dreaming experiences? Is this स्वरूप (nature) to be regarded as the aggregate—the mere sum-total—of these experiences, or does it possess a nature—a ‘Self-hood’—distinguished from these?

Sankara declares that these experiences cannot constitute the self; the self cannot be resolved into and identified with them. What the real self is cannot be reduced into its states and activities; for, these are not its स्वरूप or आत्मभूत। The real self is that which experiences these things, unaffected by them; and hence it is the *subject* to which these stand as its *object*, and these are erroneously attributed to the subject as its ‘nature’ or स्वरूप. Such is also the case with the soul’s *waking* experiences.

Here towards the close of this discussion, Sankara has employed the term—“अविद्यमाना” : i.e., ‘non-existent.’

and the term—"मृदाप्यारोपिता" i.e., 'falsely ascribed to the self', and these two terms have been used in connection with the dream experiences. These two terms are, we are afraid the source of immense mischief created in respect of the idea of the falsity of our world-experiences.

But the readers will see that Sankara never says here that what a man experiences in his dream is false. He says—

'आत्मभूतत्वेन चिद्विमाना एव गुण'—

That is to say, these experiences do not exist as his आत्मभूत, i.e., as his स्वस्व or as the 'nature' of the self. These are falsely regarded as the nature or the *swarupa* (स्वस्व or आत्मभूत) of the self. The experiences of both the waking and the dreaming states of the man cannot be his आत्मभूत, i.e., cannot constitute his *swarupa*. The 'nature' (स्वस्व) of the self is what is *distinct* from these experiences, and this nature underlies these experiences, without losing its own identity in them.¹

Here with a view to preclude any possibility of a mistake, Sankara records three reasons showing that

¹ In his commentary on माण्डूक्यकारिका, वैशेष्य प्रकरण (28) Sankara has shown both the waking and dreaming experiences as असत्—unreal. But the reason given for it is the same as here. They are unreal because they are regarded as धर्म, i.e. essential property of the self. In reality, these experiences are not so. The self seems to be affected (i.e., become सद्विकल्प) by these, but really it stands apart from these. "न स्वत मिदं, किन्तु स्वप्नस्थानवती धर्मः । स्थानिधर्मवत्त्वमेवेति असत्त्वम् ।"

the real nature of the self is *distinct* from its experiences and the latter cannot therefore be regarded as *आत्मभूत* of the self. The experiences are *his* ; they are not *he*. Why?—

(I) दृश्यत्वात्—These experiences are the *objects* of the self. They are what the subject experiences, to which the self directs its attention. The knower must be distinct from the objects known. Hence these known objects cannot constitute the *nature* of the knower.

(II) व्यभिचार-दर्शनात्—These experiences are by their nature transient and changing. They appear, they vanish and they are succeeded by other experiences. Such being their character, how can they constitute the nature of the self which is permanent?

(III) वस्तुनर-सम्बन्ध-जनितत्वाच्च—These experiences are elicited from the nature of the self by the external or internal stimulating environment upon which they depend. But the underlying self is not dependent on anything and not produced by any stimulating object like “शब्दादि,” *i.e.*, the sounds, touch, etc., etc.¹

¹ “हित्वा स्वप्नं, यदा सुषुप्तः तदा ‘स्वाभाव्यं’ गती भवति, ... ‘अन्य-सम्बन्ध-कालुष्य’-हित्वा । ... तदा शब्दादिः ‘सम्बन्धि वस्तुनरं’ किञ्चन न वेद” (ब्र० 2.1-18-19).

Here cf. “न हि यस्य यत् स्वहृषं, तत्तेन अन्यतोऽपेक्षते । अनपेक्ष मे-सिद्धत्वात् । यद्धि अनपेक्षं, तत् स्वत एव सिद्धं” (केन भाष्य, 1-4). Also—“द्रव्यस्य हि तत्त्वमविक्रिया, परानपेक्षत्वात् । विक्रिया न तत्त्वं, परापेक्षत्वात् । न हि कारकापेक्षं वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं । सतो विशेषः कारकापेक्षः ; विशेषश्च विक्रिय । यद्धि यस्य नान्यापेक्षं स्वहृषं, तत् तस्य स्वरूपं । यदन्यापेक्षं, तत् न तत्त्वं - अन्याभावेऽभावात्” —तै० भा० 2.8 ।

The self is therefore distinct from its experiences. We see, now, that the experiences of the world, as such, are never regarded by Sankara as unreal or false. The unreality only comes, when the self is entirely resolved into these experiences, and when these are taken to be the nature (स्वभावः) of the self.

(b) In a similar passage in the Chândogya Upaniṣad, where a similar comparison between the waking and the dreaming experiences occurs, Sankara very forcibly expresses his view saying that their apparent unreality lies in their *relativity*, i.e., in relation to the dreaming experiences, the waking experiences may be called unreal and in relation to the latter, the former may be regarded unreal.¹

"जातं दृश्यमित्येतं न दृष्टुमर्हं, न ह्यतः ।"—ऋ० ३.३.१.

But both kinds of experiences must be regarded *real* respectively in *their own spheres* (स्वविषये, मतः) ।—

"स्वविषयेऽपि सत्यं सत्यमेव,

मनुदृश्यादहं.....इति न कश्चिद्विरोधः ।"—ब्रा० भाष्य ३.३.४.

1. The world of नामरूप has frequently been described as *unexplicable*—अनिर्णयनीय

The world is neither absolutely सत्य nor absolutely असत्य (अनिर्णयनीय).

—in the Sankara bhāṣya. We find such sentences as these—नामरूपमवबोधेन...
प्राकृतप्राकृतारम्भेन 'तत्त्वान्विताध्यामनिर्णयनीयेन'

अथ परिणामादिमर्जणवद्वाराप्यदलं प्रतिपद्यते" (इ० 2.1.27)²

¹ Here compare इ० भा० 2.2.20, where similar conclusion has been drawn.

² Vide also इ० भा० 2.1.14.

The reason given for characterising the world as “inexplicable” is to be found in the expression—

तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्व्वचनीयेन ।

This expression means that the world is neither absolutely सत् (*i.e.* ब्रह्म), nor it is not-सत् (*i.e.*, something absolutely different from Brahman), and it is therefore inexplicable.

If the readers will call to mind what has been said about Sat (सत्) and Asat (असत्) in Chap. I, the real significance of the expression (अनिर्व्वचनीय) will come out. From one point of view the world will appear as real or सत्, and from another point of view it will appear as unreal or असत्. We have seen there that prior to actual manifestation, the world of नामरूप—existed in Brahman in undifferentiated condition and so indistinguishable from Brahman. But as the differentiations began to arise, some वैलक्षण्य—something new—some difference—began to appear. But the difference which arose was in reality not something altogether different (अन्य) from Brahman, but is Brahman itself. For, it was nothing but the *manifestation* of Brahman's nature.

So long as the world is regarded as existing in Brahman in undifferentiated condition, it is identical—अभिन्न—with Brahman—not विभक्त or अन्य from it, and so long it is real or सत्. But as soon as the world is differentiated, there is some difference—वैलक्षण्य or भेद also. In the Chāndogya, Sankara remarks that prior to its production, previous to its manifestation, the world was real—सत्.¹ But when it was differentiated or came out of Brahman—when नामरूप actually appeared—we began to look upon it as something absolutely different from

¹ “ननु न श्रुतं त्वया ‘सदेवै’त्यवधारणम् ” (का° 6.2.2).

Brahman—as *विभक्त* or *व्यक्त*—as something self-existing and independent. Taken in this way, the *जगदव्य* is unreal—*अव्यक्त*. But from a higher view, from the *पारमार्थिक* standpoint—*जगदव्य* is not really different or *व्यक्त* from Brahman,¹ but inseparably connected with Brahman. Thus from two different views, the *जगदव्य* or the world is both real and unreal. Hence it cannot be said to be absolutely real or unreal. We in our *अविचारणा*, always separate the effects (*विचारण*) from their underlying causal reality (*कारण*). This is our *अव्यक्त-व्यक्त*-state. But even in our *अव्यक्त-व्यक्त* state, we must try to change our outlook and look upon the world from the *पारमार्थिक* point of view, and then the effects will appear standing inseparably connected with their cause (*कारण*)—the underlying Reality, and not something separate. For, the underlying Reality is being expressed or realised through them.

The readers will find that Sankara does not deny the existence of the world as such, he only wants us to treat it not as *व्यक्त* from Brahman² or something self-existent and independent. This is Sankara's view of unreality.

5. The theory of causality as elaborated in the Vedānta Philosophy by Sankara which is

Doctrine of causality elaborated. Relation between unity and multiplicity does not imply falsity

known as the *Sat-kārya-vāda* (*सत्कार्यवाद*) has not, it appears to us, received the attention which it deserves, and such scanty and superficial treatment of this celebrated Principle of

¹ “न हि स्थितावपि हि कार्यं कारणात्मानमनरेण 'स्वतन्त्र' मास” (६°, 2.1.9).

² For this, the world—the *जगदव्य*—has been stated as *पारमभूत* in several places. It means—‘not *स्वतन्त्र* from Brahman,’ cf. *पारमभूता-मन्वत्तन्त्रा*, न सौम्यपरिक्लृप्त प्रधानादिवत् पृथग्भूतां स्वतन्त्रां यन्त्रिं.....ईश्वर-द्वेषावस्थितामिष्यते:” (चै° भा°, 1.3).

Causality is, we fear, responsible, to not an inconsiderable extent, for the current views about the falsity of the world.

In a previous chapter we have given brief indication of this theory, and here we desire to elaborate the idea of causality further in the light in which it has been elucidated by Sankara himself.

Sankara, it will be seen, has, at the very commencement of his discussion, splitted up the theory into two distinct parts and laid it down as a general rule that—

“ अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्ये-कारणयोः,—

कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं, न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं । ”

—वेदा^० भा^० 2.1.9.

- (1) The first part, *viz.*,—न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं implies that the cause or the causal Reality is *distinct* from its effects or its successive changes or manifestations, because it has a ‘nature,’ a स्वरूप, ‘selfdom’ of its own ; and it cannot therefore be *resolved* into, or identified with, the effects or successive changes emerging from it ;—it cannot therefore be regarded, to use Sankara’s own mode of expression, as becoming something other than its own nature (स्वरूप) when the effects emerge from it in succession—

“ न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वक्ष्यन्तं भवति

.....स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ”—

वेदा^० भा^० 2.1.18.

If you violate this part of the teaching,
a great fault will vitiate your theory,

i.e., the causal reality would consist merely in its effects, i.e., the sum-total of the effects (parts) would constitute the cause (the whole). In this case—Brahman would be all, and all would be Brahman.

(II) The second part of the theory, i.e. —

“कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं”—implies that the cause is no doubt distinct from, and independent of, its effects or the emergent changes, but the effects (कार्य) or the successive changes cannot be absolutely *separated* from their cause and regarded as independent and self-sufficient ‘things’ (वस्तु), each complete in itself—

“यस्य च यस्मादात्मनाभी भवति, स तत्र

‘अप्रविभक्तो’ इष्ट, यथा घटादीनां

मृदा 161 (४०).” And— नहि ‘वस्तुत्वेन’

विकारी नाम कथिदस्ति । कारणात्

‘व्यतिरिक्तेषु’ अभावः कार्यस्य ’ । १

The effects are called *अनन्य* from their cause. That is to say,—as the real ‘nature’ of the cause becomes gradually manifested or realised in these successive effects, the latter are mere *means*, instruments, for the realisation of the ‘nature’ of the cause ². It is not therefore possible to *separate* any of the effects from the underlying cause. For, these are merely the phases, or stages (सम्यानभेद मातृ)

¹ Vide 2114 वे० भा०, and also ३० भा०, 161

² Our readers will remember that in the Vedānta the self is known as स्वार्थः i.e. purpose and everything else besides the self is known as — परार्थः for the realisation of that purpose. This point the reader will find discussed in Chapter II

assumed by the cause for its own manifestation. We cannot, therefore, regard any of the stages as something अन्य or independent and separate, as if existing on their own account.—

“ सामान्य (The cause) ग्रहणैव तद्वताः विशिषाः (the effects)
रहीताः स्युः.....न तत एव ‘निर्भय’ ग्रहीतुं शक्यन्ते ”¹

In this way, the effects are called in the Vedānta as अन्य (*ananya*) from their cause.

One of the Tiká-Káras amplified the sense of the term अन्य (*Ananya*) by stating—

“ कारणात् पृथक्-सत्ताशून्यत्वं साध्यते, न तु ऐक्याभिप्रायेण² ” ।

The created world is not absolutely *identical* with Brahman—its underlying cause; but the world has no *separate being* apart from, or independent of, its underlying cause. That is to say, the world is entirely *dependent on* Brahman and inseparable from it. No one of the successive changes can be separated from the underlying Causal Reality (*i.e.*, Brahman) which is constantly present behind each change, unaffected by it; and no one of its changes can be regarded as so many independent ‘things’—

“ न हि ‘वस्तुवृत्तेन’ विकारी नाम कश्चिदस्ति । ”

“ परमार्थतः कारणात् ‘व्यतिरेकेण’ अभावः कार्यस्य ”

—(वेदा० भाष्य 2.1.14) ।

Sankara has, in this way, explained and elaborated his celebrated Causal Theory in his Vedāntabhāṣya and other places.

6. The readers must remember that we have already referred to the theory of Pantheism which was associated with the name of one Vṛttikāra and which Sankara took particular care to refute. Some

Refutation of Pantheism does not favour unreality.

¹ Vide वृ० भा०, 2.4.11, etc., etc., etc., and वे० भा०, 2.1.14.

² The Bhāmati remarks—‘अभेदः न साध्यते, किन्तु भेदो व्यासिद्धयते—वेदान्ते’ ।

pertinently asks—when you reduce the one to the many, or when you reduce the many to the one, how can *both* be declared to be equally real? ¹ One of them must be an unreality. For—

(a) If the unity is entirely reduced to the many, the many would be the only reality and the unity has no *separate* existence apart from the many. The unity would be merely a unity of collection—a mere aggregate of disconnected parts. The aggregate alone stands here, with no *separate* unity behind to connect it. There would be no real unity, no plan, no purpose, no regularity (नियमेन प्रवृत्तम्) in the world. As the flowers of a garland fall when the connecting string is removed, so the successive differences of nāma-rūpa without any connecting identity passing through them would fall to the grund,² as आनन्दगिरि has so beautifully stated. Then again, as the unity is a mere logical *abstraction*, the nāma-rūpas—the many—would stand *unrelated*, as an independent whole. But how can there be nāma-rūpas at all, without Brahman on their background? For, it is Brahman as the cause of which the world of nāma-rūpa is the production. And without the subject, how there can be an object? Who

¹ Cf. “ न सद्येदं मेकस्मिन् धर्म्मिणि अभिहितं । त्वयैव इदं विरुद्धधर्म्मत्वेन एकवस्तु परिगृह्येत आत्मा ” (व° 2.4.13).

“ न हि एकवस्तु स्वतएव रूपादिविशेषितं, तद्विपरीतञ्च—इत्यवधारयितुं शक्यं विरोधात् (व° 3.2.11).

Sankara elsewhere shows there can be no co-ordination between Brahman and the world. “ सर्वं ब्रह्मेति सामानाधिकरण्यात् आशङ्का सम्भवति, तां निवर्तयितुमाह—इत्यादि.” (व° 1.3.1). Cf. also व°, 3.2.29.

² “ कारणाख्यहीनं कार्यं न स्यात्सुतसहते.....अन्यथा सक्तं, सुष्टिवत् व्यशीर्येत । ” Cf. क्वा०भ०, 6.7.1. also.

would *comprise* the series of his states and call them to be *his own* *

(6) If the many is reduced to the one, if the *nāma rūpa* are changed or sacrificed to Brahman the one or the all inclusive whole would be the only reality. Everything of the world all differences of *nāma-rūpa*, the many—would be equally divine all would be Brahman, there would then be no differences between a saint and a sinner. All distinctions, all *śeṣa*, will, as Sankara justly remarks, disappear. There would be no higher and lower, no *param* in the objects of the world. The finite selves would be mere phases of that whole and therefore would have no freedom and responsibility.

In this way, Sankara has shown that *both* the unity and the multiplicity cannot be held to be equally real in Vṛttikāra's theory. In Sankara's own theory where there is no question of reduction, no such absurdity as noticed above can arise. In his own theory, the one is the reality which has a 'nature' of its own and which cannot be

१ "एकं हि परं ब्रह्म हैतादृतात्मकं न च उपदेष्टा षष्ठी ब्रह्मण्य
ब्रह्मबीजस्य उपदेष्टादृष्टादिकल्पना न सम्भवति । नहि ह्यहोदिहैतादृतात्मके
देवदत्ते, बाह्यरूपी देवदत्तेकदेवभूतयो वाक उपदेष्टो नच केवल उपदेष्टस्य
षष्ठीना देवदत्तता नोपदेष्टा नाप्युपदेष्टस्य षष्ठीता इति कल्पयितुं शक्यते ॥
(४° 511)

यदि हि अहैतार्थत्वमेवासां याम पण भगोद्यथैव नास्तीति यामायस्यगोद्यथो
॥ गच्छन्, गृह्णन् तु कर्मफलवैचित्तविशेषः ॥ (४° 321)

Of क्रिया कारक फलभेदस्य लोकप्रसिद्धस्य सत्यतामसत्यताच ॥ च वारयति
(2120)

२ "मलाभिज्ञात् आविस्तरलोपपत्तेः । आदिवादिषु हि मत्समर्थनप्रकाश
पतनप्रवृत्त आविस्तर ऋति न तु तत्रैव तदधिक तागत्येन आविर्भवति इत्यादि
(१०° १४१११) ।

reduced to the many. And there arises no need also to declare the unreality of the existence of the many, as in the Vrittikara's view. The many is the factor which is inseparable from the one, in and through which the nature of the unity is realising or manifesting itself, and the many—the world of nāma-rūpas—is to be always taken in *inseparable connection with* the underlying unity of Brahman as its stages or means of manifestation,—and not as a separate and an independent whole. Taken as a *separate* whole, the world would be an unreality.¹

Now, we find, as the result of this exposition of the Vedantic theory of causality that we are not to resolve the prior causal reality into its effects, *i.e.*, the created nāma-rūpas with their infinite diversities. If we do so, the causal Reality would lose its own unity or its *Swabhāva* (स्वभाव), and with the successive emergence of the differences or changes, it would itself become something absolutely *other than* its own nature (*i.e.* अन्य): *Brahman would become the world, and both would be entirely identical.*¹ Sankara calls such world *unreal*, *false*, असत्य. For, in that case the world would be the only reality. *Everywhere he has held the world and the changes (विकारः) to be unreal and false in this sense only.* He has not negated or abolished or denied anywhere the existence of the world and its changing विकारः, as they are, as they stand. In the case of the finite self and its states and activities, the theory holds good equally. If the finite self is resolved into its successively emergent states and activities ;—the self will become absolutely *identical* with these and will thus become

¹ “सतीत्येवम् अनृतत्वं, सदात्मना तु सत्यत्वमेव” । “न हि मृदमनाश्रित्य घटादेः सत्त्वं स्थितिर्वा सच्चवति” (का० भा० 6.3.2 and 6.8.4.)

“आत्मस्वरूपात्—‘अन्यत्’ वस्तुत्तरं—स्वप्नमायामरीयुदकसममसारं” (व० भा०, 3.5.1).

something *other than itself*, such a self is unreal and false¹

The fact is that Brahman as well as the *Jivas* maintain their own nature or *स्व* and preserve its unity and identity in and through its successive states or changes, and these emergent changes are always to be considered as self-evident *stages* (*अवस्थाभेद*) for the manifestation or realisation of their underlying *स्व*, for, we have seen that it is Brahman which has manifested itself as its *other* and therefore the other is not absolute, but only itself, and consequently they cannot be separated and treated as something absolutely distinct (*द्वय*)² from Brahman. When they are so treated, Sankara would at once call them unreal, false. In no other way, he is prepared to label the world and its experiences as false.

7 There is quite a large number of terms, phrases, and expressions, very widely made use of by Sankara which frequently occur in diverse places of the commentaries. These terms, phrases and expressions have, we are sure, contributed much to give currency to the idea of the falsity of the world. For, these phrases and expressions, when detached from the context in which they occur, convey the meanings which apparently may be taken to favour the idea of falsity. But fortunately, Sankara has, in every case, taken good care to give a clear exposition of these phrases and expressions, from which we can, if we feel so inclined, gather

¹ अविद्याध्यापितसुखित्वादिविजिदप्रतिबन्धदेव आरमण स्वर्ग्येण अनवप्यान, स्वरूपावप्यानश्च त्रैय ” (भा० का भा०, 232)

² This idea of *अनन्य*, when perfected has also been called by the phrase ‘सम्भारमभाव’ in the commentaries. ‘सतएव द्वैतभेदेन अन्यथागृह्यमानत्वात् नासत्त्व कस्यचिद वस्तुन द्रुमीवर्य’ (छा० भा० 623)

their right import. We now propose to present them to our readers with a view to show that a great injustice has been done to the writer of these phrases, terms and expressions in understanding them in a sense which was far from the mind of the author.

(a) Let us take the celebrated expression—

“वाचारम्भाणं विकारो, नामधेयं,

—वृत्तिकेतेष्व सत्यम् ।”

We come across this sentence for the first time in the Chāndogya-Upanisad where Ārūṇi Uddālaka, that vedic teacher of high renown who founded the celebrated Mortar-Doctrine—explained, to his son Sveta-ketu, with the help of certain familiar objects of every-day-use in the household, the relation existing between a causal substance and its effects which are successively produced from it. This sentence attained so much importance in the subsequent vedantic literature that one of its phrases formed an integral part of an Aphorism in the Brahma-sutra,¹ and Sankara himself made use of this sentence in several parts of his commentaries while engaged in giving an exposition of the vedantic causal theory. In view of the eminent place which this sentence holds, we shall here try to arrive at the true significance of this expression.

Uddālaka was telling his son that the causal substance—the clay—produces from it several transformations in succession to which specific names are applied—say, the plate, the pot, the cup and so on. A lump of gold produces several forms out of it to which we apply specific names, *viz.*, a bracelet, a crown, a necklace. Now, all these so-called objects, the transformations, the changes, (विकार) are, declares Sruti, absolutely dependent on the

¹ Vide the Aphorism—2.1.14.

specific words people choose to apply to them. But these are in reality nothing other than—*नामधेयम्*—the class-name, i.e., *नाम-सामान्य* to which they belong as inseparably connected. This is the relation between a genus (*सामान्य*) and the several species (*विशेष*) subsumed under it.

Sankara, in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka, records his opinion on the relation which exists between a *genus* and its species. Sankara remarks there (1-6.1) that all the (*वृद्धविशेषाः*) *specific* words are but the differentiations of one *नाम सामान्य*—

“यः कश्चन वृद्धो नामैव सा.....

वृद्ध सामान्यमात्मन् । एतद्विशेषा—

नाम-विशेषाणां कारणम् । (उ०, 1.6.1)

The class-name or the *नाम-सामान्य* is the cause of the specific words or the *नाम विशेष* (individual words). It is the *नाम-सामान्य* which divides itself into, differentiates into, the specific words and binds them to itself.¹ And these *विशेष* cannot, therefore, be taken out of, separated from, the *नाम-सामान्य* and treated as self-sufficient entities (*पदम्*).² Why? Because these are all *included within*³ the *सामान्य* and these are mere phases, shapes, forms, of that *सामान्य* in which it manifests itself—

“सामान्ये तद्विशेषाः उताः । ”

“विशेषाणाञ्च सामान्ये अन्तर्भावात् ”—

Sankara concludes that when the *सामान्य* is taken, all

¹ “नाम सामान्यात् सन्धाति नामानि यद्वदसौ द्विवदस इत्येवमादिप्रविभागानि ...उपतिष्ठन्ति प्रविभज्यन्ते । न तत एव निर्भेदा यद्वीतुं शक्यम् । ”

² “न पृथगनुभवः किन्तु तत्-सादृश्यात् ” (स्वामिनिवृण्णम्).

³ “कारणं हि लोके कार्यात् भूयो दृष्टं ।...यच्च यम्य अन्तर्भवति, तदत्य, भूय इतरत् (छा० 7.12.1).”

“सामान्ये हि विशेषः अन्तर्भवति ” (छा० 7.4.1)

the विशेषs are taken along with it; for, it included them within it¹ as its inseparable parts. It is the सामान्य which sustains² all its विशेषs and it is, therefore, not at all possible or reasonable to *separate* the latter from the former, looking upon the latter as so many independent and separated objects existing on their own account, which all of us most unreasonably do under the influence of our अविद्या. Regarded in such a way, the so-called objects would be unreal, false.

Now, in the light of these suggestions made by Sankara, the sentence—"वाचास्मान् विकास्, नामधेयं; सृष्टिर्मेव सत्यं"—means that all विकारs, such as the earthen cup, the plate, the pot, etc., which are all dependent on वाक् (वाचास्मान्),—to which specific names or words (वाक्, i.e., शब्दविशेषाः) are applied—are, properly speaking, only नामधेय, i.e., नाम-सामान्य³. And this सामान्य is real—सत्य—in them, as the clay, i.e., सृष्ट-सामान्य is real in the specific differences, viz., the cup, the plate and the pot. Hence the विकारs, i.e., these specific objects cannot be *taken out* of their सामान्य, cannot be separated from it and regarded as so many self-sufficient entities. In that case, if separated, they would be unreal—असत्य. Yet in our practical life (व्यवहारिक-state), we always regard them so.⁴ But in reality—from the पारमार्थिक-stand-point, they are not such independent (अन्य, विभक्त) things, but they are only सामान्य; for it is the सामान्य which sustains them, सामान्य which includes them in itself and which expresses its nature through them.

¹ सामान्यस्य ग्रहणेनैव तद्वत्ताविशेषाः गृहीताभवन्ति (ब० 2.4.7).

² 'सामान्य' आत्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन हि विशेषान् विभर्ति धारयति' (ब० 1.6.1.).

³ The affix धेय is in स्वायं; नामधेय must therefore mean नामसाधनम् i.e., नामसामान्यम् ।

⁴ 'अविद्याया 'अन्यत्' वस्तुनरमिव पश्यति' (प्र० भा० 4.5).

The readers will see that this is the real explanation of the celebrated sentence according to the light thrown by Sankara himself, and this explanation does not at all make the *svapna* non-existent or unreal or *असत्य*. Sankara wants us to regard *svapna* to be taken always in connection with their *मायामय* which finds its expression in them—and not *separated* from it, as so many different objects. We have no right, says he, to sever their connection or relation with their underlying *मायामय*—which is their causal substance. Thus the world ought not to be taken as *separated* from the underlying Brahman and regarded as a self-sufficient whole existing on its own account. The world would be unreal in this sense alone, according to Sankara.

• (b) Let us now take the expressions—

एतत् सर्वं ब्रह्म—All this is Brahman ;

एतदेतद् अहम्—All this is Ātmā ,

एतद् अहम् इदमस्मात्—All this is what is Ātmā ,

A superficial reading of such expressions as these cannot but leave in the mind of a reader an impression of the absolute identity of Brahman with the world. But we would request our readers to turn their eyes to the three main places in the Vedānta-bhāṣya where Sankara himself explains these expressions ; viz.,—the sūtra 1.1.25, Sūtra 1. 3. 1, and Sūtra 2. 1. 14.¹

¹ In fact, in the first section (commencing from aphorism 20), second section and the third section—in all these sections (पाद) of the first chapter of the Vedānta sūtras, the readers will find that the real sense of such terms as *प्राण*, *आकाश*, *अग्नि*, *वायु*, etc., has been discussed. It has been concluded that these terms are not to be mistaken for the mere phenomenal objects of nature. They are all

Sankara's idea about these expressions may be summarised in his following observation :—

“ विकारेऽनुगतं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म निर्दिष्टं—‘तदिदं सर्वं मिल्यते,’ यथा
‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेति ।’ कार्यञ्च कारणात् अव्यतिरिक्तमिति वक्ष्यामः ।”¹

Sankara in these places, does not at all absolutely *identify* Brahman—the causal Reality—with its effects (विकार). The effects he takes in the relation of *अनन्य* (*ananya*) from the cause. We have already explained the sense of *अनन्य* from the standpoint of Sankara which we need not repeat here.

It does not mean pure *identity*. Such being his explanation of the phrase—

‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म,’ we have no warrant to regard the world with all its changes (विकारः), as absolutely identical with Brahman

derived objects; have derived their existence and activity from Brahman --the causal Energy which lives in them and sustains them,—whose purpose they serve (संहतानांपरार्थत्वं दृष्टं). Sankara has shown that these are all *effects*, and can have no self-sufficient *being* of their own, *apart* from the *being* of the causal Brahman which reveals in them.

¹ In Sutra I. 3. 1. also, it has been shown that Brahman cannot be resolved into the changes of the world. Hence Brahman is to be regarded as a unity unaffected by its evolving changes.

“ न कार्यप्रपञ्च-विशिष्टः विचित्र आत्मा...यथा अनेकात्मको ह्येव...एवं नानारसो विचित्र आत्मा इति । ‘सर्वं ब्रह्मेति’च सासाक्षाधिकरण्यात् आशङ्का सम्भवति ; तां निवर्त्तयितुं माह । ”

In Sutra 2 I.14 also, the effects are shown to be *अनन्य* from their cause. ‘ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वं’, ‘आत्मैवेदं सर्वं’, ‘नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन’—all these are cited as examples of that theory. *The nature of the cause gradually finds its expression in the effects. Hence the effects cannot be separated from it and regarded as something अन्य or independent.*

Such is the sense, everywhere, of these phrases.

regarding the world as the only reality. The real nature of the cause is transcendental (कृत्य)¹ in the system of Sankara, which underlies all its products. And it cannot, as we have already seen, be resolved into its products.

It is Brahman which realises itself in the form of the world. Hence the world cannot be absolutely identical with Brahman in Sankara's philosophy.² The world is simply to be taken as the means through which the underlying nature or *svayam* of Brahman is being realised or expressed in higher and higher forms.³

(c) It is not infrequently that the differentiations or the created *advaita* (अविद्येत्यर्थः) —the changes or differences that are

¹ "कृत्यम् ..कारणम् कर्तृमुच्यते" [६ भा०, २.२.२६]

² "कृत्यमेव विद्यमानम्" २१११ इति ।

Sankara has nowhere applied the term 'cause' to the mere antecedent in time "महाब्रह्ममद्वैतायां पूर्वस्यां प्रत्यक्षव्याप्तिः कारकमव्यवस्थितम्" (६ भा० २.२.२६)

³ Compare the famous phrase "तत्त्वान्तर्भावनिर्णयनीयम्"—(i.e., neither तत्त्व—absolutely identical, nor अव्यक्त—absolutely other (Vide p. 130) Cf. III Smṛti—'न तु यत् तत्, तत् तत्' (६, 131).

⁴ "कृत्यमव्यक्तव्यवस्थायाम् प्रत्यक्षव्याप्तिः तत्त्वान्तर्भावनिर्णयनीयम्" [६ भा०, १.१.११]. Continuously higher and higher differences emerge in Nature, as an inexhaustible (अव्यक्त) and perfect principle stands behind nature and is revealing itself through her. "यादिव्याप्तिरिति तत्त्वमव्यक्तव्यवस्थायाम् प्रत्यक्षव्याप्तिः [चैतन्य], न तु तत्त्वैव तत्त्व चरितम् ।... यदा तत्त्वैरिति प्रत्यक्षव्याप्तिः...यादिव्याप्तिः तत्त्वमव्यक्तव्यवस्थायाम् प्रत्यक्षव्याप्तिः तत्त्वमव्यक्तव्यवस्थायाम् प्रत्यक्षव्याप्तिः" [१० भा०, १५.१२].

"यदापि कर्तृत्वमव्यक्तव्यवस्थायाम् प्रत्यक्षव्याप्तिः, तथापि यत्पूर्वतः तत्त्वमव्यक्तव्यवस्थायाम् प्रत्यक्षव्याप्तिः" [७ भा०, ५.१.१].

emerging in the world have been called in the Bhāṣyas as—

अविद्या-प्रत्युपस्थापित—brought about or presented by Avidyā;

अविद्या-कल्पित—fancied or imagined by Avidyā;

अविद्यात्मक—consisting of Avidyā;

अविद्याध्यारोपिते नामरूपे—(nama-rūpas) ascribed or imposed by Avidyā;—
and so on.

Now, these phrases, to all outward appearances, imply the illusory character or unreality or falsity of these changes—these emerging nāma-rūpas. But such meaning, if adopted, would militate against the entire theory of Sankara, as we shall presently see.

For the true meaning of these phrases we would refer our readers to Chap. I of this book (p. 45) where we have shown that Sankara in commenting on the Taittiriya Upanishad observed that as Avidyā belongs to nāma-rūpa¹ and exists as a property of our intellect,² it is under its influence that our intellect (अन्तःकरण) always takes nāma-rūpa as an essential property of the self (आत्मधर्मी).³ In

1 “नामरूप-पक्षेयैव विद्याविद्ये । नामरूपे च नात्मधर्मी” ।

2 “विवेकाविवेकौ (i.e. विद्याविद्ये) रूपादिवत्...अन्तःकरणस्थौ” ।

3 “नामरूपे च न आत्मधर्मी...ते च पुनर्नामरूपे सवितरि अहोरात्रे इव—आत्मनि कल्पिते, न परमार्थतो विद्यमाने” ।—तै° भा°, 2.8. (कल्पिते=अध्यारोपिते । Cf. “‘संशुद्ध’-रूपेण कल्पितत्वमिष्टं”—मा° का° भा°, आन,°3.32).

another passage, we find Sankara making a similar observation, where he says that as the self has a 'nature' (स्वद्वय) of its own, it is always *distinguished* from the nāma-rūpa, and to look upon the nāma-rūpa as an essential property or अर्था of the self, which people erroneously do, must therefore be wrong.¹ Brahman always remains unaffected (निर्विकल्प) by the world of nāma-rūpa which has emerged from it; it is our Avidyā which makes it appear as affected (विकल्प) by and thus identified with the changing nāma-rūpa of the world.²

The celebrated Introduction appended to the "Brahma-sūtra" also points out that it is our Avidyā³ which produces false

¹ "यत् यत् परः आत्मधर्मैर्लेन चक्षुषमच्छति, तस्य तस्य नामरूपात्मकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । नामरूपाभ्यां च आत्मनीत्युक्त्याभ्युपगमात् ।... उत्पत्तिप्रलयात्मके हि नामरूपे तद्विलक्षणं ब्रह्म" ।—इ भा०, 2 1.20.

² "न हि परमायती 'निर्विकल्पे' ब्रह्मणि कश्चिदपि 'विकल्प' उपपद्यते ।... आत्मप्रतिपक्षार्थमेव बहुभवन-सर्गादि 'परिकल्पते' ब्रह्मणि" (तै० भा० 2.8).

Compare—सूत्रेषु अकल्पितस्य 'संखट'—रूपेण कल्पितत्वमित' " (मा० भा० आन० 3.32).

³ Dr. Hermann Jacobi of the University of Bonn, Germany, in a letter addressed to the author, expresses his reluctance to take अविद्या in the sense of 'Individual Avidyā' alone, and he makes a distinction between 'Cosmic Avidyā' and 'Individual Avidyā.' This individual Avidyā he calls as "fundamental Adhyāsa" under whose influence the world and ourselves appear to us to be *real*, but when it is sublated, they *vanish* as far as concern the individual, soul who has got rid of his fundamental Adhyāsa. It is the 'Cosmical Avidyā, he says, which as a cosmical principle is the cause of the material world, and, as the world is the product of this Avidyā it must be *false*. He also observes

identification (अज्ञास), and the changing states of the self are looked upon by its influence as the 'nature' or स्वरूप of the

that when Vidyā arises it annihilates the Avidyā of an individual and thereby sublates for him the अविद्याभ्यस्तः द्रव्यणि प्रपञ्चः. But this विद्या is inefficacious with regard to the cosmic अविद्या which is the cause of नामरूप, which latter *continues to subsist* after the *mukti* of a jiva.

The arguments used by the learned professor do not, however, seem, to us, convincing. By making a distinction between the individual and the cosmic Avidyā, he simply shows that the world born of the latter is not a *mere subjective appearance*. It does not vanish into nothingness, the moment the individual attains Mukti. All that is involved in the attainment of Mukti is displacement of the false outlook (अविद्या) by the true one and not the annihilation of the world. If the world is *false*, even on attaining release not only the false vision of the world but the world itself should disappear. Since Dr. Jacobi concedes that the latter does not happen, he admits that the world is not false. Again, since the world is not due to our individual Avidyā but is born of the cosmic Avidyā, in Dr. Jacobi's term, its only locus is Brahman. Māyā, in Sankara-Vedānta, is looked upon as both Āvaraṇa (आवरण) and vikshepa (विक्षेप). In Mukti, the former only disappears while the latter remains, and it may not be regarded as more real than the false error of the *independent esse* of the world what the professor calls fundamental अज्ञास (i.e., false identification). This alone disappears in Mukti, and not the world itself. Moreover, to regard the world as false world would be to identify Sankara's view with the vijñāna-vāda which would be to violate all canons of sound interpretation. Sankara criticises Vijñāna-vāda and it means that he is against all theses which reduce the world to mental states. In fact, the world, according to Sankara's view, is an expression of God's sakti and it is relatively real, not false. While it is necessary to distinguish the world from God, it is equally necessary to distinguish it from an illusion or subjective phantasm.

N. B. साक्षात् प्रमाणशक्ति in the Sankara-Vedānta is not merely a *subjective idea* but it is an *objective principle* from which the world of nāma-rūpa comes out. Many people labour under an erroneous idea that Sankara's साक्षात् is nothing more than a *subjective idea* of the mind by which we perceive the appearance of the world. But this is

self, though in reality the self is always distinguished from its states.

Now, from the above discussion, we may draw the following conclusions—

(i) The finite self is not a characterless being, but it has a distinct nature of its own and cannot therefore be reduced into its states and activities. The self has been described by Sankara as transcending the external and internal elements of the body, but yet controlling and illumining them—

“कार्यकरवासीतः ; तद्यापि कार्य-करवावभासकं—चात्मन्योतिः” । [उ°, 4.3.10].

(ii) Similarly he has described Brahman's nature as transcending the nāma-rūpas (changes) and untouched by them, but yet controlling and directing

not true. In Ved-Bhāṣya, II. 1. 9, a suspicion may indeed arise to the effect that Sankara makes *सिद्ध्याज्ञान* as the root-cause of all differentiations (*विभाग व्यवहार*). That it is not a mere subjective idea, but an objective principle or power (of Brahman) becomes clear if we consult a similar passage in Māndūkya Bhāṣya (कारिका, आगमप्र° 1-0) where this *सिद्ध्याज्ञान* has been identified with *प्राणशक्ति* which is the cause of all differentiations.

He says there—“*निर्वर्जितयैव चेत् सति प्रलीनानां सुषुप्ति-प्रलययोः पुन-रुत्थानानुपपत्तिः स्यात् ; सुक्तानाञ्च पुनरुत्थानमसङ्गः । तस्यात् ‘सर्वोक्तत्वा’-भ्यपगमेनैव सतः प्राणत्वव्यपदेशः सृष्ट्यनुत्तिषु च कारणत्वव्यपदेशः ।*” Here, *प्राण* is the cosmic seed (*बीज*) of the world present in Brahman. The term *सिद्ध्याज्ञान* of the Ved-Bhāṣya referred to above is nothing but this *प्राणबीज*. Thus the world can not be false or subjective phantasm. It is called *सिद्ध्याज्ञान* or *अज्ञान*, because it is the other i.e. opposite of *ज्ञान* or *ब्रह्म* ; but it is not absolutely other, it is also identical. (Vide Ohap. I, pp. 25-31.) Also cf. अनिर्वचनीयवाद, pp. 135-137.

the activities of these changing *nāma-rupas*—

“नाम रूपाभ्यामस्पृष्टं यदित्येतत् तत्तद्ब्रह्म, नामरूप-विलक्षणं नामरूपाभ्यामस्पृष्टं तथापि तयोः निर्व्यभिक्तं । एवं लक्षणं ब्रह्म” । [छा° भा°, 8.14.1.]

Hence we find that neither Brahman, nor the individual selves can be resolved into its manifested changes. The changes stand to the underlying reality in the relation of *ananya* (अनन्य),—*i.e.*, they cannot be separated from it and regarded as something *independent*; but they are to be taken merely as a *means* for the gradual manifestations of the nature of the underlying cause—

“उपर्युपरि आविस्तरत्वमात्मनः...‘आत्मप्रकाशनाय’ ” (ऐ° आ° भा°, 2.1.3).

“ज्ञानशक्ताद्यभिव्यक्तिः परेण परेण भूयसी भवति ” (वेदा° भाष्य, 1.3.30).

“आत्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव...बहुभवनादि परिकल्प्यते ” (तै° भा°, 2.8).

How can the changes, then, be regarded as false or unreal, in the view of Sankara? It is only when under the influence of *Avidyā*, we forget the separate reality of the underlying cause and *identify* it with its evolving changes (विकारः), as if the causal reality has become something *other than* its own nature,—that the changes become false, unreal.¹ This is done under

¹ Cf. “अन्यदिव आत्मनो वस्तुनरमिव अविद्या प्रत्युपस्थापितं भवति...अन्यत्वेन ब्रह्मणः परिकल्पमानानि अन्यानि ” [बृ° भा° 4.3.21-23].

“अविद्याकृतं भूतमात्रोपाधि-संसर्गजं ‘अन्यत्वाभासं’ तिरस्कृत्य—इत्यादि” (5.1.1).

The changing states and activities are all elicited from our underlying ‘nature,’ through interaction with the external environment ‘भूतमात्रासंसर्गजं’; ‘सर्वभूतभौतिकमात्राः अस्य संसर्गकारणभूता’ विद्यन्ते (4.8-9).

the influence of Avidya. It is in this sense alone that the diversities of the changing *nāma-rupas* in the world are regarded as false or unreal, in Sankara's system

(d) Now, let us consider such expressions as—

नेह नानादृशि किञ्चन—The diversities or the differences exist not in the world,—
यस्य सर्वत्रात्मैवाभूत् .. तत् केन कं पश्येत् ?—i.e.,
the man who sees the *Atmā* every where, cannot see other things in the world

These phrases seem to imply, apparently, that there are really no diversities,—no *nāma-rupas*—no changes—nothing—in the world,—that these are all mere appearances and unreal

But let us see how Sankara himself has explained these expressions. We invite our reader's attention in this connection to *Sūtras* 2, 1, 14 and 3, 2, 22, where Sankara himself has quoted these phrases and explained them.

He first raises the question—If the 'unity' is reduced to 'multiplicity,' can

When these are produced, we erroneously identify ourselves with these, and these become the only self to us. But this Self is false. The real self is what underlies these states and activities and to which these are referred as to a centre. Such is the case with Brahman also. This identification is due to the fault of our intellect. But how can there be identification? Sankara says—"अविद्याकल्पितेन द्रोणेण पारमार्थिकं वस्तु न दृश्यति।—न च मिथ्याज्ञानं परमार्थवस्तु दूषयितुं समर्थं" [गो^० भा^०, 13 2] Sankara does not call the objects false, he calls identification false. स्वरूपेण अकल्पितस्य 'मसृष्ट'रूपेण कल्पितत्वमिदं" [मा^० का^० भाष्य, चान^० ११२२] ।

it retain its unity—and decides in the negative. He points out—as ‘one’ and ‘many’ oppose each other, *both* cannot be true in respect of the one and the same thing. The pantheists of his time looked upon ‘unity’ and ‘multiplicity’ *both* as true. The pantheistic unity is merely अनेकात्मक, *i.e.*, it is the unity of mere collection. It is an abstract whole—a mere aggregate of parts, having no substantial being or life of its own outside of and *apart* from its parts which constitute it.

But Sankara shows here that Brahman cannot be both एक and अनेकात्मक Brahman is a true unity; it has a ‘being,’ *outside* the world—

“उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं एकत्वज्ञानेन

नानात्वज्ञानमपनुद्यते इत्युच्येत ?” — वै° 2.1.14.

As Brahman has a ‘nature’ of its own, how can it be *resolved* into many and become अनेकात्मक ?¹ Hence his conclusion is that the ‘unity’ retains its unity in all circumstances and it is the only

¹ न हि अद्यपि परमार्थसत्त्वात्मनि प्राणादि-संसारजातमिदं जगत् ‘नाना’—वस्तुन्तर-भूतं भवति । “न हि प्राणाद्यात्मना इदं विद्यते कदाचिदपि” । यथा रज्जुस्वरूपेण निरूप्यमाणो न ‘नाना’भूतः कल्पितः सर्पोऽस्ति, तद्वत्” (भा° का-भा°, 2.54) ।

Cf. ‘मायामात्रं हि एतत्, यत् परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मना अवभासनं’ (वै° भा°, 2.1.9). (*i.e.*, as if Brahman has become अवस्थात्रयात्मक—*i.e.*, entirely reduced to अवस्थात्रय).

“मायया भिद्यते...न परमार्थतः निरवयवत्वादात्मनः । सावयवं हि अवयवान्य-द्यात्वेन भिद्यते”—भा° का° भा°, अद्वै° प्र, 19).

Reality. The diverse changes—नामरूप—
—the differences which emerge from it—
are not absolutely distinct from Brahman,
as so many independent things true and
real with the unity; but they are *means*,
stages (दरभूतानि) —for the gradual
manifestation of the 'nature' of Brahman
which is present behind them and is
realising itself through them.

Now then, the line—

“यद्य सत्त्वंनामैवाभूत्.....तस्मिन् के पद्येत् ?”—

—and the line—

“नेह जगत्सि किञ्चन”—

Such lines, such expressions—do not mean
that there are *not* things in the world,
that all are non-entities. They mean that
the things in the world will no longer
appear to us in the same light in which
they appear to the ordinary *ignorant*
people. They would not appear as so
many absolutely—*independent* things—
a crass plurality—a tree there, a cow
here; a river there, a man here.
They would appear *only* as higher and
higher *stages* through which the under-
lying unity of Brahman is progressively
revealing its own 'nature,' is realising
itself—¹

¹ “स्यावरत्नादारभ्य सप्तयुपरि आविस्तरत्वमात्मनः.....आत्मप्रकाशनाय”
[६० भा० भा०, 2.1-3] ।

“यथा मनुष्यादिस्तत्त्वपर्यन्तेषु ज्ञानैश्वर्यादिप्रतिबन्धः परेषु परेषु भूयान् भवन्

“तत्स्वरूप-‘व्यतिरिक्त’ ‘मन्यदन्तु’ किमिच्छम्

.....आत्मनो ‘व्यतिरिक्तस्य’ कस्य कामाद्य” ?

(बृह° भा°, 4.4.12).

The emerging *nāma-rūpas* would, now, be looked upon as only further and further revelations or realisations of Brahman; they would not, now, be looked upon as ‘व्यतिरिक्त’ or ‘अन्य’ or absolutely distinct from the underlying Brahman¹ but as अन्य from it.

This is the conclusion which we have gained from a discussion of Sankara’s celebrated Doctrine of Causality. Now it stands clear that there arises no question for the *abolition* of the diverse objects in the world—in the system of Advaita Philosophy.

(e) There is still another phrase used in the Vedānta which demands our consideration and attention. We mean the phrase known as—विशेष-निराकरण or विशेष-प्रतिषेध ।—
i.e., the repudiation or rejection of the

दृश्यते, तथा मनुष्यादिष्वेव हिरण्यगर्भपर्यन्तेषु ज्ञानैश्वर्याद्यभिव्यक्तिरपि परेण परेण भूयसी भवति” [वि° भा°, 1.3.30] ।

“एवं पूर्वस्याः पूर्वस्या भूमेः उत्तरस्यामुत्तरस्यां भूमौ.....शतगुणेनानन्दीत्कर्षः उपपद्यते ।—मनुष्यगन्धर्व्याद्युत्तरोत्तरभूमिषु शतगुणोत्तरोत्तरोत्कर्षेण यावद्विरण्यगर्भस्य ब्रह्मणः आनन्दः—इत्यादि” [तै° भाष्य, 2.8 also बृ° भाष्य 4.3.33].

“सत्त्वाधिकादाविस्तरत्वीपपत्तेः । आदित्यादिषु सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकाशं...अतस्तत्रैव आविस्तरं.....नतु तत्रैव तत् अधिकं ।...यथा आदर्शादौ स्वच्छे स्वच्छतरे च तारतम्येनाविर्भवति—तुल्येऽपि मुखसंस्थाने—तद्वत्” [गौ° भा°, 15. 12].

¹ “न हि कारणव्यतिरेकेण कार्यं नाम वस्तुतोऽस्ति यतः कारणबुद्धिर्विनिवर्तते” [तै° भा°, 2.1].

particular determinant *qualities* we find in the world. The qualities are universally existent; and although they belong, in a sense, to one Reality—*ब्रह्म*—as a whole, still they belong definitely to a particular reality as its determinations and not of others. The qualities are but the activities of the individual things or individual beings. The phrase *विशेष-निराकरण* may appear at first sight to mean that Sankara has denied the existence of the qualities—that these are mere appearances;—that they do not really exist. But let us assure our readers this was far from the mind of Sankara. The explanation of this *विशेष-निराकरण* which he himself gives in the *Vedānta-Sūtras*—4-3-14 and 3-2-22 conclusively shows that he has denied nothing, repudiated nothing, rejected nothing.

The purport of his explanation is briefly this:—Suppose a quality emerges; if you identify the underlying Brahman (Causal Reality) with this quality, Brahman becomes entirely reduced to this quality and hence it becomes something *other than* its own 'being'; whereas all the time Brahman maintains its unity in and through this quality;—and so on with other successively emergent qualities in the world. Sankara's idea is that Brahman is to be regarded always as a unity, unchanging in its own nature and unaffected by the

qualities; and it cannot therefore be regarded as—गुणविशिष्ट or धर्मविशिष्ट, *i.e.*, *identical* with the qualities—as if its nature is not one but composed of the qualities (अनेकात्मक)¹—

“अनेकशक्तित्वं ब्रह्मण इति चेत् ? न ।

विशेष-निराकरणश्रुतीना मननार्थत्वात् ।”

Sankara next concludes—

“प्रपञ्चमेव ‘ब्रह्मणि कल्पितं’ प्रतिषेधति,

परिशिष्टे ब्रह्म”² —

(वे° भा°, 3.2.22).

i.e., By विशेष-निराकरण, the *qualities*, as such, are not repudiated or negated; but Brahman if regarded as *composed* of the qualities is repudiated or negated.

The ‘nature’ (स्वरूप) of Brahman is *present* behind the qualities evolved in the world and this nature cannot be resolved into or identified with them. It is present *unaffected* by these changing qualities. Sankara has elsewhere pointed out that all the changing and emergent qualities

¹ Of. “न कार्यप्रपञ्चविशिष्टः विचित्र आत्मा विज्ञेयः...यथा अनेकात्मको ह्यक्षः” (वे°, 1.3.1).

² “कल्पित-रूपप्रत्याख्यानं—‘स्वरूप’वेदनं” (कल्पितं=अविद्यया आरोपितं) । Of. “स्वात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानेन मरीच्युदक-रज्जुसर्प-गगनमलानीव, मरीचि-रज्जु-गगन-स्वरूपदग्नेनैव कृतकयोभवति” (कठ भा°, 3.14.) । “रज्जुद्रव्येन सता, ‘अयं सर्प इति, धारयं, दण्डोयमिति वा’—रज्जुद्रव्यमेव कल्पते, एवं प्राणादिभिरनन्तैः ।...सर्व्वे एते आत्मनि अध्यारीष्यन्ते...आत्मा एतेषु अनुगतः, सर्पधारादिभेदेषु यथा रज्जुः” (सा° का°, 2.32-33).

are interwoven into the underlying Reality which reveals its nature through them—.

"सामान्यानुविद्धानां विवेकाणामदर्शनात्" (उ० भा० 1.5.1).

It is wrong therefore to identify the under-lying reality with these qualities. This *identification* is repudiated, as it is due to our intellectual error (बुद्धिदोष or चक्षुः); and therefore such identification must be *false, unreal*.

This is the purport or sense of the विवेचनिराकरण or the repudiation or rejection of the qualities. Sanka has established this position in another way thus —

These qualities are definite relations into which one individual is brought with other individuals or things. But these relations cannot exhaust the individuals. I am brought into a particular relation with you, but yet I am something *more* than this relation. In this way, every individual self is a part of another individual self, yet he belongs to himself. Sankara points out that an individual has a substantive (सुख or विवेक) and an adjectival (सन्निविष्ट or विवेक) mode of existence. He exists by himself and this is his substantive mode; yet he is related to something beyond him and this is his adjectival mode of existence. A man, say Deva Datta, may come into different relations with different people and he is designated differently. But yet the same Deva Datta does not lose his own सुख in

these relations.¹ Every individual therefore maintains his own identity in the various relations into which he is brought with others. Brahman, in the same way, maintains its own identity in those variously interconnected relations or qualities.²

If you identify the underlying Brahman with these relations, Brahman would become 'many'—अनेकात्मक, नानागुणविशिष्ट *i. e.* composed of parts. Sankara has not denied the relations or qualities as such. He only denies Brahman or the individual self being regarded as अनेकात्मक. Such self or Brahman must be unreal, false, in Sankara system.³ The relations are but a means, or medium (उपाय, द्वार) for the expression

¹ “एकत्वेऽपि स्वरूप-वाच्यरूपापेक्षया अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात् ।

यथा एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः, स्वरूपं सत्त्वन्धिरूपश्च अपेक्ष्य
अनेक शब्द प्रत्यय भाक् भवति—मनुष्यः बालः युवा...पिता
भ्राता जामाता इति” (वे°भा°, 2-2-17) ।

“शुक्तः कम्बलः, रोहिणी चेतुः, नीलमुत्पलं—इति द्रव्यस्यैव
तेन तेन विशेषणेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्, द्रव्यात्मकता गुणस्य ”

(वे°भा°, 2-2-17.)

² “सर्वगतः (*i.e.*, immanent) परमेश्वरः—एकः स्वतन्त्रश्च (*i.e.*, transcendental)” —कठ-भाष्य 5.12. | The qualities are but the responses made by the individuals to the *Pran-spandan* which is the active common medium or environment which elicits the responses. The qualities are thus ‘inter-connected relations.’

³ “न हि उषरदेयः वृङ्खत्-प्राण्यध्वारोपितोदकफेनतरङ्गादिमान्, तथा नात्मा
अवधारोपितकेशादिमलैर्मलिनो भवति ” (मा°का°भा°, 3,8) ।

Of, “अनेकात्मकः...कार्यधर्मविशिष्टः विचित्र आत्मा इति आशङ्का भवति, *etc.*” (वे°, 1. 3.1). To imagine parts of the underlying ground is due to our intellectual error. In गौड़पादभाष्य, Sankara calls it चित्तकल्पना.

of the *śarūpa* of the underlying unity and hence they are *द्वय* from the *śarūpa*.

(f) There is another expression, *वि*, प्रपञ्च-विनाश—Dissolution of the world—which deserves consideration.

The question of प्रपञ्च-विनाश arose in connection with a doubt which existed in the mind of many people. So long as the world exists to occupy our mind, to distract our attention, how is it possible to realise the knowledge of Brahman? For, the world stands there as a rival to Brahman and it will act as an obstruction in the way of the knowledge of Brahman. It is therefore necessary to dissolve the world—to abolish it altogether so that nothing stands in the way of the realisation of Brahman.¹

In order to remove this doubt, Sankara has given us the true sense of the idea of प्रपञ्च-विनाश from which his views about the existence of this world very prominently stand in clear light. He has recorded his views thus :—

“What,” Sankara enquires of the doubter, “is your idea about the Dissolution of the world—प्रपञ्च-विनाश, pray? Do you mean by it that as heat disintegrates the solid particles of the clarified butter and ultimately dissolves them, we are to dissolve the world in the like manner? But this is, we say, simply an impossibility.

The world—both in its subjective and objective condition—actually exists (*विद्यमानः*), nobody is therefore capable of dissolving the *existence* of such a world. Hence such actual dissolution of the world is out of the question. You cannot really mean this by your term प्रपञ्च-विनाश. If, however, your idea about dissolution be that we are to remove—dissolve—the false *identification*—the identification

¹ “.....एवं ब्रह्मत्वमवमुत्सृज्यमानेन तत्प्रत्यनीकभूतः प्रपञ्चः प्रविलापयितव्यः ।तेन नामरूपप्रविलापनेन ब्रह्मत्वज्ञातव्यो भवतीति” (वे० भा०, 3.2.21).

of the world with Brahman in consequence of an erroneous imposition of the former upon the latter (by ignoring the *distinct* being of Brahman which underlies the world unaffected by its changes), you are welcome to do this. Such dissolution by true knowledge is indeed possible. We agree with you in this view of *dissolution*.”¹

Do these remarks show in any way that in Sankara-Vedanta the actual existence of the world has ever been denied?

8. We should like to conclude this discussion by

A typical illustration analysed. Cause strives towards future end which is real power present and realised in the changes which are inseparable. Inseparability proves their reality

calling the attention of our readers to an important typical illustration given by Sankara with a view to clearly illustrate the steps of his own doctrine of causality as expounded by him in his Vedanta-bhasya. We find this typical illustration admirably explained in the Brihadāranyaka-bhāṣya. This powerful exposition of the theory makes it impossible, once for all, for us to look upon the world and its evolving changes (विकारः) as unreal or false. We have therefore to recognise this illustration as a fact of capital interest

¹ “अत्र वयं पृच्छामः—कीयं प्रपञ्चविलयो नाम ? किमग्निप्रतापसम्पर्कात् छतकाठिन्य-प्रविलय इव प्रपञ्चप्रविलयः कर्तव्यः, आहोस्वित्.....अविद्याकृतो ब्रह्मणि अध्यस्तः नामरूपप्रपञ्चः विद्यया प्रविलापयितव्य इति ? अत्र, यदि तावत् ‘विद्यामानीयं’ प्रपञ्चः—देहादिलक्षण आध्यात्मिकः, वाह्यश्च पृथिव्यादिलक्षणः—प्रविलापयितव्य इत्युच्येत, स पुष्पमात्रेण अशक्यः प्रविलापयितुं मित्यादि” (वै० भा०, 3.2.21).

N.B.—In Brihadaranyakabhasya, there is a reference to प्रपञ्चविलय. प्रपञ्च is ordinarily regarded as something independent—as अन्य—different from Brahman. The idea of this अन्यत्व ought to be killed. This is प्रपञ्चविलय. “अन्यत्वदर्शनलक्षणां विशेषसंज्ञा—इत्यादि (वै० भा०, 2.4.13)”In this way प्रपञ्चविलय is explained here. (This अन्यत्वदर्शन is the result of identification.)

and importance to the student of the Advaita Philosophy which will make clear in a different way the problem, the solution of which we are seeking in this chapter; and will prove helpful in coming to a decision about it. We have therefore thought it fit to re-emphasise this illustration to which reference was made in a previous chapter.

Sankara explains here the idea of the cause and the effects which emerge in succession from it by an illustration of a lump of earth (मृत्तिका) and its successive transformations until the *last* transformation—the jar (घट)—is reached. The ultimate future end is present, he says, in the real nature or स्वप्न of the causal substance. It is impossible to hold it to be non-existent in the cause. To deny this presence is to make the passage clearer for the easy entrance of that undesirable guest—*Āsat-kāryya-vāda* (असत् कार्यवाद). Until it is completely realised, the End—though future—must be held to be present in the nature of the cause.¹

The potter, Sankara observes, with a view to produce this end, *viz.*, घट (jar) collects the मृत्तिका (lump of earth) and continues giving it its successive shapes (in the form of चूरे, पिण्ड, कपाल, etc.). You cannot, Sankara goes on, deny this striving on the part of the potter towards this future end.² Sankara says that, it is necessary, for an end to realise itself completely, to pass through certain

¹ "प्रास्तुपत्तेरपि सदेव कार्यं । तस्मात् घटाद्यभिव्यक्तार्थिनी नियत एव कारकव्यापारीऽर्हवान् ।...एवञ्च सति, घटस्य प्रागभाव इति—न घटस्वरूपमेव प्रास्तुपत्तेर्नास्तीति ।...स्वेन हि भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो वर्तते" ।

² "अनागतार्थ-प्रवृत्तेः । न हि असति अर्थितया प्रवृत्तिलोके दृष्टा... असंभवे तु भविष्यद्घटः, ऐश्वरं भविष्यद्घटविषयं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं भविष्यात् । 1.2.1.— (Hence घट or the end is the real cause of the प्रवृत्ति or movement on the part of मृत्तिका.)

antecedent transformations or stages.¹ It follows therefore that the future end is present throughout the successive stages of the *सृत्तिका*—though not in actual form (“वर्त्तमानतादयेण”), but still it is present throughout in the form of future possibility² in the nature of *सृत्तिका*.

The change is a *relation* between two terms. In order to be related, the two terms of the relation must be *real*. The change is therefore a relation between something present and something future, *i.e.*, which is going to be. If you say the *future* is unreal, is nothing—then the *cause* or Brahman would itself become unreal.³ The future (घट) therefore operates in the present (*i.e.*, in the *सृत्तिका*);⁴ and the present becomes thus connected with the future.

¹ “कारणे वर्त्तमानं कार्यं कार्यान्तराणामावरणमित्यवोचाम ।...पिण्ड-
कपालाद्यवस्थयो विद्यमानमेव घटादिकार्यं घटादिकार्याधिना
घटाद्युत्पत्तौ...यत्र कर्त्तव्यः” । 1.2.1.

² “स्वेन हि भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो विद्यते । न हि पिण्डस्य वर्त्तमानता, कपालस्य
वा घटस्य वा भवति ।...तस्मात्कुलालादिव्यापार—वर्त्तमानतायां, प्रागुत्पत्तेर्घटोऽ
सन्निति न विरुध्यते (*i.e.*, घट is not present *actually*, but as a *future* possi-
bility.)”..... “किञ्च, प्रागुत्पत्तिः अभावभूतस्य घटस्य स्वकारणसत्ता-
सम्बन्धाद्युत्पत्तिः, इयाद्यत्तत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य” (*i.e.*, the change being a *relation*,
must have two terms of relation—the present and the future. The
future cannot therefore be non-existent or असत्.)

³ In the *Mandukya*, 6, Sankara says—

“यदि हि असतामेव जन्म स्यात्, ब्रह्मणी ग्रहणद्वाराभावात् असत्त्व-प्रसङ्गः ।”
Ananda-giri elaborates the passage thus—“इयाद्यत्तत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य । कार्येण
हि लिङ्गेन कारणब्रह्म ज्ञानार्थत्वं सृष्टिस्तृतीयां । तच्चेदसद् भवेत्, न तेन तस्य कारण-
सम्बन्धधीरिति असदेव कारणमपि स्यात् ।”

⁴ For, घट is an end and it is the real cause of the striving or move-
ment of *सृत्तिका* towards the end, which striving exists for its sake. The
end is therefore present in the beginning and operates as a real cause.

Hence, the cause is really the future End or Power which is realising itself in all the changes. It is therefore this power which underlies, and works in, all changes. It gives continuity to them and is above them all. It is realising itself through all successive changes which cannot, therefore, be separated from it.¹ Sankara illustrates this idea thus—

“As a player, taking on successive characters upon himself, enacts on the stage the parts of each of these characters in succession, but yet retains his *own distinct character* ; so the underlying causal unity, retaining its own distinct identity, realises itself successively in each of the changes produced.”²

Now, we must apply this typical case of *सृष्टि* and its final realisation in the form of *पद*, to all the individual changes in the world. We come then to learn from Sankara's exposition just stated that—

in the real nature or *मेव* of an individual being, the future *end* is present, and this end works in it.

¹ Sankara has noted that the changes cannot be separated from the underlying cause, nor can they be separated from one another as independent ‘things,’ because the cause itself holds them all by its own power (*इष्ट*) and realises itself in each of them successively,—

“*यामृष्यव्यपप्रदाभेन मामास्य विजेष्यान् चारयति*” and “*मामास्ये लभामता-
काममेव कर्मणा व्युत्थीकरं*” (*३^०* and *४^०*) ।

² “*मूलकारणमेव या—यन्त्याकाश्यात्, तेन तेन कार्याकारेण, नटवत् साद-
व्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते*” (*वे^० भा^०, २.1.18*). Also *Vide* *वे^०, 1.3.19*.

And in order to have its final realisation, this end will necessarily have to pass through its preceding successive transformations or stages, until at last it becomes finally realised in its last stage.¹ This last stage is therefore the *end* of the individual being and this end is therefore a future possible power, present in the individual; and it works in all the changes as its *purpose*. This end (or purpose) is the *real cause*; for it reveals itself more and more through the successive transformations or stages and completes itself in the last stage.

Is it possible, then, to *separate* any of these *changes* or stages from the underlying स्वरूप (swarupa) of the individual and to treat them as independent things (अच्यवत्)? For, how is it possible to know the real nature of the cause until it reaches, and fully reveals itself in, its last change or stage?

For this reason, Sankara has repeatedly remarked that no effects can be treated as something *distinct* and *separate* from their underlying cause. For, it is the cause which is revealing or realising ² itself *in* these changes. The

¹ It has been noted that the underlying cause must be present up to the time the *last* effect is produced “हेतुस्वभावस्य फलकालावस्थायित्वं” and “हेतुस्वभावानुपरक्तस्य फलस्य अदृशनात्” (वे° भा°, 2.2.20). For, it is seen everywhere that the *last* effect (फल) is always accompanied and coloured by the underlying cause. “तद्भावनुरक्तां बुद्धिं कार्यकारणयोः” (वे°, 2.1.15).

Cf. the expression—“एकविज्ञानेन सत्त्वविज्ञानं भवति.”

² “आत्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव” (तै°, 2.8).

effects are therefore nothing but the necessary *expressions* of the cause which is present and operative behind them.

Is it then possible for Sankara, who gives such a description, to deny the effects or changes and to declare them to be false or unreal? The falsity only comes in, if you regard the nature (स्वरूप) of the underlying cause actually *lost* in these effects emerging from it;—if the स्वरूप is resolved into and thus absolutely *identified with* these changes—as if it has become something *other than* itself (i.e., अणु),—as if the underlying Brahman is actually converted into the aggregate of the empirical changes,¹ and thus become अनेकारम्भकः ।

✓Sankara has, everywhere in his Bhasya, called the world unreal or false in *this sense alone*.

9. We have tried, in the preceding pages, to find out the real intention of the Leader of the Advaita school of

thought in the Indian Philosophy, and examined carefully all possible cases which may produce in the mind some confusion about the unreality of the diversities of nāma-rupa emergent in the world. It is, however, not necessary to push our examination any further, and the considerations we have so far made will, we hope, clear away all

¹ “आत्मप्रकाशनाय...आविसरत्वमात्मनः” (१० भा० भा०) ।

² “न कारणात् ‘अणुत्’ कार्यं” बध्नेतेनापि शक्यं निश्चितं—एवं युक्तेः कार्यस्य प्राप्त्यपत्तेः सत्त्वं अनन्यत्वञ्च कारणात्—अवगम्यते” (६० भा०, 2.1.18).

“न च विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण ‘वस्तुन्यत्वं’ भवति...स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्”—2.1.18.

“अनात्मदर्शिनस्तु तद्व्यतिरिक्तवस्तुन्यत्वेऽप्योः—‘समेदम्यात्’ ‘पुत्रस्य इदं’ ‘भार्याया इदं’—इत्येवमौघमानः पुनः पुनः जनन-मरण-प्रवत्यादृष्टः..... । सञ्चारम-दर्शिनस्तु (i.e., अनन्यत्वदर्शिनः) तदसम्भव एव” (४० भा०, 4.4.2).

“न कार्यैः तद्व्यतिरिक्तं कारणं ‘संयुज्यते’—६० भा०, 2.1.9.”

misapprehensions which certainly exist about the problem of the unreality of the objective world of facts and we may fairly conclude that we are not committed to the universal nihilism in Sankara's school of Philosophy. A few words must, however, be added in regard to one point of primary importance, before we conclude this line of our enquiry.

We have said that Brahman (as well as the individual-selves) possesses a स्वरूप, a nature, of its own. In order to realise this स्वरूप, Brahman has created and evolved the world,¹ and the world is moving from the lowest to the highest stages.² This movement has become possible for the world, because behind each stage, that eternal principle (पूर्वसिद्धः आत्मा) is present, which is gradually expressing itself in and through these stages or changes.

The reader who has followed us thus far will now find that such is the position which Sankara has taken up in the Vedanta philosophy. Against this position, however, an objection may be urged to the effect that if the multiplicity of the changes is held to be *not false* or *unreal*, what would be the fate of the *Sruti* which insistently declares that—

“there is only *one* principle—Brahman
which is *without a second*—secondless”—

“ब्रह्म एकं अद्वितीयम्” ।

¹ “पूर्वसिद्धोऽपि हि सन् आत्मा विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमयामास आत्मानं” (वे०भा०, 1.4.26). “यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते, न तत् तत् उत्पद्यते ; यथा सिकताम्यस्तैलं” वे०भा०, (2.1.16) ।

² “नामादि प्राणान्तानि उत्तरीत्तर-विशिष्टानि तत्त्वानि, अतितराश्च तेषामुत्कृष्ट-तमं भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं” (का०भा०, 7.1.1.) । “विकाराणां सदेव समाधिः अवसानं” (का०भा०, 6.8.4).

There is thus a *conflict* between the statement of the *Śruti* and the position established by Sankara¹ To this supposed objection, Sankara thus replies—

(i) To the ordinary ignorant people,—who under the influence of *avidyā*, resolve the underlying unity (Brahman) into the multiplicity of the changes and thus identifies the two,—the multiplicity of the changes is the *only* Reality. Thus no question of conflict between the unity and the multiplicity can rise here²

(ii) But those who have realised the truth that the underlying unity (ब्रह्म) is untouched (unaffected) by the evolving multiplicity of changes—do not regard these changes as something separate and apart (व्यतिरिक्त) from Brahman, do not look upon them as so many independent and self-sufficient ‘things’ (वस्तु) complete in themselves³ To these people, the multiplicity of changes would appear merely as

¹ “नामद्वयोपाध्यायित्वे,—‘एकमेवाद्वितीयं’ इत्यादिभूतयो विरुध्योरम्—इति चेत् ? न, समिलक्षणेन दृष्टान्तेन परिहृतत्वात् मृदादिदृष्टान्तैश्च” (ब०भा०, 3.5.1)

² “यदा तु स्वाभाविक्या अविवक्षा ब्रह्मस्वरूपं .. किञ्चिद्व्युत्पन्नभावमपि सत्, नामपेकार्थकरद्वयोपाधिभ्यो विवेकेन नावधार्यते—नामद्वयोपाधिद्विरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी,—तदा सर्वोद्भूयं वत्तन्मरालितव्यवहारीऽस्ति” (ब०भा०, 3.5.1)

³ “यदा तु परमार्थदृष्ट्या परमात्मतत्त्वात् ‘अन्वयेन’ निवृण्वमाने तन्मद्वये ‘वत्तन्मरे’ तत्ततो न सः, तदा ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयं’ मित्यादि परमार्थदर्शनगोचरत्वं प्रतिपद्यते, अतो न काचन विरोधाशङ्का” (ब०भा०, 3.5.1)।

“स्वतन्त्रत्वं निषेधेन स्वतःप्राप्तनिषेधात्, न अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः, न तु एकाभिप्रायेण” (पानन्दगिरि० व्याख्या)। “कारणाभु ‘व्यतिरेकेण’ अभावः, कार्यस्य” (वे०भा०, 2.1.14)।

a *means* (उपाय, द्वारभूतानि), as a mere indicative *mark* (परिचायक लिङ्गानि), as an *expression* (संस्थानमात्रं)—of the underlying Brahman.¹ The gradually evolving changes² would appear to these people, merely as an *instrument* (परार्थ) for the realisation of the purpose (स्वार्थ)³ —of the underlying Brahman. Thus there is no possibility of a *conflict* (विरोध) between the unity and the multiplicity here also.

After establishing his theory in his commentary on the Vedānta, Sankara has expressly recorded his remarks thus—

“The author of the *Brahma-Sutras* himself saw no reason for rejecting the manifested changing world (कार्थ्यप्रपञ्च). The *Sutra-kāra* adopts the विवर्तवाद (*i.e.*,

¹ “नामरूपादि.....सत्यस्य परमार्थस्य उपलब्धि-‘द्वार’ भवति” (क्रा०भा०, 7.17.1) “विकार-‘द्वारेणापि’ ब्रह्मणो निर्देशः कर्त्तव्यः। ...तानि नामादीनि प्राणान्तानि निर्दिश्य, तद्द्वारेणापि भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं निर्दिश्यामि” (क्रा०भा० and व०भा०)।

“संख्या-स्वरूप परिज्ञानाय’ रेखाध्यारोपणं कृत्वा, *etc.* (व०, 4.4.25).

“पाणि-पादादयः.....ज्ञेयसङ्घाते ‘लिङ्गानि’—गी०भा०, 13.13.” “सत्-‘संस्थान’ मात्रमिदं सर्वं” (क्रा०, 6.2.2)। “सदेव संस्थानान्तरेण अवतिष्ठते,” *ibid.*

“यत् जगदाकार परिणामित्वादि श्रूयते तत् ब्रह्मदर्श-‘नोपाय’त्वेनैव विनियुज्यते” (वे०भाष्य, 2.1.14).

² “नामादि प्राणान्तानि उत्तरोत्तरविशिष्टानि सत्त्वानि, अतिवरास्य तेषामुत्कृष्टतमं भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं” (क्रा०भा०) इत्यादि। “तारतम्येनाविर्भवति” (गी०, 13.12)।

³ “स्वार्थेन असंहतेन परेण केनचित् अप्रयुक्तं संहतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं संहतानां ‘परार्थ’त्वं दृष्टं” (कठ०भा०, 5.5).

the principle of unity) as of supreme value; but he has also *retained* परिचय (i.e., the fact of the multiplicity of changes) as of subordinate value and entirely dependent on the former." ¹

In his commentary on the Māndukya-kārikā, Sankara himself expressly tells us that there is really no *conflict* between the *Drishta* (the empirical world of changes and the *Advaita* (Non-Dualism, i.e., the fact of unity) ² —for the reasons advanced above.

Ananda-giri also in elaborating the idea of Sankara has by an illustration shown that no *conflict* really arises between the two standpoints—the empirical truth and the transcendental truth.³

Vidyāranya in his पञ्चदशी, in explaining the विश्वेश्वर, has shown that in Sankara-

¹ "सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थोभिरप्येकं 'तद्व्यवर्त' मित्याह। अपत्याप्यायैव च कार्यप्रपञ्चं, परिचय प्रक्रियाश्च आनयति" (वि०भा०, 2.1.14.)

² "तेनायं द्विगुणः चक्षुष्यो न विरुध्यते तैः दैतैः।.....अग्नौदोषोऽयं 'सर्वान्नयताम्' आत्मैकतद्व्यवर्तश्च न विरुध्यते तैः, यथा स्वदक्ष्यादादिभिः" (मा०का०भाष्य, 3.17-18).

³ "यथा पुरीवर्जिषि भुजगाभावमनुभवम् विवेकी—'नास्ति भुजङ्गो रज्जुरेषा कथं विभेदोति' आत्ममभिदधाति। आत्मन्तु स्वकीयापराधादिव भुजङ्गं परिकल्प्य भोतः पन्थयेत्, न च तत्र विवेकिनो वचनं मूढदृष्ट्या विरुध्यते। तथा परमात्मकूटमात्मदर्शनं व्यवहारिक-जनादिवचनेन 'अविरुद्धं'" (मा०कारि० भाष्ये, 4.57).

Vedanta the परिणामवाद is not incompatible with the विवर्तनवाद¹.

Thus we find that no need arises to abolish परिणाम. Both the परिणाम and विवर्तन can exist compatibly *together*.

It will be seen that we have tried in this chapter, as well as in others, to present Sankara before our readers, as he reveals himself in his own writings; and we hope that our readers will agree with us in thinking that it is not possible to come to any other conclusion than that which we have sought to reach here, from a deep and careful reading of his commentaries. It is our firm conviction that a great injustice has been done to this great philosopher of India in respect of this most vital point upon which rests his great मायावाद—the Theory of Māyā.

¹ “क्षीरस्य पूर्वस्वरूपं परिव्यागं पुरःसरं नवस्थान्तरोत्पत्तिसङ्गादेऽपि, मृत्-सुवर्णयोस्तु पूर्वस्वरूप-परिव्यागाभावात् विवर्ततापीति” (पञ्चदशी, 13.51—टीका)। (In the case of क्षीर even, compare Sankara's idea—“न क्षीरस्य पूर्वोपमद्वयं न द्विभावापत्तिः—वृ० भा०”). Of. Sankara also—“पिण्डघटादीनां मितरंतरव्यभिचारोऽपि, मृत्त्वाव्यभिचारात्”—छा० भा०, 6.2.2.

CHAPTER IV

OF ETHICS AND RELIGION IN VEDANTA

1. It is very widely believed that one of the fixed tenets in the Vedanta is that the work or *कर्म* is, after all, a bondage which ties a man to this metempsychosis or *Samsāra* (संसार). One must try therefore to get rid of this bondage and secure his final release or *मोक्ष* from it. It necessarily follows from this that the Vedantic *मोक्ष* (Mukti) is equivalent to the emptying of the human soul, which directs all its energy to leave the human life devoid of all actions and thus to make it a barren desert. It is also generally held that human desires or *वासना*s are condemned wholesale in this system of philosophy in no unequivocal language and unmistakable terms; and it is the desires which lie at the root of all works. To kill the desires outright is evidently the sole aim of the Vedanta and their total annihilation, it is thought, is enjoined in an authoritative tone, whose voice can be heard from every page of the Vedantic literature. In dealing with this subject, a writer has thus expressed his idea:—

“The Indian Theism, because of its bondage to the Karma idea, has been unable to rise to a high conception of the

Divine character. In making motive itself the fetter, instead of evil motive, it turned its back upon the ethical goal and suggested the endeavour to escape from the region of the ethical altogether.....The endeavour to get rid of desire is an endeavour to pass beyond the good, and ends in confounding the conscience with covetousness."

As the entire man is thought to be a mere sum-total of "desires and works mechanically related," and as his virtues and vices are all relegated to the empirical region and are described as false and unreal;—it has been generally supposed that the destruction of the individuality which consists merely in the desires, works, pleasure, pain, etc., is the aim of this philosophy which seeks absorption of one's being in the "difference-less pantheistic empty void" which it calls *Nirguna Brahman* (निर्गुण ब्रह्म) and such absorption is the *सुक्त* which it teaches. The healthy enrichment and expansion of the human soul by the acquirement and cultivation of moral virtues, it is seriously maintained, is out of place in this system of philosophy. And a philosophical system which, it is very justly concluded can shed no wholesome influence upon the life and conduct of man and human society, has very little practical interest which it can evoke and it stands condemned in its own teaching.

Such, in fact, are the ideas and conclusions which are to be found extensively gaining ground both in Europe and

¹ Cf., "The method of attaining to the *Ātmā* according to the teaching of the Upanishads, is that of making the human spirit a desert.
*** The goal of effort is an absorption in which all difference is lost. Every movement of the mind and heart must be cast forth and stilled."

in India even among the best and the most sympathetic critics of the Advaita philosophy

We propose in this chapter to cautiously examine the validity of the assertions above referred to, and to see if such conclusions as have been drawn find any support from the writings of Sankara—the great interpreter and leader of this school of thought. We shall also try to discover what constitutes the real thing of the Vedanta and to determine if Ethics and Religion do not form an integral and essential part of the Vedantic theory.

2 Every man is born endowed with a psychological disposition which may be traced to the origin of the human race, and which constitutes the most essential heritage for him to which he has succeeded. In this disposition are to be found imbedded all his natural instincts and habits, his love and hatred, his pleasure and pain, his appetites and passions, and his entire stock of impulses and desires. It is the receptacle of all the race-experience and his past impressions or *samskars* lying deep in it in a latent form, ready to rise up to the surface at the slightest notice or call. Sankara would call this disposition—*prakriti* or *svभाव* or nature,¹ and man is *passive* (*अस्तम्य अवय*) in respect of this *स्वभाव* (nature) which determines him and his actions,

¹ Cf Sankara's observations in the *Taittiriya bhasya*—"जन्म भर कृतसंस्कारिणी जन्ममेव विरक्ता दृश्यते केचित्, केचित्तु कर्मसु प्रवृत्ता अविरक्ता विदुः विद्वेयिणः (तै० भा०, 111) Of also 'दृश्यते च केवाचित् कामुचित् क्रियासु चित्रकर्मादिलक्षणं सुजन्मत एव कौशलं कामुचित् अत्यन्तसीकथ्ययत्नास्वपि अकौशलम् । तथा विषयोपभोगसु स्वभावत एव केवाचित् कौशलाकौशल्यः' (ब० भा०, 442)

and which is revealed when he is born. It is owing to this disposition that man has likings and dislikings for particular sense-objects ;—that some men are seen from their childhood evincing natural attachment to mundane objects of enjoyments, and others developing natural aversion to temporal pleasures.¹

An idea of how this 'disposition' (जैव प्रकृति) has been described in the Vedānta-works can be formed from the following :—

(a) "Nature (प्रकृति) is the *Samskāra* (the latent self-reproductive impression of the past acts of Dharma and a-Dharma) manifesting itself at the commencement of the present birth.....All living beings follow their own nature."

(b) "Nature (स्वभाव) is the tendency (*Samskāra* —*Bāsanā*) in living beings acquired by them in the past births, and manifesting itself in the present birth ready to yield its effects, and this 'nature' is the source of the *Guṇas*, it being impossible for the *Guṇas* to manifest themselves without a cause."

(c) "As regards all sense-objects, there necessarily arise in each case love (रागः) for an

¹ Sometimes, Sankara calls this 'disposition' as—"अविद्यादिकामकेशयः" (गी० भा०, 8.19). Since, this disposition is the natural determinant of all our activities, and it is the root of our desires, pleasure and pain stimulated from it. The term *avidya* is used in its connection, because it is not the 'true' self but Sankara describes it as composed of 5 sheaths or "मनोमयादिभिः पृथ्वीपृथ्व्यादिभिरुत्तरीमदैः सूक्ष्मैरानन्द-मयान्तैः आकाशादिभूतान्तैः... 'आत्मवत्ताः' सर्वे" (तै०, 2.3).

agreeable object and aversion (द्वेष) for a disagreeable object. When desire (काम) arises, it rouses the *Rajas* and urges the person to action.¹

This 'nature' or empirical character of the man is a gradual development in consequence of his education, association, society and the circumstances in which he is born and brought up. This is the unformed undisciplined animal nature in man. Thus, man is born with a fund of animal impulses and inclinations which are the source of his movements or the tendency to activities. He is born subject to desire—love and hatred—राग द्वेष—which colour his whole nature. Man is, at the beginning, no better than an animal being. If he is just emerged from nature, he is not yet a self-conscious being. He is simply 'aware' or 'conscious' of certain pleasurable feelings aroused in him in consequence of his contact with the outward environment, and of certain impulses within, spontaneously rising and demanding their satisfaction—moving him towards, and repelling him from, the agreeable and disagreeable objects, as the case may be. In fulfilling his काम क्रोध (impulses of love and hatred), he fulfils his life's entire purpose. These impulsive movements are always accompanied by pleasure and pain which leave their impression upon the mind. Mere idea of pleasure, thus, becomes the guide of his life and the sole guide of his movements and actions.

¹ (a) प्रवृत्तिनाम धर्माधर्मौदिसम्कार यत्तमानजन्मदावभिव्यक्त तस्या महत्तमेव धर्मा जनु चेत्तत (गी० भा०, 3 33)

(b) जन्म क्लृप्त सत्कार यत्तमानजन्मनि स्ववार्थ्याभिमुखत्वेनाभिव्यक्त स्यभाव गुणप्रादुर्भावस्य निष्कारणत्वानुपपत्ते (गी० भा०, 16 11)

(c) यस्यादिविषय इष्टे राग अनिष्टे द्वेष —यवयव्याविनी । कामी हि उद्वीत रज प्रवर्धयन्, पुरय प्रवर्धयति (गी० भा०, 4 31 and 32)

“Desire is the longing for a pleasure-giving agreeable object of experience when actually coming within the ken of our senses or heard of or remembered; and anger is the aversion for the disagreeable, for the cause of pain when being seen or heard of or remembered.”

(*Gītā-bhāṣya*, 5. 23.)

Man is completely passive here and utterly at the mercy of these impulses. This is the empirical, actual self.

Sankara, as we remarked before, is reluctant to call this self a self at all. He is fond of calling it अनात्म. There is *agency* in this self no doubt; but this is no real agency at all. For, all the necessary elements constituting the agency of this self are reciprocally determined by their antecedents and consequents in time. The actions involving movements of the body, sense organs, *manas*, are necessarily mechanically determined by, and are the resultant of, their antecedent conditions in time—

“चलनात्मकस्य कर्मणः अनात्मकत्वं कस्य

‘अहं करोमीति’ प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्ट्यात् ”

(गी० भा०, 18.66.)

None of these actions can, therefore, be called ‘free.’¹

In such a life, there is no purpose, no end, no aim, no regulation.² As we are enslaved by these impulses and passions and blinded by their influence, we cannot discern

¹ Vide Chap. II of this book.

² “यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः ‘इष्टं मे भूयादिति’—न स आत्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं (end) लभते” (ब० भा०)। “कामक्रोधवशात्—कार्याकार्यविषय-विवेकायोग्यता अन्तःकरणस्य नाश उच्यते—नाशत् पुरुषार्थायोग्यता भवति” (गी० भा०, 2.65)। “करणानि हि मन-आदीनि नियमेन (regulation) प्रवर्तन्ते, तन्नासात् चेतनावति अधिष्ठातरि उपपद्यते” (कि० वा० भा०, 1.1.)।

our right path, we cannot choose our true End—our *सुखार्थ*—

“To one whose mind is subject to the passions of desire and aversion, there cannot indeed arise a knowledge of things as they are, even of the external world. And it needs no saying that to such a man whose intellect is thus overpowered by passions of desire and aversion—*रष्ट-हृ*, there cannot arise a knowledge of the innermost self”¹

3. But is this the ‘whole’ man? Is man's environment without and his impulses within,—the sole determinant? Is there ^{Actual man and possible man} no other nature *higher in man than this his ‘animal nature’*? Is there no *सत्*—inner unity—underlying these manifold impulses and instincts which is the true source of his action?

What a man speaks and acts is not the whole man. ✓ All that flows from him—all his words, actions and movements cannot be the exhaustive expression of the man. It is wrong to identify the man with all these. What the man actually thinks and acts can never be equivalent to what the man is in his essence. What he *actually* feels, thinks and does—falls infinitely short of what is *possible* for him to do. He is not a mere sum-total of his feelings, impulses, habits, gathered in the past.² As much as he

¹ “*रष्ट-हृ* यी सुख दुःस्वप्नहेतुनामा लभायकी भवतः यदा, तदा तौ र्भूयः। नो प्रज्ञावः स्वप्नं यादानद्वारा परमात्मतत्त्ववयवज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकारणं मोहं जनयतः। (गी०, 7.27).

² “नहि रष्ट-हृ एवमशोकतावस्थाय यथाभूतं सै-वियमवि-गलमुत्पद्यते बहिरपि। किमु वक्तव्यं तादृशमाविष्टकृतेः प्रयत्नायानि ज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते ततः” (गी० भा०, 7.27).

³ His actual life is swayed by each and every impulse as it is stimulated. How can there be unity and order in such life? The individual

did express himself in his past records, and as much as he expresses himself in his present deeds and thoughts—fall far short of what properly constitutes his 'nature' or स्वरूप. These will always remain imperfect expressions of that inner 'nature' which these seek to express. It is because man is something more than these.¹ It is because Brahman which is infinite and inexhaustible (अव्यय), is revealed in man and is present behind him.² It is for this reason that—no one of his expressions can fix the infinite and inexhaustible possibilities in man in a rigid and final form.³

Sankara has observed that infinite ज्ञानैश्वर्य (infinite knowledge and power, etc.) lies concealed in man under the cover of his *actual* thoughts and deeds.⁴

self is thus described—"That which first shows itself as the Innermost self (प्रत्यगात्मा) in the body, and turns out in the end to be identical with the supreme Reality—the Brahman."

प्रतिदेहं प्रत्यगात्मभावः 'स्वभावः' :...देहमधिकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मतया प्रवृत्तं, 'परमार्थ-ब्रह्मावसानं' वस्तु—स्वभावोऽध्यात्ममुच्यते (गी०, ८. ३.) ।

¹ "सर्वप्रणिनां करणैः 'तद्वा' भवति ; किञ्च ततोऽपि 'अधिकतरं' एतद् भवति" (तै० भा०) ।

² "सर्वेषु भूतेषु...एकं भावं—आत्मवस्तु अव्ययं पश्यति, तच्च भावं अविभक्तं (indivisible) प्रतिदेहं—देहभेदे" (गी० भा०, १८.२०).

³ It is wrong to restrict what is inexhaustible to its actual deeds and thoughts, as if these are its exhaustive expressions. In the Gita such idea has been condemned as *tāmāsa* idea. 'यत् कृतस्त्वत् (i.e., यत् अव्ययं तत्)...एकस्मिन्नेव कार्ये सक्तं....' 'एतावानेव आत्मा परमेश्वरो वा नातः परमस्तीति'—ईदृशं ज्ञानं तामसानामेव भवति" (१८.२२). "यद्यपि कार्यात्मना उद्दिश्यते उद्गच्छति, तथापि यत् पूणत्वं तत्र जहाति—पूणमेव उद्दिश्यते" (वै० भा०, ५.१.१).

⁴ "सोऽपि तु जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यतिरोभावः देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनादियोगात् भवति" (वै० भा०, ३.२.६).

"विद्यमानसपि तत् तिरोहितं अविद्यादिव्यवधानात्" । "उपाधिकृतस्वरूप तिरोभावात्...स्वरूपस्य तु अनपायित्वात्" (वै० भा०, ३.२.५ and ३५). "तत् पुनः तिरोभूतं यतमानस्य जन्तोः.....ईश्वरप्रसादात् आविर्भवति" (३.२.५).

"Atma," says Sankara, "has been expanded in man only. With other animals, eating and drinking alone constitute their sphere of knowledge. But man is entitled to approach and reach the supreme end of life (निःश्रेयसम्). He it is who desires to gain the highest end by appropriate means and by knowledge (ब्रह्मविद्या)."

"अद्वैत उक्तं: अथ ह्य सत्त्वानिन्दुः ।

शेषा ?—भविष्यता—भविष्यत्वादानां

उक्तं प्राप्तिरित्येवम् ।"

(नौ० भा, 10.34).

That is to say—"it is the actual presence of the Supreme End behind them—which constitutes the possibility for their *future progress* from the present stage to the next higher and higher stages—of those who are fit for such progress."

"Man's distinction lies in the fact that instead of being passively disposed of by his impulses and desires, he can bring them under the law of the rational self, which the impulses envelop."

It is this presence, within us, of something inexhaustible which makes us desire *more and more*, and it is for this *infinite possibility* in us that we never feel satisfied with our actual thoughts and deeds.

१ किं पुनः प्राधान्यं ? कर्मप्रज्ञाधिकारः ।...पुरुषे त्वेव आविष्टराभात्मा ; स हि प्रज्ञानेन सम्पन्नतमः विज्ञानं पश्चात् यत्नम्...मर्त्तनं चयुतं ईक्षति । इतरेषां पशूना मयना-विपासे एव अभिविज्ञानं " (नौ० भा०, 2.1) । "मनुष्य एव विशेषतोऽभ्युदय-निःश्रेयससाधने अधिकृतः...(उ०, 1.4.19).

Because of this *possibility* of man he is held responsible for the works—good or bad—done by him. How is it that we do not make animals accountable for their evil works? What is it that distinguishes a man from the lower animals? It is not at all possible for an animal to do otherwise than what is dictated to it by its actual nature, by its impulses and passions. But with man the case stands differently. He could have, had he only paused and deliberated, seen the consequences of his impulsive actions which he had indulged in. There was, in him, a possibility for a better course of action than what he had done, and this possibility he had ignored. Why did he, in following his evil impulse, stoop to an animal satisfaction? It is for this that we hold the man responsible for his evil deed and punish him for it. We all know, his actual life is not all-in-all to him; infinite possibility lies hidden in him. An infinite possibility either for good or for evil is always present in him. It is for this possibility within man that nobody can tell how he will express himself at the present crisis. It was for this possibility within him that the notorious Jagai (जगाई) whose life had seemed irrevocably fixed in evil ways, was suddenly shocked into his real life and quite unexpectedly turned over a new leaf, resolving thenceforward to live a higher life,—when the famous saint of Nadia—Srichaitanya—had extended his arms of love towards him in return for the bleeding injury he had received from the cruel hand of the miscreant. It is this possibility or power which is the shaping or directing force (प्रेरयित) within us, bringing man, step by step, to the ultimate realisation of his final end—his परमपुरुषार्थ. Man's *actual present* life is this possibility *so far realised*;—is the partial and imperfect

manifestation or expression of this inexhaustible possibility.

4. Sankara has observed in more places than one that—

The nature of self:
(1) It is an end—
Purpose-Power—
utilises all its activi-
ties for its own rea-
lisation.

“all the movements visible in the world, all its works and activities—must have a regulative purpose present behind them which shapes them for its own realisation.”

“It not only holds good in the outward world, but it is also true in all the activities of the inner world.” He continues—

“it is also the case with all the impulsive movements which go on within the human organism—all the actions of the sense-organs, all the functions of the man's intellect and the like.”

This is an observation the value of which, it is needless to add, cannot be overestimated. What are these movements and activities for? For what use do these aspirations, efforts and actions (संश्रयाः प्रवृत्तयः) go on? Their value, Sankara points out, does not lie in that they exist alongside of Ātma, but in the use (कर्मात्मापत्तिनिमित्त) which the Ātma (the self) makes of them.

“इहिकर्मात्मापत्ति-निमित्ता हि जगत्;

संश्रया प्रवृत्तिः—‘अहमिदं भोक्त्ये’

...‘एतदयमिदं करिष्ये’ ‘इदं प्राप्स्यामि’

—इत्याद्या” । ¹—

¹ Vide Gita, 9.10—

“मयाप्यस्त्रेषु प्रवृत्तिः सृजते सचराचरं ।

हेतुनानेन कौन्तेय जगत् विपरिवर्तते न

Sankara explains the stanza in this way—“The विपरिवर्तने of the world, i.e., the continuously changing elements of the world are

All these activities of the organism have their only value in the fact that they may be used by the *दृग्*—the rational “I” for his own purpose; that they may be *utilised* for his end; that they may prove *useful* (कर्मत्वापत्ति or उक्कार) to him. Otherwise, all these actions and movements (प्रवृत्तयः) will entirely lose their value.¹ There is the *Âtma* or the self within, *other than* these movements and activities, *for whose sake* they act. This remark proves the self (आत्मा) to be a Purpose—and end—which is realised in these activities, and which utilises these for its own use.

Elsewhere, Sankara's remarks in this connection are equally valuable and bring the same important truth into prominence—

“Suppose,” he says there, “no *Âtma* (self) is present behind these activities (प्रवृत्तयः); there are only these activities working, but there is no purpose to regulate them. An absurd consequence will follow, *viz.*, nobody is present whose *purpose* they serve; nobody is there to use them, to utilise them—

moving to realise a Divine Purpose or end. The world with all its changing elements is moving for the realisation of the Final end.

हेतुना निमित्तेन अनेन अध्वचत्वेन जगत् चराचरं विपरिवर्तते सर्व्वावस्थासु ...जगतः सर्व्वा प्रवृत्तिः...अवगतिनिष्ठा अवगत्यवसाना । *i.e.*, ब्रह्मावगति—The realisation of Brahman is its अवसान, *i.e.*, the Final end. In the Vedantabhasya he says—अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं...नातः परं किञ्चित् ‘आकाङ्क्षं’ अस्ति । *i.e.*, the realisation of Brahman is the पर्यन्त—the final goal where all desires find their fulfilment. Hence the sense of the stanza is that all activities are for the realisation of the final Purpose.

¹ “काष्ठ-लोष्ठसमस्य चेतनेन अप्रवर्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः” [वि० भा०, 3.2.38].

All प्रवृत्तिस (activities) without the self to direct them are like काष्ठ लोष्ठ.

“यदाचिद् हि चात्मनि, यदाहिः कदाः
रहस्यः अर्थाः सम्यगेभ्यः” * 1—

‘The activities would thus prove *useless* (अर्थाः); they would be to no purpose. For, there is no regulation of these activities; no purpose to guide them.’ Thus there would be no order, no unity, no central purpose in the human life.

It has been stated elsewhere, as a general principle that—

“the works and activities (कर्माणि), if severed and cut off from their source, the self,—are entirely valueless or useless, like the broom, the stick, the dust on the road-side.”

This important truth is also expressed in the Kena-bhasya where the self has been established as a purpose—a will-power—an organising principle—and it is this

* Vide Gita-Bhasya, 18-50. Here also the commentator remarks that the actions and the works point to something beyond them whose purpose they serve, for whose sake they act. Otherwise pleasure, pain, etc., would have to be supposed to be acting for the sake of pleasure and pain, etc.; the activities of the body are for the sake of the body. To avoid such absurd supposition, the existence of the self must be admitted whose purpose these activities realise. “न च सुखायं सुखं, दुःखायं वा दुःखं। आत्मावगम्यवसानार्थत्वाच्च सर्वव्यवहाराणां” All activities are moving for the realisation of the self (आत्मा) which is their final end (अवसान). It is the self which connects and determines all these functions and activities for its own final realisation. This is the significance of the commentary here.

* “स्यतः काष्ठ-लोष्टमानी हि तानि (चक्षुरादीनां दर्शनादिसामर्थ्यानि) चेतन्यात्मज्योतिःशून्यानि” (उ° भा°, 4.4.18). Cf. “काष्ठ-लोष्टसमस्य चेतनेनाप्रवर्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः” (वेदा° भा°, 3.2.38). Cf. also “तेन हि निरात्मकं किञ्चिद्व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते.”

purpose for whose sake all the elements of the body work. And this purpose is, in its nature, *other than* (स्वतन्त्र) these activities which it directs and controls and moves for its own realisation—

“स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मनःश्रद्धि-प्रेषयितृत्वं”¹

Do not all these passages clearly imply that Sankara's idea about the self was that it is an End-in-itself—a Purposive power—which purpose *utilises* all its impulsive movements for its own realisation? Can, in the face of such clear expressions embodied in these passages, Sankara's self be treated as a “mere intelligence divorced from action”? We have gathered together principal passages on the subject and presented them before our readers with the hope that they may come to their own conclusion on this important point for themselves.

But we have not done with it as yet. To another passage which is found recorded in
(ii) It is a ‘free causality.’ the Katha-Bhasya² we now beg to request our readers to turn their attention. This passage will show that the self is a ‘free

¹ Vide Kena-bhāṣya, 1.1. Sankara has observed here that “किं यथाप्रसिद्धमेव कार्यकरणसंघातस्य प्रेषयितृत्वं, किंवा संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मनःश्रद्धिप्रेषयितृत्वं” ? This power is distinguished from the actions of the body, organs, manas, etc. ; it does not disintegrate into those activities, none of which endures. The self, as causal Power, does not yield to the impulsive activities, but it lies entirely outside these empirical series and determines them. “मनः न स्वतन्त्रं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविषये अत्युग्रदुःखे कार्यं वार्थमानमपि पतति मनः । तस्मात् युक्त एव केनेषित मिति प्रश्नः.”

² Vide कठ-भाष्य, 2.2.5. “मन्दबुद्धीनां दुर्विवेकरूपे पुरुषं प्राप्नुतः श्रेयः प्रेयश्च । क्षीरः मनसा आलीच्य गुरुलाघवं पृथक् करोति. विविच्य च, श्रेय एव अभिवृणोति, प्रेयसीऽभ्यर्हितत्वात् श्रेयसः ; यस्तु मन्दबुद्धिः सहसद्विवेकासामर्थ्यात् प्रेयः पुष्पपुत्रादिलवणम् वदोति”—इत्यादि ।

causality' which weighs its impulses and determines their activities for the realisation of its own End or purpose.

"The supreme good (६८) and the mundane good (६९) are confusedly presented to the man. The intelligent compare the two, and on mature reflection discern their relative value—their difference, the supreme good as worthier than the pleasurable. Then they adopt means to the attainment of the End chosen."

We thus compare, estimate our impulses, and they, thus, become *objects* of our contemplation. A sum-total of feelings, impulses, etc., cannot compare, deliberate and control any more than each feeling and impulse separately. Only a *free* self can do so which *has* them, which is *above* them. In a comparison between the impulses, in a preference among them of what is the highest good, we are *agents* and we are *free*. A man thus freely makes a choice from among his several objects of choice and desire which are qualitatively higher; and ultimately chooses what he *rationally* decides to be his *highest-good*. If it be true that—I often act in *opposition* to what is my strongest desire at the present moment, it follows that my self acts *independently* of pleasure, temperament, habit, etc.—

“मयी हि उत्तरीतरं भवति भोक्तः,
तस्मात्तु पुनर्वित्तदिनीभिः प्रतीयोऽहम् ।
ततोऽधिकतरं दुरुपायं दूषापमपि अभिप्रेक्षुः”

(कठ भाष्य, 1.28).

Similar remarks are found embodied in the Gita also—

“Man is man only so long as his antahkarana is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When he is

unable to do so, he is debarred from attaining the highest of human aspirations. Hence at the very commencement he must *rise above* the sway of राग-द्वेष—affection for and aversion to the sense-objects or pleasures and pains.” He must restrain these natural tendencies, he must exert himself with vigour to resist these natural impulses, and then the action of his will is in an opposite direction.”

“महता प्रयासेन स्वभावप्रवृत्तिनिरोधं

कृत्वा, प्रतिस्वीतः प्रवर्त्तनमिव, प्रत्यगात्मानं पश्यति ।

(कठ-भाष्य, 4.1)”¹

Unrestrained *desire* works mischief ; and urged by uncontrolled desire, the man commits sin and evil. We are bent on selfish ends and are deluded by ‘egoism’—when uncontrolled desire urges us to action. We must, therefore, bring our impulses and desires under the law of *rational* self, into the path of our positive purpose of life which we have deliberately selected and which has filled up our entire being.

¹ The conversion of undisciplined animal nature in man into a disciplined, moral and virtuous character involves great effort (महता प्रयासेन). The effort of the whole man must be turned and concentrated from the natural direction to opposite direction.

The same idea occurs in the Vedānta-bhāṣya also—“ यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्त्तते पुरुषः, ... न च तत्र आत्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते ; तं आत्यन्तिक-पुरुषार्था-भिवाञ्छिनं, स्वाभाविकात् कार्य-करण-संघातप्रवृत्तिगोचरात् विमुखीकृत्य, प्रत्यगात्मस्वीतत्त्वया प्रवर्त्तयन्ति ” (वे० भा०, 1.1.4) ।

5. The foregoing discussion has brought into clear light an important truth before our mind. Both—the gratification of impulsive desires and the realisation of the highest purpose of life—cannot be pursued by the same man as an *object* of desire. There exists a conflict between the selfish impulsive activities and the realisation of the supreme purpose of life. Both cannot be chosen by a man, as an object for his realisation.¹ There cannot be *two ends* of his life. Sankara has repeatedly shown that there is eternal conflict (संघर्ष) between Karma (कर्म) and Jnan (ज्ञान). Unless a man feels disgusted (विरक्त) with the pleasure-giving mundane ends, he cannot choose the realisation of self as his supreme and only End of life.

Sankara has expressed his own idea on the subject, thus :—

- (a) "I desire to attain an End which is eternal, imperishable and transcendental; what shall I do with Karma which is opposite to it in its nature?"
- (b) "Light and shade cannot co-exist. Interests in outward activities and interests in the inner self are mutually exclusive. The dualism between the spheres of virtue and prudence is an irreducible dualism whose rival claims it is impossible to adjust."
- (c) "Unless our mind is turned away from the mundane objects, we are unable to

¹ This is the notorious कर्म-ज्ञान-संघर्ष, against which Sankara has written so much.

devote it to the realisation of the self. You cannot desire both—the outward objects and the inner self at the same moment. There is conflict between the two courses.”

- (d) “In the world people revel with mundane goods. It is not so with the wise whose *revels* are centred in the self alone. For the unwise, there are many pleasures due to the sense-objects. But to the wise, their sole rejoicing proceeds from the self.”
- (e) “A distinction has been made between Jnana-nishtha (ज्ञाननिष्ठा) and Karma-nishtha (कर्मनिष्ठा). Vedic works are intended for him only who has desires. The renunciation of these works is enjoined on him who seeks only the self.”
- (f) “He who wishes to reach the eastern sea, cannot have the same road that the man who wishes to go to the western sea chooses. The difference between the knowledge (ज्ञान) and works (कर्म) is as wide as between a mountain and a mustard-seed.”
- (g) “Emancipation being the *result* of knowledge, how can a man desire the *result* of works ?”¹

¹ (a) “अहं नित्येन कूटस्थेन अचलेन ध्रुवेनार्थेन अर्थी । न तद्विपरीतेन । अतः किं कृतेन कर्मणा अनर्थसाधनेन ?” (सु° भा° 1.2.12) ।

(b) “न हि वाङ्मक्रियावान्, आत्मरतिश्च भवितुं शक्तः । वाङ्मक्रियात्मक्रीडयोः विरोधात् ; वाङ्मक्रियानिवृत्तौ हि आत्मक्रीडो भवति कश्चित् कश्चित् । न हि तमः-प्रकाशयो युगपदेकत्र स्थितिः सम्भवति ” (सु° भा°, 3.1.4) ।

We need not quote further passages. The passages quoted above all declare what really worked in the mind of Sankara, and what led him to make a distinction between ज्ञान and कर्म—knowledge and works. His purpose was not that we are to renounce all works—even the higher moral virtues;—and, as we shall presently see, he was not advocating inertia. These and other similar passages clearly indicate the truth that there can be only *one* ultimate End of life. ज्ञान and कर्म both cannot constitute the supreme End. Karma (कर्म) done to secure mundane pleasure or goods and Jnana (ज्ञान), i.e., the realisation of the self—cannot both be the ultimate ends of life.

Sankara thus contrasts the result of the two—Jnana (ज्ञान) and Karma (कर्म) :

If you desire the realisation of the self as your highest end, how can you choose works or कर्म ? For, works or Karma

(c) “न हि यद्वात् चरामनीदृश्यादृशविषय, चरामानमेव भोक्तृमिदृशसितं बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते। वाङ्मयगतमद्रश्मो विरोधात् ” (३^० भा^०, 1.6.1) । “न हि वाङ्मयविषया भोक्तृमयत्वं, प्रत्यगात्मैवयत्वं—एकस्य सम्भवति ” (कठ-भा, 4.1) ।

(d) “देहमात्रमात्रा ‘वतिः,’ वाङ्मयात्रा ‘कीदा’—भोक्तृः। न तथा विदुषः ; किं तर्हि ? चरामविज्ञाननिमित्तमेव लभ्यं भवति ।...यद्वादिनिमित्त ‘चराम्’ विदुषा । न तथा विदुषः ; किं तर्हि ? चरामनिमित्तमेव सत्यं ” (वा^० भा^० 7.25.2) ।

(e) “ज्ञान-कर्मनिष्ठयोर्विभागवचनात् ।...अविद्या-कामवतएव सत्यादि कर्माणि श्रोतादीनि दर्शितानि । तेभ्यो मृत्याञ्च चरामानमेव भोक्तृमिदृशोऽकामस्य विहितं ” (गो^० भा^०, 2.11) ।

(f) “न हि पूर्वसमुद्रं जिगमिषीः, प्रातिनीत्येन प्रत्यक्समुद्रजिगमिषुषा समान-मार्गेण सम्भवति । प्रत्यगात्मविषयप्रत्ययसन्तानकरणाभिनिवेश्य—ज्ञाननिष्ठा । सा, प्रत्यक्समुद्रगमनवत्, कर्माणां सङ्भावित्वेन विवर्तते । पर्वत-सर्पपयोरिव चरामान् विरोधः ” (गो^० भा^०, 18.55) ।

(g) “न ज्ञाननिष्ठा कर्मसहिता उपपद्यते । कैवल्यफलं ज्ञाने, क्रियाफलार्थित्वा-मुपपत्तेः ” गो^०, 18.66) ।

can be chosen only for the following purposes :—

- (i) You can choose Karma, if you are desirous of producing something which is as yet non-existent (उत्पाद्य). But as the self is what is already in you eternally existent, —how can Karma produce it ?
- (ii) If you desire to reach a place or an object, you must perform certain activities or Karma for it (आप्त्य). But the self is what is always within your reach, no Karma is needed at all for it.
- (iii) For the purpose of effecting a change or transformation to a thing, work or Karma may prove necessary (विकार्य). But as the self is beyond change, as it is subject to no transformation—is immutable—Karma is out of place here.
- (iv) If you desire to effect purification to your mind or something else, work or Karma proves useful for the purpose (संस्कार्य). But what would action do to the self which is always pure ?¹

Now, from the foregoing discussion it follows that there can be but one object of our desire, one supreme end of our life, and that is—the realisation of the self. And works or Karmas are only needed for the purification of our mind or antahkarana.

¹ Vide Vedānta-Bhāṣya, 1-1-4, and Brihadāranyaka-bhāṣya, 3-3-1, and other places for this discussion.

6. We have seen above that we are naturally selfish beings. We seek always the gratification of our pleasure, to appropriate which to ourselves, we do not hesitate to work mischief to others. Our mind is, by nature, filled with desire for agreeable objects and aversion to disagreeable—*atya*,—and driven by these impulses, we work blindly for our selfish ends and often quarrel with others to secure pleasure to ourselves. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, for us to *purify* our mind from these selfish desires and inclinations, and to free it from their influences. Unless this purification can be effected, the realisation of the self is out of the question.

The purification of the mind or *antahkarana* can be effected by restraining these egoistic impulses and tendencies to action (negatively), and by performing higher kinds of works (positively). By exerting ourselves always for the good of the community and by the performance of unselfish and disinterested works, our mind may become gradually free from selfish passions and desires; and when these impurities are thus removed, it is prepared for the supreme realisation. But a caution is needed here. These unselfish works ought not to be done, nay they cannot be done—as ends-in-themselves. As there can only be *one* supreme *End*, *i.e.*, the realisation of the self which is the only object of our desire; higher disinterested works can be done only as a means of helping that realisation. This, in brief, is the view of Sankara.

Works done with impulsive and selfish motives have been condemned in the Vedanta, as *Sakāma-karmas*. And as such works have always been looked upon as the source of bondage, with a view to supplant and supersede these self-seeking activities, higher disinterested kinds of works have been prescribed and the

aspirants after emancipation (मुमुक्षु) are called upon to diligently perform such works. These higher works are considered indispensable for the purification of the mind (चित्तशुद्धि or सत्त्वशुद्धि), infested as it is with selfish impulses and desires.¹ And as these are done for emancipating the mind from the influence of the lower natural tendencies, which would ultimately lead to the realisation of the true self, these works cannot prove a bondage. If, however, the supreme end is forgotten, and these are done as ends-in-themselves, only then they will prove a bondage.

An idea prevails among many that in Sankara's

(1) They are indispensable for purification of mind (सत्त्वशुद्धि).

System of Vedanta no room has been left for works and that his aim was to get rid of all works altogether.

To our mind, this is an idea which cannot be accepted and which must be condemned as erroneous, with all the emphasis which we can command. We have said above that as our mind is naturally swayed by selfish passions and desires, it needs purification in order to prepare it finally for the realisation of the ultimate End which constitutes the only object of our desire. How this purification is to be executed will appear from the following passages :—

- (a) "When a man performs higher kinds of works (Nitya-karmas or obligatory works), his mind or antahkarana, unsoiled by

¹ "इन्द्रिय-विषयसंसर्गजनित-रागादिमलकालुष्यापनयनात्, आदर्श-सलिलादिवत्, प्रसादितं स्वच्छं अवतिष्ठते यदा, तदा ज्ञानस्य प्रसादः स्यात्" (मु० भा०, 3.1.8)।

"दृष्टा हि अमृदितकल्मषस्य उक्तोऽपि ब्रह्मसि अप्रतिपत्तिः, विपरीतप्रतिपत्तिश्च।" (केन० भा०, 4.8)।

desire for results,—without attachment and longing for results—becomes *regenerated and pure*. When thus purified, the mind becomes fit for contemplation of the self. Thus the man whose mind has been purified by the performance of obligatory works (*secord*) and who is thus *prepared* to acquire the self-realisation, may gradually attain to *Jñāna-niṣṭhā* (the final End)."

- (b) "The three higher kinds of action should be performed; for, they cause *purity* in those who have no desire for fruits... These actions should be performed by a *seeker of liberation*, though they form the cause of bondage in the case of one who has an attachment for the actions and a desire for their fruits."
- (c) "The seekers of liberation must perform ritual works and other obligatory duties without any longing for the fruits of such works. When performed, the works prove useful as a *means* to the birth of spiritual regeneration of the mind (*विद्युत्पत्तिः*)."
- (d) "He who is free from a desire for the fruits of action and performs action as a bounden duty (*Nitya-karmas*)—not as a *Kāmya-karma*; he who performs actions thus, is superior to those who perform action in a different spirit..... One who is devoted to action abandoning attachment for the results of action—performs for the purification of the mind

(सत्वशुद्धि) is said to be a Sanyāsin and a Jogin."

- (e) "Works are meant for the *purification* of the mind. Selfish desires and passions are *impediments* to self-realisation. Unselfish prescribed duties when not done with self-seeking motives remove these impediments, effect purification of the mind, and thus help the final realisation."¹

We need not multiply instances. Such observations are to be found everywhere in the Vedānta works. The readers will judge for themselves if such observations at all favour the idea of *inertia* prevalent among the critics of the Sankara's theory. We find Sankara everywhere teaching that higher works which are described as Nitya-karmas must be done for the purification of the mind.

¹ (a) "यः नित्यं कर्म करोति, तस्य फलरागादिना अकलुषीक्रियमानमन्तः-करणं, नित्यैव कर्मभिः संस्क्रियमानं विशुध्यति । विशुद्धं प्रसन्नमात्मा लोचनचमं भवति । तस्यैव नित्यकर्माच्छुष्ठानेन विशुद्धान्तःकरणस्य, आत्मज्ञानाभिमुखस्य क्रमेण तन्निष्ठा स्यात् " (गी० भा०, 18.10) ।

(b) "यज्ञोद्दानं तपश्चैव पावनानि विशुद्धिकराणि फलानभिसन्धीनां ।..... सासङ्गस्य फलार्थिनी वन्वहेतव एतान्यपि कर्माणि मुमुक्षोः कर्तव्यानि इत्यपि-शब्दस्यार्थः " (गी० भा०, 18.5 and 6) ।

(c) "अनभिसन्धाय फलमनुष्ठितानि यज्ञादीनि मुमुक्षोर्ज्ञानसाधनानि भवन्तीति प्रपञ्चितं...धर्मविशेषैरनुग्रही विद्यायाः सम्भवति " (वे० भा०, 3-4-27 and 3 etc.)

(d) "यो हि कर्मफलतृणवान्, स कर्मफलमाश्रितो भवति । अयन्तु तद्विपरीतः अनाश्रितः कर्मफलं.....स कर्मान्तरेभ्यो विशिष्यते । "... किं तर्हि ? कर्मा अपि । कर्मफलासङ्गं मग्नस्य, कर्मयोगमनुतिष्ठन् सत्त्वशुद्धयै—'स मग्नराशौ च योगी च' भवतीति ज्ञेयते " (गी० भा०, 6-1 ; and intro.) ।

(e) "कर्माणां विशुद्धिहेतुत्वात् । कर्मभिः संस्कृता हि विशुद्धात्मानः शक्तुं वृत्ति-आत्मानं अप्रतिवन्द्येन वेदितुं । ... एवं काव्यवर्जितं नित्यं कर्मजातं सर्वं आत्म-ज्ञानीत्युक्तिद्वारेण मोक्षसाधकत्वं प्रतिपद्यते । एवं कर्मकाण्डेन सह एक-वाक्यतावर्गाः " (इ० भा०, 4.4.22) ।

But a word of caution is again necessary. These are never to be performed *as an End, i.e.*, as an object of desire. For, as we have seen, there can only be *one* object of desire,—one End, *viz.*, the realisation of the true self.

As a corollary to the above proposition, we may mention here another fact. The
(11) Why Karma
Section of the Veda reader will find an objection raised by
not useless Sankara himself in several places of
his works that—if the self-realisation be the only End
which we must pursue, all works necessarily become useless.
And the work-section (कर्मशास्त्र) of the Veda—in which
rules and prescriptions have been elaborately laid down for
the performance of works—does also prove utterly value-
less. To meet this objection, Sankara replies —

“Only the selfish works (Sakamakarmas)
are to be considered useless. The higher
disinterested works (Nityakarmas) have
always a value in the Vedanta, they are
never to be considered useless. For they
are meant for the *purification* of the mind.
Disinterested works always help the
realisation of the self.”

The reply suggested by Sankara in his
commentary on the Gita is still more
valuable and deserves our particular con-
sideration—“Our theory does not lead
to the conclusion that the *śruti* teaching

“म च निपुण्योजना प्रवृत्तिः । यदि हि चात्मविज्ञानेन चात्मविद्याविययत्वात्
परित्यागादिविहितं कर्म, ततः ‘प्रचालनाद्वि पश्य दूरादृष्यमेव वरः’ इति अनारम्भ
एव कर्मैव श्रेयान् । एतत्तु सकामम्, न निष्कामम् । तस्य तु भङ्गकाराद्यनि एव
कर्मोपि भवन्ति । निष्कामस्य तु चात्मज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धं प्रमादोऽपि भवति । उत्पन्नारम्भ
विनाशस्तु अनारम्भो—निरर्थकत्वात्’ (केन° वा° भाष्य, 11) ।

works proves useless. For, by restraining the first *natural activities* one after the other, and thereby gradually inducing fresh and *higher activities*, it serves to create an aspiration *to reach the innermost self*.”¹

From these passages the readers will find a very clear enunciation of Sankara's position about the works. It is not true that works have no place in his philosophy and that he considered all works as fetters. On the contrary, higher and higher works, as we have just seen, must always be performed—so long as we have not reached the final End where all works, all our duties, find their completion and highest fulfilment—

“ न च अस्ति सम्यग्दर्शने, सर्व्वात्मना काम्य-प्रतिषिद्धवर्जनं
केनचित् प्रतिज्ञातुं शक्यं ”— (वि० भा०, 4.3.14) ;

“ यत् कर्तव्यं तत् सर्व्वं, भगवत्तत्त्वे विदिते
कृतं भवेत् ; न च अन्यथा कर्तव्यं परिसमाप्यते
कस्यचित् । ”—

(गी० भाष्य, 15.20) ।

But here we must remind the readers of the note of warning which Sankara had sounded. No works, however high their nature, should be done as an end-in-itself ; no work ought to be made an object of your desire (न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन). For, as an *object* of desire, work will constitute itself *as an end*. Wherefore it is that, everywhere it has been laid

¹ न चैवं कर्म्मविधयुक्तेरप्रामाण्यं । पूर्व्वपूर्व्वप्रवृत्तिनिरोधेन, उत्तरोत्तरापूर्व्व-
प्रवृत्तिजननस्य प्रत्यगात्माभिमुख्येन प्रवृत्तुत्वात्पादनार्थत्वात् ” (गी० भा०, 18.66) ।
Again cf. “ भगवत्कर्म्मकारिणो युक्ततमा अपि कर्म्मिणो यं, ते उत्तरोत्तरादीन-
कष्टत्यागायमानमाधनाः ” (गी० भा०, 18.66) ।

down that works are not to be performed with a desire for their fruits (फलाकाङ्क्षा) Since, there can only be one *object* of desire, one ultimate End of life Works ought not to be abandoned—

“ न त्याज्य, कारुण्येन तत् ”—16 5

They must be done for the purification of our mind—

“ पावनानि मनीषिणाम् ”

which is full of impure thoughts and tendencies to activity. Only they must not be done as ends-in-themselves—as if they possess a primary and independent value in themselves But their performance is always indispensably needed as a *means* (उपायत्वेनैव)¹, they must be utilised by us, so that they may prove *useful* for the ultimate purpose we have in view, viz., the realisation of the final goal. The works, nay—everything of the world—have value, *not* as they exist alongside of the Ātma, but only so far as they are *used* by us—how we use them—

“ सन्नियम 'उपकारकत्वं' (४० भा०, 15 15) ”

“ चर्हि सा ब्रह्मचर्यादीन च विद्यां प्रति

‘उपकारकत्वात् ’ (ते० भा०, 1 11)

“ अनभिरुन्धाय फलमनुष्ठितानि यज्ञादीनि

सुमुचोः ज्ञानसाधनानि भवन्ति ” (वे० भा०, 3 4 27) ²

¹ “ परमिन् ब्रह्मणि विद्यावतारोपायत्वेनैव एते परिकल्प्यन्ते, न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन ” (वे० भा०, 3 3 12) [Here ‘उपायत्वं’ stands in contrast with ‘द्रष्टव्यत्वं’
उपायत्वं useful as means न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन—i.e., not as an End]

² All the good and disinterested works and virtues are *means* useful for the realisation of the final End They are to be looked upon as instruments (साधनानि) which we must use (उपकारक) as *helps* to the realisation of the self. They have value, only because they are utilised by the self for its own purpose.

“ उपायभूतानि हि कर्मणि सत्कारहरिण ज्ञानस्य । ”—वे० भा०, Int.

In this way, by the performance of disinterested higher

(III) Higher Nitya-Karmas regenerate man from animality to rationality :

works, the man is regenerated from the undisciplined 'animality' (पशुत्व—असुरत्व) to the disciplined 'rationality' (देवत्व). In the Brihadáranyaka, the

yielding of the mind to the natural inclinations and instincts has been called as Ashura-bháva (असुरभाव—पशुत्व), and the doing of higher disinterested works for the good of the community, under the prescriptions of the shástras, with higher and unselfish purposes and inclinations has been designated as Deva-bháva (देवभाव).¹ If men follow passively the natural bents of their mind and permit them to become the sole guide of their life, they are no higher than animals. But if they obey the injunctions of the sástras and work for social good and public utility—such disinterested motives and works will exalt them to the higher attributes of benevolent gods (देवत्व). This high lesson the Vedanta teaches. How to make men possessors of godly qualities while on earth is the aim of Vedanta. But here again the Vedanta has *not stopped*. Its ultimate aim is to carry the man *beyond* the world to final realisation and to fulfil his *transcendental* destiny.

7. We have said that the higher forms of works—

Higher, disinterested works cannot be hypostatized as an *End*. Two reasons stated. They are to be used as a *means*.

Nityakarmas—works done with disinterested motives cannot be treated as ends-in-themselves, but always as *means*—as a sádhana (साधन) useful, through the purification of mind, for

the attainment of the true self which is our ultimate End.

¹ “स्वभावसिद्धौ राग-द्वेषौ अभिभूय, यदा शुभवासना-प्रावर्त्येन धर्मपरायणी भवति, तदा स 'देवः' । यदास्व भावसिद्ध-रागद्वेष प्रावर्त्येन अधर्मपरायणी भवति, तदा 'असुरः' ।”—गीताभाष्यव्याख्यायां मधुसूदनः ।

If, however, these works are treated as *ends*, as is generally done, some serious consequences will follow. Let us consider these consequences now.

We are all members of a social whole. We belong to Varnāśrama-community, of which we are the members. Certain rules and laws we find recorded in the *sāstras* for our guidance. These laws are authoritative for us; because they form the collective experiences and opinions of the best selves of the community. It is generally held that certain rules and acts which have been evolved within the community for its own preservation, are imposed upon its individual members, so that each of them may observe and act up to these rules. Thus the preservation or the good of the community becomes the *end* for which the individual members live and act. These actions are known as Varnāśrama-Dharma (वर्णाश्रम-धर्म) and we must all perform these Dharmas or duties for the good of the Varnāśrama-community, of which we, as members, form parts. Its prescriptions (निषिद्ध) and its prohibitions (निषेध) are all binding upon us which each of us must obey. This is the generally accepted and usual view with regard to Varnāśrama-Dharma. The individuals can have no other purpose in their life, but to perform these duties or Dharmas. Regarded in this way the individuals have only an instrumental value;—they are reduced to a machine somehow constructed to produce certain works beyond themselves, for the good of the community. They exist for these duties which they owe to the community of which they form quite an insignificant part; they have value only for these works. The community thus annexes the individuals to itself. The moral value of the individuals entirely depends upon their works—their service—their utility—to the community as a whole. Their moral criterion is judged only by some *outward result* which

they can produce. The individual is thus entirely resolved into his works. If the outward works are regarded as ends in themselves, such inevitable consequence is bound to follow.

But this cannot be the right view of the works. Sankara urges his objections against this view of the works thus—

He points out—

- (I) Man cannot be made an object of command (नियोग-विषय) from outside. Man is not a *thing* to be passively moulded and shaped from outside.¹ He may be persuaded from the inner side, not controlled passively from the outside. Sankara has told us that—

ज्ञापकं हि शास्त्रं, न कारकं ।

“Man chooses his *end* according to his own light. The Śāstras only present before him the lower and higher lines of conduct, but do not compel him to select a particular course of action. The Śāstras do not mould the man to their own ideas of good ; they can only appeal to his inner self.”²

¹ Vide Ved. bhāṣya, 3.2.21 and 2.3.48. “ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यं, यथाभूतविषयम् । न तद्विधोऽगतेनापि कारयितुं शक्यते ; न च प्रतिषेधगतेनापि पारयितुं शक्यते । वस्तुतन्त्रं हि तत् । अतोऽपि नियोगाभावः ” (3.2.21).

² “न तु शास्त्रं मृत्यानिव वलात् निवर्त्तयति नियोजयति वा ।...पुरुषाः स्वयमेव यथारुचि साधनविशेषेषु प्रवर्त्तन्ते । यस्य यथावभासः, स तथारूपं पुरुषार्थं पश्यति तदनु-
रूपानि साधनानि उपादित्सते ” (ब्र० भा०, 2.1.20). Hence, how can you say that the rules prescribed by the community (through its Śāstras) are the *ends* to which the man is entirely *subordinated* ? As if the man is a *mere means* for the performance of these prescribed duties as his *end*.

(II) Again, Sarlata points out that the ideas of good works (virtues) and bad works (vices) evolved within the community cannot be regarded as *ends in themselves*. For, he says, we find the ideas of virtue and vice in a particular epoch of society *differ* from the ideas of virtue and vice in the next or another epoch. Again, "in the same epoch of the community different people select different works as ends" "What are looked upon as good works in a particular time and place are regarded otherwise in a different time and place".

(III) It is also laid down in the Vedanta-bhasya that "in the progressively higher and higher worlds, the virtues and vices are being evolved in higher and higher forms up to *Brahma-loka* where they are perfected."²

१ "उदात्तैषु धर्मैकान् चरन्निष्ठं उत्तरदिग्ं उदात्तमे दृश्यते । ..अत्रापि तु कर्तव्यं चरन्निष्ठः कान् अष्टौद्विविधत्वात्" (वे० भा०, १३१६)। "विद्या 'गायन' लोकोद्विष्टत्वात् मध्यमे एव विद्यायाः, १०, विशेषो ह्येवं चतस्र्यं चारुदत्तम् । न विद्या 'मन्त्र' मुक्तौ । ..न मुक्तावति चारुर्न निरुपार्थकोद्विष्टतयः उपपद्यते । तस्यां चिराचिरोत्पत्तिरुद्विष्टतयो भवन् भवेत्" (वे० भा०, ३१५२)।

२ "तदाच सागाद्यमुदात्तानामिव विद्यामभाविनिष्ठत्वात् उत्तरं च यदा गमनं, श्वभैरिटापूर्तं दत्तमाचनेः दक्षिणेन यदा । ..तत्रापि गायनं तारतम्यं श्रूयते" (वे० भा०, ११४)।

"यदिन् दिग्ं कार्यं निमित्तं च यो धर्मीऽनुदीयते, स एव दिक्कायनिमित्तान्तरं च धर्मी भवति" (वे०, ३.१.२५)।

३ "मनुष्यतादारभ्य ब्रह्मलोके तु दिक्कायं सुपतारतम्यं च श्रूयते, ततश्च तद्गती-धर्मैरपि तारतम्यं श्रूयते" (वे०, ११४)

All these clearly show that virtues (and vices) are constantly evolving in higher and higher forms, and they are constantly growing with the progressively growing communities and the worlds. They cannot therefore be regarded as the *ultimate end of life*.

We can do no better than to repeat in this place the utterances of Sankara himself which embody his general views on the Varnâsrama-duties (वर्णाश्रम-धर्म). These remarks are important and we invite particular attention of our readers to them. These remarks bring the relation between the higher karmas (कर्म) and Jñāna (ज्ञान) very forcibly home to the mind; and the valuable bearing which the works have upon the self-realisation stands palpably revealed. Sankara writes—

“These duties, respectively enjoined on the several castes, lead, when rightly performed, to swarga as their *natural result*..... But from the *operation of a new cause*, a higher result accrues; *viz.*, worshipping the Lord (ईश्वर) by performing his duty, man *attains perfection*, through his being qualified for the Jñāna-nisthā.”¹

(Gitâ-bhâṣya, 18.44.45.)

“Can this *perfection* be attained *directly* by the mere performance of one’s duty? No;—how then?The perfection

¹ “एतेषां जातिविहितानां, कर्माणां सत्यगनुष्ठितानां स्वर्गप्राप्तिः फलं स्वभावतः ।
...कारणान्तरात्तु इदं वक्ष्यमाणं फलं ।...स्वकर्मानुष्ठानात् अशुद्धिचये सति, कार्य-
न्द्रियाणां ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणां संसिद्धिं लभते ।”

acquiring in worshipping the Lord through *one's own duties* qualifies the aspirant for the Jnana-nishthā which *culminates* in Moksha" (18-56).¹

In this manner—

"the works which are held as a *bondage* are converted into a *means* for *self-realisation*."²

From these observations, we can now conclude that the works (Karma) when regarded as *ends*, as objects of desire—do prove a *bondage*, and they come into *conflict* with the Jnana (i.e., the self-realisation). But taken as a *means*, and used as such, this conflict (विरोध) between them vanishes, and instead of offering opposition to Jnana, the works prove a very useful ally—

“तेषां निरभिमुखीनां निष्ठायां कर्मणां
पारादुपकारकत्वात्, मोक्ष-माधन्यायि
कर्मणां भवतीति—न विरुध्यते (३० भा०, ३३१)।”

The right, therefore, of Karma as separate and rival interests, as rival ends-in-themselves—must die; because Karma is *superseded and included* in one supreme interest or end of life. All works thus become *an element* in this one interest, and *organic* to this one central purpose.³

¹ “विंशकर्मगतुष्टान्त एव साक्षात् संसिद्धिः ? न ; कथं तर्हि ?...स्वकर्मणा तमोक्षं च धर्मं किमर्थं, ज्ञाननिष्ठाधीन्यतालक्षणां सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः ;...ज्ञाननिष्ठा मोक्षफलवसाना ” (गो०, 18.45).

² “ननु बन्धहेतूणां कर्मणां कथं मोक्षहेतुत्वं ? उपासनाविरोधादित्याह ‘तच्छूण’ इत्यादिना ” (मधुसूदन's gloss).

³ Cf. “ज्ञानमैव हि प्रापकं सत् कर्म प्रयासा मोक्षकारणं भवति । तस्मात् कर्मणोऽपि ज्ञानसंयुक्तस्य ‘मोक्षकार्य’ पपत्तेः ” (वि० भा०, 4.1.10). And also cf. सुमुच्यता मोक्षप्रयोजनोद्देशेन कृतं—प्रतिबन्धकारणोपात्तदुरितव्यहेतुत्वदारेण—ब्रह्मविद्या सद्यः ‘एककार्य’ भवति ” (वि० भा०, 4.1.18).

All works now become the medium, the vehicle, the opportunity, for the realisation, in and through them, of the spiritual purpose—

“ सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते । ” 4.33.

8. The foregoing discussion has brought us to the

What then is the outstanding relation between Karma and Jnana? Higher Karma point to the Transcendental goal.

conclusion that the life of higher works—of unselfish virtuous deeds, is not the ultimate goal of human life. Virtuous deeds possess value in that they purge our mind from

selfish, self-seeking propensities which know no other higher end than gratification of the sense-pleasures, and thus to prepare it for the realisation which alone constitutes the ultimate goal of our life. One deed of virtue leads to another, which again leads to a still higher deed of virtue and so on perpetually. Sankara has pointed out that one work done is succeeded by another work which awaits you for its accomplishment¹ Moral or virtuous life is therefore a life of incessant endeavours for, and aspirations after, higher and higher virtues (पुण्योत्कर्षः), which cannot be *completed here* under mundane conditions. It is, thus, a life of constant progress; it is marked by incessant advancement from lower to higher deeds; such a life therefore cannot itself be an end but always points to the End, to a goal *beyond it*, where all its aspirations after higher and higher *goods* will reach their fulfilment and complete satisfaction.² Thus, the human

¹ वह्नि हि कर्माणि...तेषां कानिचित् लब्धावसराणि,...कानिचित् देशकाल-
निमित्तप्रतीक्षाणि आसते, इत्यतस्तेषां अवशिष्टानां साम्प्रतेन उपभोगेन क्षपणासम्भवात्।
...कर्माशेषसङ्गावसिद्धिश्च ” (वे० भा०, 4.3.14).

² “ यावत् यावत् पुण्योत्कर्षः, तावत् तावत् फलोत्कर्षप्राप्तिः । तस्मादुत्तमेन
पुण्योत्कर्षेण मोक्षो भविष्यतीति आशङ्का स्यात् । सा निवर्त्तयितव्या । ज्ञान-

life of virtue will reach its perfection in a Transcendental goal which is the End towards which it is perpetually moving.

We have seen before that the performance of higher works and virtuous deeds is not an end in itself—is not the ultimate goal of human life. These virtuous deeds are needed for the *purification* of our mind from selfish propensities and tendencies and for constant preparation for the ultimate End. The higher works, in this way, prove to be an *indirect* cause for the attainment of Mukti or the final goal.¹ They cannot *directly* produce Mukti, for, in that case, these works would themselves become the ultimate End. The readers will realise that Sankara's position in this respect remains logically unassailable. As the ultimate goal is transcendent, no mundane works or attributes can have power to directly produce it. For, in that

सहितस्य प्रकृतस्य कर्मैव. एतावती गतिः । व्याकृतनामकस्याप्यदत्त्वात् कर्मैव सत्
फलस्य च । न तु चाकार्यं निमित्तं . क्रियाकारकं फलसम्भावयति" (transcendental
goal) कर्मैवो व्यापारीदृष्टिः" (इ० भा०, 3 3 1) i.e., When the works
are not ends in themselves, the End must be beyond them to which they
lead; moral ideal is not an absolute and self sufficient ideal, but it is a
progress to the supreme or perfect End

¹ "विषयीयमभिलष्यमानस्य विज्ञानस्य शुद्धिः—आहारशुद्धिः. रागद्वेषभीर्हरस
स्पृष्ट विषयविज्ञाननिर्ययः । तस्या सत्त्वा चक्राःकरणस्य सत्त्वस्य शुद्धि भवति सत्त्वशुद्धौ
विवेकेष प्रसीदयं यत एतत् 'उत्तरीतरं' (progressively higher and higher)
आहारशुद्धिर्भूत्, तस्यात् सा कर्तव्या" (इ० भा०, 7 20 2) । "पूर्वं पण्यकृतभूत्वा,
पुनस्त्यक्तैषण परमात्म हेतुसि अभिनिवृत्तः" 4 4 9 (इ०).

² There must therefore always be a negative relation between the
mundane life (and its works) and its transcendental goal (towards
which it moves and where it will be perfected). Yet it is the same life
This mundane life would become transformed into supra mundane life

"अस्य आत्मनोक्तस्य कर्मभिः असद्वन्धात्, कृतस्य च कर्मफलस्य विद्याफले
ऽनर्भावात्" (इ०, 4 4 2).

" न च कदापि कर्तव्यं परिदृश्यात् कश्चित् ।
भगवत्तत्त्वे विदिते यत् सः ' कर्तव्यं ' तदस्य
कृतं भवेत् । "

(गी० भा०, 15.20).

" नहि सुखकन्दने निपद्ये, 'यवानर'
किञ्चित् ग्राहितुं शक्यं । ... " चारुमविदः
कर्तव्याभावं दर्शयति...न किञ्चिदन्यत् 'कृत्य'
सर्वनिष्यते । (वेदा० भा०, 4.1.2)

9. We are now in a position to enumerate some of the

A rapid survey of the position thus far reached.

Moral endeavour passes into a higher fulfilment and is completed in the Transcendental goal.

higher virtues, ethical and moral qualities, the cultivation of which has been deemed *useful* for the realisation of the self, through the purification of the mind. But before we proceed to do so, it may be found instructive to

make a rapid survey of the entire position which we have tried to sketch in the preceding pages.

Man is, we have found, naturally a selfish and egoistic being, seeking the gratification of his own pleasure and depriving others of it; and all his activities are impelled by impulsive, self-seeking motives. As man is thus subject to sensibility, he commits sin and evil, under its influence. But man is *also a higher* being in whom God has been revealed, and a life of infinite Divine possibility is implanted in him, and this is the true man within him. Man is thus endowed with a discriminative knowledge of right and wrong.—

" The ignorant, *natural* man regards desire (राग-द्वेष) as a friend at the time when he thirsts for objects. The mind, when allowed to be engrossed in the thoughts of various pleasurable objects, loses its discriminative knowledge of the self and the

not-self and turns towards the sense-objects." But as man is a *rational* animal, he must bring his impulses under the law of the rational self which those desires envelop. In fact, he exerts himself *actively* with vigour to resist and control such impulses and consequently his action is in an *opposite* direction—

“आत्मवश्यैर्विधेयात्मा विषयानिन्द्रियैश्चरन्” ।

Sankara further observes—

“Man is man only so long as his *Antah-karana* is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When he is unable to do so he is debarred from attaining the highest of human aspirations (परम-पुरुषार्थ). Hence at the very commencement, he must *rise above* the sway of राग-द्वेष—affection for and aversion to sense objects of pleasure and pain. He must restrain these natural tendencies *by means of their enemy*; i.e., by actively cultivating the *virtues*, which are the enemies (प्रतिपक्ष) of love and aversion.”

When the man, thus, cultivates these *ethical and moral virtues*, he is no longer subject to *his own nature* (प्रकृति). These virtues are the *means* (ज्ञान-साधन) for attaining the

¹ “कार्याकार्यविषयविवेकायोग्यता अन्तःकरणस्य नाश उच्यते । तावदेव पुरुषो यावदन्तःकरणं तदीयं कार्याकार्यविषयविवेकायोग्यं, तदयोग्यत्वे नष्ट एव पुरुषो भवति...पुरुषार्थायोग्यो भवति” (गी० भा०, 2-63). “तत्रायं पुरुषकारस्य (human free-will) विषय उच्यते...या हि पुरुषस्य प्रकृतिः सा रागद्वेषपुरःसरैव स्वकार्ये पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति (man is passivo here)...यदा पुनः राग-द्वेषौ तत्प्रतिपक्षेण नियमयति, तदा शास्त्रदृष्टिरेव पुरुषो भवति न प्रकृतिवशः (actively free) तस्मात् तयोर्विशं नागच्छेत्” (गी० भा०, 3.34).

self-knowledge which is his highest end.¹ Natural राग-द्वेष creates the idea of *separateness* or exclusiveness; but as these are supplanted by the moral virtues, his *true unity* with his fellow-beings will gradually remove this idea of exclusiveness.² The term दैवी-सम्पत् (Daivi-Sampat) used in the Gita covers under it the virtues which man must cultivate in the place of the natural selfish impulses for which the term आसुरी-सम्पत् (Āsuri-Sampat) has been used.³ These virtues have been described as—

“the virtues leading to *liberation* from Samsāra.”

Is it not, we ask, wrong, in the face of all these remarks of Sankara, to suppose—as has been supposed by many—that the Vedanta “insists upon the *emptying* of the human mind, making it a barren desert?” Is it not wrong to hold that “no moral virtues are taught in the Vedanta” and that “all actions are treated as a bondage and therefore liberation from this bondage is the goal or aim of the Vedanta?”

From what has been stated above, the readers must have seen that such remarks as these⁴ do the greatest injustice to Sankara's own views and his writings.

¹ These are called as अर्च्यपूज्य (गी० भा०, 12.13) and they are *means* of the highest realisation.

² “ज्ञान-साधनमर्थं, यस्मिन् सति त्रैयविज्ञाने योग्यो भवति । ज्ञान साधनत्वात् ज्ञानशब्दवार्थं (गी० भा०, 13.7).

“ज्ञान-निमित्तत्वात् ज्ञातमुच्यते ” (गी० भा०, 13-12).

³ “यदा सम सुखमिष्टं तथा सर्वप्राप्तिनां । यच्च दुःखं सम प्रतिकूलमनिष्टं तथा सर्वप्राप्तिनां ।...सुखदुःखे...तुल्यतया सर्वभूतेषु समं पश्यति, न कस्यचित् प्रतिकूलमाचरति ” (गी० भा०, 6.32).

⁴ “दैवी सम्पत् विभीक्षाय, निवन्धायासुरी मता ” (गी० 16.5).

“देव्याः आदानाय, इतरयोः, परिवर्जनाय ” गी० भा०, 16-1).

⁵ For other similar remarks, vide p. 178 of this book where they are quoted.

Man cannot find final satisfaction of his self in any earthly and temporal order of things. He seeks in Brahman the fulfilment of the good he is trying to realise in his own life. The supreme good (प्रियतम)—which is working and revealing itself in the worldly objects,—of which they are but imperfect manifestations—is the *highest* end of human pursuits. The higher and lower objects are therefore only the proximate ends and these can be made to be embraced and included in the supreme End. But as Brahman *transcends* the temporal order of things, man must not rest satisfied with these lesser ends, but must move through them for a *final* realisation of the supreme good ¹—

“अयमात्मा सर्वलौकिक-प्रियेभ्यः

प्रियतमो भवति । तस्मात् तन्नामे

महान् यत्र आस्थेयः । ” 1.4.8.

The self-realisation, therefore, is the life's highest End. This End, says Sankara, which has been deliberately chosen, must be *steadily kept in view* and resolutely maintained against all other partial interests and ends.² For, it is only when one perceives the End of knowledge that one will endeavour to *cultivate the attributes* which are the *means* of attaining that knowledge.³ The inner purity of the mind consists of the removal from it of

¹ आत्मानात्मप्रिययोः, अन्यतरप्रधानेन इतरप्रियोपादानप्राप्तौ, आत्मप्रियोपादानेन, इतरहानं क्रियते ” (ब० भा०, 1.4.8).

² आत्मतत्त्वमेव ज्ञेयं अनादृत्य अन्यत् । अन्यत् लौकिकं प्रियमपि अप्रियमेवेति निश्चित्य, आत्मैव प्रियो नान्योऽस्तीति प्रतिपद्यते । ...यदि लोके निरतिशयप्रियो भवति, सर्वप्रयत्नेन लब्धव्यो भवति.....कर्तव्यताप्राप्तमपि अन्यप्रियलाभे यत्रमुज्झिता ” (ब० भा०, 1.4.8).

³ “आत्मविषयं ज्ञानं...तस्मिन् नित्यभावः । अमानितादीनां ज्ञान-साधनानां भावनापरिपाकनिमित्तं तत्त्वज्ञानं ; तस्य अर्थो मीचः संसारोपरमः । तत्त्वज्ञानफलालोचने हि तत्साधनानुष्ठाने प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ” (गी० भा०, 13. 11).

the stain of attachment and other passions (राम-वेदादि), by cultivating the ideas that are inimical to them.¹ "These attributes or moral virtues are conducive to knowledge. What are *opposed* to these, *viz.*, pride, hypocrisy, ignorance, cruelty, insincerity, impatience—should be shunned as tending to *bondage and saṃsāra*."²

A glance at these 'moral virtues' as elaborated and explained by Sankara in his commentaries on the Gītā and the Upanishads will convince one of their *social or civic character*, and their inestimable value will be found in our daily and hourly dealings with our fellow-beings. If one fails or neglects to cultivate these virtues, the purification of the mind or inner organ which is naturally vitiated by impure thoughts and impulsive tendencies would be hindered and the possibility of self-expansion and self-realisation would be debarred.

10. We now proceed to give below a list of these virtues (अग्ने पून) and must rest content with referring our readers to the elaborate explanation of each of the factors constituting this list, as given in the commentaries of Sankara.

Ethical virtues and altruistic deeds—enumerated in four main groups:

The ethical or moral virtues to be cultivated are—

¹ "अन्य मनसः 'प्रतिपक्षभावनया' (अमानित भेदोकरुणादीनां भावनया—(मनु० टीका) रागादिमलापनयनं" (गौ० भा०, 13.7)। "एतैः हि संस्तुतस्य सत्त्वगुणद्विहारा लक्षणातोत्पत्तिः दृष्टा" (किं० भा०, 4.8)।

² "एतत् अमानित्वादि...ज्ञानमिति प्रोक्तं ज्ञानार्थत्वात्, ज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्। अज्ञानं—यथोक्तादन्यथा विपर्ययेषु। मानित्वं, दम्भित्वं, हिंसा, अद्यानि, अमाज्जकं इत्यादि 'अज्ञानं' विज्ञेये, परिहरणाय संसारप्रवृत्तिकारणत्वात्" (गौ० भा०, 13.11)।

(a) The *first group* of moral virtues described by *Patanjali* in his *Yoga-philosophy* is this—

मैत्री-करुणा-मुदितोपेक्षाणां

सुख-दुःख-पुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां

भावनातश्चित्त-प्रसादनं” ।

Before we proceed to explain this group, we should like to invite our readers' attention to the remarks made by Madhusūdana when elaborating the commentaries of Sankara on the moral virtues enumerated in the 'Gitā. Madhusūdana observes to the effect that this group of moral virtues together with the *two other* groups given in the Gitā—form three groups and all these must be cultivated. These virtues properly cultivated and developed would remove and supplant ¹ the natural evil desires (राग-द्वेषादि) and gradually create the healthy idea of our unity with our fellow-beings. ²

Now, to explain the *first group* stated above—

“मैत्री or sympathy is the identity of feeling with the object of the emotion which one experiences on seeing happiness or misery. If we see one happy, our feeling must be identical. Compassion (करुणा) is the same feeling for misery of whatever kind. It implies, besides the emotion, *action*, on

¹ Cf. here मधुसूदन's observations—“सा च वासना द्विविधा—मलिना, शुद्धा च । शुद्धा—दैवी सम्पत् । मलिना—आसुरी सम्पत् । तासां वासनानां परित्यागो नाम—तद्विरुद्ध-मैत्र्यादि-वासनोत्पादनं.” Sankara himself also expresses the same idea “यदा पुनः रागद्वेषौ तत्प्रतिपक्षेण नियमयति, तदा...न प्रकृतिवशः पुरुषः—इति पुरुषकारस्य विषय उच्यते” (गी० भा०, ३.३४).

² “मैत्री-करुणा-मुदितोपेक्षाणामिति—मैत्र्यादितुल्यस्य उपलक्षणं । ‘अभयं सत्त्वसंशुद्धि’ रित्यादीनां, ‘अमानित्वादीनाञ्च’ धर्माणां सर्वेषामेतेषां शुभवासमारूपत्वेन, मलिनवासनानिवर्त्तिकत्वात्” ।

equanimity consisting in not being jubilant over attaining the desirable and in not chafing on attaining the undesirable; the society of disciplined men, because such society is an aid to self-realisation and distaste for society of ordinary undisciplined men.”¹

- (c) The *Third group* is embodied in *Gitā-bhāṣya*, 16.1.3—

“Abandonment of deception, dissimulation, falsehood and the like, in all our practical transactions; reflection and recognition of the true nature of things (वस्तुस्वरूप)²; concentration through the subjugation of the senses; constant steadiness of our attitude; abstaining from injury to sentient beings; speaking of things as they are without giving utterance to what is unpleasant or false; suppression of anger arising when reviled or beaten; compassion to those in suffering; absence of fickleness.”³

¹ “अमानित्वमदम्भित्वमहिंसा चान्तिरार्ज्वं ।

आचार्योपासनं शौचं शैथिल्यमात्मविनिग्रहः ॥

इन्द्रियार्थेषु वैराग्यमनहङ्कार एव च ।

जगन्मृत्युमराव्याधि दुःख-दीपानुदर्शनं ॥

असक्तिरनभिष्वङ्गः पुनर्दारुणहादिषु ।

नित्यस्य समचित्तत्वमिष्टानिष्टोपपत्तिषु ॥

विविक्तदेशसेवित्वमरतिर्जनसंसर्गः ॥—इत्यादि ।

N. B.—“संस्कारवतां विनीतानां संसर्गः, तथा ज्ञानीपकारकत्वात्” ।

² This is विचार. Vide p. 182, note.

³ अभयं मत्त्वसंशुद्धिर्ज्ञानयोग व्यवस्थितिः ।

दानं दमश्च यज्ञश्च स्वाध्यायस्तप आर्ज्वं ॥

अहिंसा मत्समकोपः क्षत्रागः शान्तिरपैश्वर्यं ।

दया भूतेष्वनीलस्व मादर्वं क्षौरचापणं ॥—इत्यादि ।

(d) It has been laid down as a general principle that those characteristics in the disposition and conduct, which have grown habitual and natural with a *Mukta*, i.e., a man who has already realised the ultimate good are to be considered as the *Siddhantas* for a *Mumukshu*, i.e., an aspirant after self-realisation. With diligence and good care these are to be constantly cultivated as virtues by him.¹

(e) The surrender of the self to the supreme self (i.e., Brahman) and meditation on His Svarūpa. A man cannot hope to be *Mukta*, unless Brahman's grace falls upon

Cf. "सर्वभूतेषु ब्रह्मभाररहितः चात्मवेद्यत्वापकार-प्रकृतेरपि"—गी^० भा^०, 11.55.

N.B.—All these virtues have been mentioned in all the *Upanishads* also.

Cf.—"एवमाद्यदपि ज्ञानोपपेक्षकारकं—'समानितमदग्निन'मित्यादि... नीतुं हि मनुष्य ब्रह्मविद्या प्रवर्तेते" (केन^० भा^०, 4.8).

"सद्गामिनां परमार्थज्ञाननिष्ठानां ज्ञेयज्ञानं ।..... इदं ज्ञेयमात्मनं 'मुमुक्षुषा' यवतीऽनुष्ठेयं विध्योः परमं यत्तं विजिगमिषुषा" (गी^० भा^०, 12.20) । "ज्ञानसाधनमथ समानित्वादिनचरं—यत्किन् मति त्रैयविज्ञाने योग्योभवति ; यत्परः सद्गामी ज्ञाननिष्ठः सत्यते" (13.6) । सुखातीतः... एतदर्थं यावत् यवमाध्यं तावत् सद्गामिनः अनुष्ठेयं सुखातीतत्वसाधनं मुमुक्षुः. Nīlakantha explains this idea thus—

"सुखनचरानि एव मुमुक्षोः साधनत्वेन विधीते." (Fide Nīlakantha's notes on 12-20.) Some of the habitual characteristics of a *Mukta* are given in Gita, ch. 12.13-19—

"यदेता सर्वभूतानां, मैत्रः, करुण एव च । निर्वैरो निरद्वयः समदुःखसुखः समी ॥ यथाप्रोक्षते नीलो लोकात् मोक्षिते च यः । समः सद्यो च मित्रे च तथा मानापमानयोः"—इत्यादि ।

him, unless He helps him graciously in the task" ¹—

“तदनुग्रहहेतुकेनैव विज्ञानेन मोक्षसिद्धिर्भवति” (वे° भा°, 2.3.41).

In connection with the cultivation of these ethical virtues, Sankara has remarked at one place that these virtues cannot be developed in a day or two, but it requires time to gradually make them more and more matured (परिपाक), developed and perfected. So long as these are not perfected, the self-realisation would remain incomplete. It is necessary therefore to make life-long endeavours towards the maturity and perfection of these virtues, so that man may gain a thorough and perfect mastery over the impulsive self (प्रतिपक्षहीनस्य), such that his true self may be realised in it.²

(f) For the completion of the list on the moral virtues, we must mention here the fact that the list includes in it the performance of certain ritual works (यज्ञ)—*Yajnas*—which, when done with a *higher motive* for the final realisation, certainly help the *purification* (सत्त्व-शुद्धि) of the mind which forms the object of all other higher works or virtues.

¹ “विद्यमानमपि जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यं तिरोहितं सविद्याव्यवधानात् । तत्पुन-
स्तिरोहितं सत्, परमेश्वर समिधायतो यतमानस्य.....इत्यर प्रसादात् संसिद्धस्य कथ-
चित्देव आविर्भवति” (वे° भा°, 3.2.5) । “तमेव ईश्वरं आश्रयं गच्छ सर्वार्थमात्मना ।
तत्-प्रसादात् ईश्वरानुग्रहात्.....विष्णो परमं पदमवाप्नुमि” (गी° भा°, 18.62) ।
“तेषां कथं श्रेयः स्यादिति दयाहेतोरहं...अन्तःकरणागते स्थितः सन्, ज्ञानदीपेण...
भक्तिप्रसादश्रेयाभिपत्तेन...तमो नाशयामि” (गी° भा°, 10.11) । “संराधनस-
भक्ति-भ्यान्-प्रतिष्ठानायनुष्ठानं” (वे° भा°, 3.2.24) ।

² “ज्ञानस्य स्यात्सोत्पत्तिरिदं शक्येत्युक्तम्, प्रतिपक्षविहीनस्य, यदत्मासुभवनि-
यमायमानत्वं तस्य—ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरिदं शक्येत्युक्तं सहाकारिकारणं भुक्तिविशुद्ध्यादि अमानि-
त्यादि च शक्येत्य ज्ञानस्य...आत्मासुभवनियम-रूपेण यदस्याभं सा परा ‘ज्ञाननिष्ठा’
(i.e., ज्ञानावस्थानस्य) इत्युच्यते” (गी° भा°, 18.55) ।

The views of Sankara on the *Yajnas* (यज्ञ) will appear in the following paragraphs where we have gathered together his opinions, for the benefit of our readers:—

Certain portions of those Upanishads which are regarded as most reliable and ancient are found to contain discussions about the manner in which *Yajnas* are to be performed. This shows that कर्मकाण्ड is not really antagonistic to the ब्रह्मकाण्ड as some scholars hold. The former has an intimate relation to the latter, and far from being hostile it forms a necessary part of the latter. There is no real conflict between the two sections of the Veda. The purpose of the rituals is to *purify* the mind—exclusively and deeply engrossed in the attachment for the pleasure-giving sensible objects,¹ so as to prepare it for the dawn of perfect knowledge. The actions which are done from a lower motive for the enjoyment of pleasure, and which have only selfish and self-seeking ends—have been condemned as *Sakāma*. Those who are naturally selfish and are deeply absorbed in the sensual pleasures and worldly objects, cannot at once be raised to the contemplation of an ideal which is exalted beyond all sensual conditions. Their minds are to be gradually worked upon by the gradual

¹ अज्ञानां निजीविपूर्णां ज्ञाननिष्ठाऽसम्भवे—‘कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणीत्यादि कर्म-
निष्ठा उक्ता द्वितीयो वेदार्थः’ (ईशा मा०, 8) ।

change of the ideal to which they are attached.¹

Three different ideals for three different classes of people according to three distinct types of culture received by them have been laid down side by side in the Rig-Veda²; and these three types of people are to be found, we believe, in every stage of society.—

- (a) Those who travelled on the lowest plane and whose mind could not and did not receive any spiritual culture, and who had desires and longings for self-seeking pleasures, worshipped the gods; and to these, the gods appeared endowed with sensible attributes and each seemed to have a distinct existence of its own and each capable of fulfilling the desires of the devotees.
- (b) But to the people of higher types, these gods appeared not as self-existing and independent entities, but only manifestations of *one Power* working within them

¹ “मन्दबुद्धीनां दिग्देशादिभेदवद् वस्तुति एवं भाविता बुद्धिः न शक्यते सहसा परमार्थविषया कर्तुं इति । अनधिगम्य च ब्रह्म न पुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति । अनेकजन्म-विषयसेवाभ्यासजनिता विषय-विषया तृष्णा न सहसा निवर्त्तयितुं शक्यते । सोपाना-रोहणवत् खूलादारम्य सूक्तं सूक्ततरङ्ग-बुद्धिविषयञ्च ज्ञापयित्वा, तदतिरिक्ते स्वाराज्ये ऽभिषेक्ष्यामीति नामादीनि निर्दिद्विचि-” —इत्यादि (का० भा०, 8.1.1 ; 7.1.1).

Of. “न हि अग्निहोत्रादीन्येव कर्माणि । ब्रह्मचर्यं, तपः, सत्यवदनं, शमो, दमो ऽहिंसा—इत्येवमादीन्यपि ‘कर्माणि’ विद्योत्यत्तौ साधकतमानि भवन्ति । ध्यानधारणा-दिलक्षणाणि च वक्ष्यति ” —तै० भा०, शिचावल्ली, 1.11.

² Vide our Introduction appended to the third Volume of our work, “Upanishader Upadeśa” in which various arguments from the Rig-Veda have been collected and discussed in support of this position.

and realising its purpose in and through these manifestations. For these, the Veda has enjoined "conjunction of work with knowledge" (ज्ञानकर्म-समुच्चय).

- (c) But there are still higher types of people to whom, owing to the superior spiritual culture they received through good works done in the previous states of existence, the Veda holds out the ideal of Brahman—both immanent and transcendent—and for these, no ritual duties were thought useful and necessary, but only the exercise and repetition of contemplation, altruistic thoughts and works, cultivation of moral virtues ('दमनित्वादि') were deemed as the only *means* for the attainment of this ideal. कर्मकाण्ड has, thus, its own efficacy and purpose and is not in any way conflicting and antagonistic to the ज्ञानकाण्ड. We for these reasons find it difficult to subscribe to the view that at the Vedic period the Vedic people could not rise above the idea of a duality and from the planes of selfish ends.¹

Such, in brief, is the view of Sankara on the Karma-kānda of the Veda and in this manner he has attempted a reconciliation of the Karma section with Jñāna section of the Veda—

¹ We cannot also agree with the view that the Vedic people—one and all without exception—could not rise to the grasp of the highest unity ब्रह्म—and that all of them worshipped as gods the striking phenomena of nature which by their grand and impressive features captured their imagination. This view goes against the conclusion arrived at by Sankaracharyya and others.

“एवं कर्मकाण्डे नास्य एकवाक्यतावगतिः”

(वृ० भा०, 4.4.22) । ¹

11. Before we take leave of the subject under discussion, we must try to estimate the real purport of certain passages found scattered in the Bhâsya of Sankara which may, possibly, create some confusion in the mind of the readers.

(i) Let us first consider such passages in which “abandonment of *all* kinds of works” has been taught.² Such passages, to all outward appearances, demand, no doubt, from all, the renouncement of all sorts of works including even the disinterested higher nitya-karmas. But when these passages are considered, not isolating them from, but taking and reading them in connection with, the contexts in which they occur, and in the light of Sankara’s general position on the Karmas which we have tried to exhibit in this chapter,—the right import and true solution of these passages cannot but stand revealed before the readers in their own light.

When an aspirant has already attained the self-knowledge, has reached the final goal, no further need arises for him to

¹ Of. “काम्यवर्जितं नित्यं कर्मजातं सर्वमात्मज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण मोक्षसाधनत्वं प्रतिपद्यते” ।

² Compare such passages as — “सर्वकर्मसम्प्रासः कर्तव्यः,” etc., etc.

perform any kind of works—lower or higher. Sankara suggests this truth in the line—

“उपप्राप्तविद्यया तु धनारम्भः निरयंकलात्”—

(वेन-वा-भा०, 1.1) ;

For, when the man has attained the Transcendental goal (उपप्राप्तमायः), all his duties have reached their fulfilment. All contrast between lower and higher works, all succession of time-order, all his higher and higher endeavours and aspirations have ceased for him to have any further meaning.¹ “For him who has realised the *Ātmā*, no further work remains to be done.”—

“न चेवमात्मानं मनुष्यवतः किंचिदप्यत् कथं चरन्ति” ।

(वे० भा०, 4.1.2) ;

We find therefore that the “abandonment of works” mentioned in those passages is meant only for the ‘*Ātma-vid*,’ i.e., for those who have already realised the final End, which is the *completion* of all desire.

- (ii) We now come to consider the nature of some other passages. There are some passages in the *Bhāṣyas*, which speak of the higher *Nitya-karma* in terms no better than the *Sakāma* impulsive activities. Like our selfish works the *nitya-karmas* are sometimes described as

¹ “न च तस्यामपि उत्कर्ष-निरर्थात्मकोऽतिशय उपपद्यते—उत्कर्षटैव हि विदा भवति” (वे० भा०, 3.4.52) ;

the “product of *avidyā*, and of love and hatred (राग-द्वेष).” Take such passages as—

“यद्यपि शास्त्रावगतं नित्यं कर्म, तथापि
अविद्यावत् एव भवति”—

(गी० भा०, 18.66)

i.e., the Nitya-karmas are done by him who is influenced by passions and other lower tendencies.¹

For the solution of this apparent difficulty, we must call our reader's attention to the fact that our outward actions are always the outcome of our inner motives, and intentions;—our outward works entirely depend upon our inner motives, of which they are the expressions. It follows therefore that our selfish activities may, by changing our inner motives, be converted into disinterested actions; and our un-selfish works might change their disinterested character, if they are done with selfish ends in view. Sankara's idea is—‘even the virtuous deeds (धर्मकर्मसु) may be done with a lower motive—with a desire to gain some mundane end, such as social position, prosperity, higher regions

¹ Cf. विषयप्राप्तिनिमित्तं कामाः पुरुषान् नियोजयन्ति तेषु तेषु विषयेषु...तैः धर्माधर्मप्रवृत्तिहेतुभिः विषयेच्छारूपैः—इत्यादि (सु० भा०, 3.2.2). Also cf. such passage—“काम-क्रोधादिपूर्वक-पुण्यापुण्यकारिता.....संसारस्य कारणं” (ब्र०भा०, 4.4.5). “लोक-त्रयसाधनं...मानुषं विन्नं कर्मरूपं पितृलोकप्राप्तिसाधनं यिदाश्च दैवं विन्नं देवलीकप्राप्तिसाधनं.....अविज्ञाकामवत् एव सर्वाणि कर्माणि” (गी०, 2.11)।

or Devatās, and the like, and when so performed, the virtuous deeds become ends in themselves, not means. His idea therefore is that the value must be placed not upon the outward deeds—not even upon virtuous deeds—but upon the inner intention.¹

Man has always an infinite possibility either for good, or for evil, man's nature cannot be exhaustively expressed in his past and present achievements. Man is always more than what he actually is. If he allows himself to be passively guided by the impulses (चरित्याजस), his actions are selfish. If he keeps himself alive to his rational nature, he is unselfish.

Thus the apparent difficulty is solved.

¹ "इह। च काव्यापिदोषादी कामीयमर्हेन काव्यापिदोषमिति । तथा सति पूर्वकाममिपूर्वकादीनां कर्मणां कार्याविषयस्य चरन्मत्तत्वं दृष्टं । तदेवापि . . . कर्मोपि विदुषोऽकर्मं सम्पद्यते" (गी० भा०, 4 24) । "अमुदयार्थोऽपि प्रशंसितश्च यो भर्तुः शिवादिष्वन्यानि हेतुरपि ननु, ईश्वरार्थेन ब्रह्मास्तुत्यमानः, सत्त्वगुणद्वये भवति फलभिन्नमिति तस्य" (गीता०, उपोद्घात) । "कामययन्तो हि पुत्र्यः पुण्या-पुण्यकर्मणो उपार्जनोति, उपार्जतेऽपि पुण्यापुण्ये कर्मणो कामययन्ते फलधारयन्ते न भवतः" (उ० भा०, 4 45) ।

² नाभिमुखीनां निव्यानां कर्मणां ब्रह्मादीनि (भोक्तव्यानि) फलानि । ईशो पुनः निव्यानि निरभिमुखीनि, तेषां उपकारकत्वात् भोक्तव्यानामपि कर्मणि भवन्तीति न विद्यन्ते" (उ० भा०, 3 31) ।

i.e., Even these higher works when done for gaining a higher world or for gaining identity with the Devatās, still involve *avidya* since they are done for *pleasure*. But when these are done to gain final realisation (through purification of self), they are done with higher motives.

³ शिवयात्रात्मयाजिनो, आत्मयाजिनो विदुषश्च—'शिवयाजिनः श्रयान् आत्मवाजो'—

आत्मवाजो आत्ममत्कारार्थं निव्यानि कर्मणि करोति (3 31) ।

12. We ought to look upon the world of emergent *nâma-rûpas from the standpoint of unity*, always in connection with the underlying Brahman. In that case, no difference, no भेद, will appear to us. All the so-called differences would appear as higher and higher *revelations* of that underlying unity.

But such is the perversity of the human intellect that we ignore the underlying unity and identify it with the emergent *nâma-rûpas*. And the emergent differences alone become the only standpoint to us from which we look upon the world. Everything appears to be composed of parts (अवयव) and one part lying outside another part and one part being distinct and different from another part—

स्वाभाविक्या अविवक्षया...नाम-रूपोपाधि-

दृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकौ ”—

This false view of the world is entirely due to our *avidyâ*, our intellectual error.¹ It is our intellect which entirely *identifies* the underlying unity with the emergent differences and thus imagines *parts* in the unity.² Really there can be no such identity. The underlying Brahman

¹ In तै० भा० Sankara has shown that अविद्या is not चक्ष्म or property of the self. It is the property of our intellect, understanding (तै०, 2.8) (In° , °, S. calls it चित्तकल्पना and इन्द्रिय-प्रज्ञा).

² As there is always an unchanging ground in which the changing विकारs are grounded (1.3.1., वे० भा०), we are liable to take these as parts of the ground of which it is composed. It is विकल्पना, बुद्धिदोष. We must keep the ground *apart* from the विकारs.

There are people who from the use of the term चित्तकल्पना conclude that the विकारs are all our mental phantasm and these are unreal. But that is not the true sense.

retains its unity, maintains its own nature, in these emerging diversities of *nāma-rūpa*. Sankara has pointed out—

“ न हि बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेन सवयवेन
परमार्थतः सावयवं वस्तु भवति ”—¹

i.e., our intellect has no power to effect any actual change in the object. The unity does not change to multiplicity, simply because our intellect imagines parts (*सवयव*) in it, identifies the two.

“ Can the mirage actually wet the surface of the desert ? ”

We must make earnest effort to change our intellectual outlook. We must try to look upon the world from the standpoint of the unity, from the standpoint of Brahman. Sankara says—

“ There can be no object—subtle or gross—past or present—distant or near—which can remain *separated* from the underlying Brahman—either in space or in time.”

“ न हि चात्मनीन्द्रिय...तत्-प्रविभक्तद्वैतकारं
मूलं व्यभिचरितं भूतं मविच्छेदा वस्तु विद्यते ”—
(ते° भा°, २।६) ।

No *difference* will appear again to our changed outlook now, as it used to appear before. Everything—all differences of *nāma-rūpa* will now appear as revelations of Brahman's nature, as higher and higher manifestations of the underlying unity which is realising itself in them. The diversities of *nāma-rūpa* being only the manifestations of

¹ अविद्यापरिकल्पितेन द्वायेष तद्विषयं परमार्थिकं वस्तु न दृश्यति । मरीच्यन्मसा उपरदेवः न पट्वौक्रियते । ज्ञेयेन ज्ञातुः संसर्गात्तुल्यपणेः । न च मिथ्या-ज्ञानं परमार्थवस्तु दूषयितुं समर्थं (गी° भा°, १।१२) । बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेभ्यः सदवयवेभ्यः विकारसंख्यागोपपणेः...एकमेवाद्वितीयं परमार्थतः ‘इदं’-बुद्धिकाक्षिप्तं (का° भा°, ६।१।२) ।

Brahman's nature, how can these have a nature of their own which can be called *different* from the nature of Brahman? It is the self-same nature of Brahman which is present before us now in the form of diverse nâma-rûpas. Hence, this world of nâma-rûpas cannot be looked upon as something *different* from the nature of Brahman. They are merely the *expressions* of the nature of Brahman, which we used to call erroneously as *this* or *that* thing,¹ which we so long used to regard as *different* from Brahman. And this idea of separateness (भेदबुद्धि—अन्यत्व-बोध) is due to the deep-rooted and inveterate error of our intellect (अविद्या): This erroneous idea, says Sankara, stands between our self and Mukti or the final realisation. All our endeavours are to be directed to the extirpation of this illusion born of the habits of our thought.² All phenomenal objects, all activities are to be looked upon as *means, instruments* (ब्रह्मदर्शनीपायत्वेनैत) for the realisation of the Divine Purpose

¹ यथा सती 'ऽन्यद्वत्त्वन्तर' परिकल्प्य पुनस्तस्यैव प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रध्वंसाच्च कश्चिं असत्त्वं ब्रुवते तार्किकाः; न तथा अस्माभिः सतीऽन्यद्वत्त्व परिकल्प्यते। सदेव तु सर्व्वमभिधानं, अभिधीयते च यदन्यद्वद्भा। यथा रज्जुरेव सर्पबुद्ध्या सर्प इत्यभिधीयते; यथा वा पिण्ड-घटादि मृदोऽन्यद्वद्भा पिण्ड-घटादिशब्देन अभिधीयते" (छा° भा°, ६।२।३)।

² (a) "अन्यत्व-दर्शनापवादाच्च विद्याविषये सहस्रशः श्रूयन्ते"। (b) "विद्या-ऽविद्याकार्य्यं—सर्व्वीय्यभावः, परिच्छिन्नात्मभावश्च—आत्मनः 'अन्यद्वत्त्वन्तरं' प्रत्युपस्थापयति अविद्या" (ब्र°, 4.3.20)। (c) यदन्यग्रहणं.....तदविद्याकृतं" (तै°, 2.8)। (d) "न हि विदुषो 'अन्य' इवन्तरमस्ति भिन्नं (तै°, 2.9)। अविद्याकृतं भूतमात्रोपाधिसंसर्गैरुपमं अन्यत्वावभासं तिरस्कृत्य।...परमात्मस्वरूपात् अन्यदिव प्रत्यवभासमानं" (ब्र°, 5.1.1)। (e) "अन्यत्वापोहेन अतद्वन्माध्यारीपेण संसारीपरमः कर्तव्यः" ब्र°, 4.4.20। (f) "इमानि भूतानि मत्तोऽन्यानि, कामाः सर्व्वं मत्तोऽन्ये...तत्तु न इन्द्रस्य हितं न तु राज्ञो राव्यासिवत् अन्यत्वेन" (छा°, 8.12.1)। (g) निर्व्योहि आत्मभावः...अतद्विषय (अन्य इव) इव प्रत्यवभासते... 'अन्यात्म' भावनिवृत्तौ... आत्मभावः स्वाभाविकः भवति—ब्र°, 4.4.20। (h) 'न आत्मनोऽन्यत् कामयितव्यं वत्त्वन्तरम्—ब्र°, 4.4.6। (i) अविद्याया 'अन्यत्वेन' प्रत्युपस्थापितमासीत्; तत् एतस्मिन् काले एकौभूतं" (ब्र°, 4.3.23)। (j) 'अन्यस्य—अविद्याकृतत्वे, विद्याया अवस्तुत्वदर्शनीपपत्तिः—(तै° भा°, 2.8)।

working in them. Sankara calls this—*Sarvâtma-bhāva* (सर्वआत्मभाव). This idea of सर्वआत्मभाव, i.e., the idea of taking all emergent *nāma-rūpas*, all emergent activities, as higher and higher *expressions* of the Divine purpose is to substitute the former false idea, i.e., the idea of *separateness* (अव्यक्तबोध). When this सर्वआत्मभाव is firmly established in the place of अव्यक्तबोध—*Mukti* or the final realisation is reached. This is *Mukti* in the Sankara's system¹

The individual Ego is not a *component part*, a mere phase, of Brahman. But as we have already seen, all Egos have a 'nature,' have infinite *possibility* in them; and this possibility has become so far *expressed* in our *actual* states and activities. Through our constant endeavour, through the constant cultivation of the moral virtues and performance of higher moral works, and also by विचार² we must *purify* our *sense-organs*, *manas*, intellect and our mental capacities more and more. We shall, then, be able to comprehend and realise more and more, through these, the infinite wealth of the inexhaustible nature of Brahman

1 " (a) सर्वआत्मभावः स्वाभाविकः । यच्च सर्वआत्मभावात्.....वालाग्रमपि 'अव्यक्तेन' दृश्यते...तदवस्था अविद्या...सर्वआत्मभावी बोधः " (4.3.20).

(b) " ज्ञानञ्च तस्मिन् परात्मभावनिरूपितम् । निश्चये हि आत्मभावः सर्वस्य 'अतद्विषय' इव (i.e., अन्य इव) प्रत्यवभासते । तस्मात् अतद्विषयभासनिरूपित-व्यतिरेकेण न तस्मिन् आत्मभावो विधीयते । अन्वयात्मभावनिरूपणो आत्मभावो भवतीति आत्मा प्राप्यते " (8° भा°, 4.4.20).

(c) " परमार्थतोऽद्वैते.....भिन्नमित्येव 'वस्तुत्तरमित्येव' आत्मन उपलब्ध्यते ।...यच्च तु ब्रह्मविद्याया अविद्यानायसुपगमिता, तत्र आत्म-व्यतिरेकेण 'अन्यस्य' यभावः " (2.4.14).

(d) " सर्वआत्मनः सर्वफलसर्वस्वीपपत्ते रविरीधात्—सुदृढं सर्वघट-कुण्डाद्यामिः " (का°, 8.12.11).

² विचार is—"वस्तुयायास्मादर्थेन" (गौ° भा°), i.e., to look behind the changing particulars to their underlying universals. This is—contemplation of the Beautiful.

which is present in our finite self as the infinite possibility or purpose.¹ In our higher and higher progress to the higher and higher worlds, we shall build up higher organisms. And through these higher organs and organisms, we would be able realise Brahman in a higher and superior form.² In this progress, there is no breach of memory.

This realisation, by the Ego, of the inexhaustible Brahman in him has been beautifully described by Sankara by an illustration. "The union of man with Brahman," he says, "is like the union between man and his beloved wife in marriage." "When a man embraces in love and affection his beloved wife, he forgets the presence of the objects near him and loses his consciousness of himself and everything else in the perfect happiness born of this

¹ "यस्मात् विद्या-कर्म्मणीं पूर्वप्रज्ञा च देहान्तरप्रतिपत्तुःपभोगसाधनं, तस्मात् विद्याकर्म्मादि शुभमेव समाचरेत् यथा इष्टदेहसंयोगौपभोगौ स्यातां" (वै० भा०, 4.4.2).

"पूण्यकर्म्मोद्भवैः विवर्तैः कार्य-करणैः संयुक्ते जन्मनि सति, प्रज्ञामेधास्मृति-वैशारदां दृष्टं" (वै० भा०, 1.4.2).

"कार्येन्द्रियाणां ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणां सिद्धिं लभते" (गी० भा०, 18.45).

विषयोपलब्धिलक्षणस्य विज्ञानस्य शुद्धिः.....रागद्वेषमोहैरसंस्पृष्टं विषयविज्ञानं ...तस्यां सत्यां अन्तःकरणस्य शुद्धिः...अविच्छिन्ना स्मृतिर्भवति । यतः एतत् 'उत्तरोत्तरं' आहारशुद्धिमूलं, तस्मात् सा कार्या" (का०, 7.26.2).

² "स्वातन्त्र्येणैव हि गृहादिव गृहान्तरं अव्यमन्यं देहं संहरन्तः...अपरिमुषित-स्मृतयः एव । देहेन्द्रियप्रकृतिवशित्वात् निष्क्रीय देहान् अधितिष्ठति" (वै० भा०, 3.3.32). In *कान्दीग्यभाष्य*, it is stated that a Mukta possesses his organs, intellect, purified and perfect—"स नै मुक्तः सर्व्वीत्मभावमापन्नः सन्.....मनउपाधिः सन् एतेनैव मनसा कामान् पश्यन् रमते" (का०, 8.12.5).

mutual union”¹ The readers will realise from this illustration that this सर्वोत्तमभाव, the result of the union—is not the actual *abolition* of the objects of the world as unreal,² leaving Brahman as the only reality This is also not the *absorption of the Ego in Brahman*—which is his true essence

And this सर्वोत्तम भाव is the Vedantic *Mukti*,—it is simply the cessation of the idea of *separateness* or अणुत्व बोध—

अद्वैतभावनिवृत्तौ आत्मभावो भवति (३^० ४ ४ ११)

“सर्वोत्तमभावो मोक्ष उक्त ” (३^० भा^० ४ ४ ६) ³

¹ “यथा प्रियया द्विषया सम्यखिद्यन्ती न बाह्य किञ्चन वेद—सत्त ‘अन्यदस्य’ इति, अखिद्यन्तस्तथा ‘प्रविभक्त’ जानाति सर्वं । एवं पुरुष, क्षेत्रज्ञ, भूतमात्रासंयुत ‘प्रविभक्त’ (३८, अन्य इव), स्वाभाविकेन आत्मना सम्यखिद्यन्त, ‘सर्वोत्तम’ न बाह्य ‘वृत्तान्त’ वेद ” ३^० भा^०, ४३ २१) । “भेदजातस्य सच्चिदानन्द आत्मभूतत्वात् ” (३^० भा^०, ३ १० ५) । “कथं सर्वोत्तमत्वोपपत्तिरित्याह—इमान् लोकांश्च आत्मत्वेन अनुभवन् ब्रह्म ‘सर्वानन्दरूप’ गायन् ” (३^० भा^०, ३ १०, ५)

² It is simply looking upon everything as not ‘*anya*’ (अन्य) from the self “इदं ‘रन्त्यत्वेन’ सर्वेषां अभावात् न पश्यति . मुक्तस्यापि सर्वैकत्वात् समानोद्दिष्टाभावात् —‘केन क पश्येत् ?’ इति च उक्तमेव ” (३^० भा^०, ८ १२ ३) [For the sense of ‘केन क पश्येत् ?’—*vide* Chap III of this book where such expressions have been explained]

³ As an example of सर्वोत्तमभाव Sankara (वे^०भा^०, १ १ ४) has quoted the Vedic sentence अहं मनुभवं सूर्यस्य, etc. etc and things he takes as “ब्रह्मदर्शन” which shows that when सर्वोत्तमभाव is realised, the existence of मनु सूर्य and other objects of the world is not abolished These objects will then be looked upon as simply the expressions of ब्रह्म’s nature (ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव) and hence they are not something अन्य absolutely, but there is unity in difference Readers are requested to note this Similarly in ३^०, in describing the experience of a मुक्त पुरुष it is stated as “अहमत्र अहमत्राद् सर्वानन्दत्वेन गायन्,” etc. Here also everything appears to a मुक्त as ‘अन्य’ really There is no question of abolition at all

Of also what Sankara has spoken of a मुक्तपुरुष—“एष विशेषो विदुषां, अन्यतोऽपि प्रपञ्च संसारः । पृथगारमणो न पश्येत्”—आत्मनिरूपण (१००) ।

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1. Professor A. Berriedale Keith, D Litt., D.C.I., University of Edinburgh—

" .. Your book is a remarkably able and highly interesting contribution to the interpretation of Sankara. Its collection of passages alone would be of very high value, for the extent of Sankara's writings is so great as to render easy reference impossible without such aid, and I fully appreciate the labour which has been involved in the selection of the texts cited. Even greater value applies to your powerful exposition of the realistic element in Sankara. Your restatement of his position in terms of modern philosophical conception shows very great skill and will demand the most careful consideration from those who seek to apprehend the true force of the teachings of the Acharyya. It is a striking tribute to his great philosophical power that the question of the interpretation of his doctrines still presents the most interesting problem of Indian Philosophy. .. I shall not fail to mention your work in my next publication now in the press "

2. Professor S. Y. Leany, Ph.D., University of Prague, Austria—

" I have read your valuable book with great interest. It will be reviewed by me in one of our periodicals, but it can be said at once, that the teaching of your great countryman—Sankara—has been treated by you in a very happy way and to much profit of your readers. (The problem of Sankara's Advaita Philosophy is complicated and I am of opinion that our understanding of his teaching may be far more furthered by Indian scholars and books like yours which treat the problem in a scholarly way, than by European scholars who very often treat the matter too much in the light of our European Philosophy..... There is one point more which I like in your book, that are the accurate quotations, at least as far as I can see. The merit of the book is not diminished by some misprints, as for instance Asat-karjya-vāda instead of—(kāryya).....on the whole, your work displays complete acquaintance with the problems derived certainly from the extensive reading of Sankara's writings."

3. Professor E. Washburn Hopkins, Ph.D., LL.D., Yale University, America—

" I beg leave to acknowledge with many thanks the receipt of your very valuable book, Advaita Philosophy, which has been at hand for some months. I should have thanked you for it before, but I wanted to study it first.....Now to speak of the book itself, I will confess that

at first it rather bewildered me, since in several particulars it contravenes general opinion very drastically. But on a second reading, which I found necessary owing to the weighty matter in it (for though the book is small it is of profound significance), I discovered that the primary revolt against your conclusions diminished in proportion as I read more carefully your citations tending to uphold your contentions step by step. My final judgment is that you have made a most important contribution to our knowledge of Sankara's Philosophy. Your powerful analysis of the Iswara idea and of the Ego leaves the *onus probandi* on the shoulders of those who would still believe in an unreal God and empty individual self. Having just published a little book on Hindu Ethics, I was particularly interested in your final words on the Ethical reality of the Vedanta and am glad to see so forcible a presentation of this matter. As I have phrased it in my book—"there can be no religion without morality, no morality without religion" (In B. G. and Vedanta). I have not yet done with your "Adwaita," in fact I wish to go through your citations again and perhaps make public note of your position. In my view, you have done a great service in composing this work."

4. Prof. Julius Jolly, Ph.D., University of Wurzburg, Bavaria—

"Your valuable book has been duly received. This work contains an excellent exposition, I think, of the main principles of the Adwaita system and an equally excellent vindication of this against the reproaches raised by scholars wrongly interpreting its technical terms. The numerous original Sanskrit texts quoted in your work make it easy to control the doctrines contained in it. It is to be certainly hoped that the study of your work will give a just impetus to Adwaita Philosophy both in India and in Western countries, and will remove the misunderstandings concerning it."

5. Prof. Louis De la Vallée-Poussin, University of Brussels, Belgium—

"I am happy to say that I have read your book with great pleasure. I am willing also to think that the views of many controversialists on this great system are wrong, because they do not realise that Sankara, although he is a great rationalist, is also a mystic. (It is not the intention of Sankara to deny the existence of a personal, all-knowing and all-powerful God, nor the existence of the human souls, or of the world. I believe that your great endeavour—"महान् यत्नः"—to purify the Mimamsa from all misinterpretations—"कदर्थं"—is on the whole successful. Do you not admit that there are in his system a number of theses which obscure this general tendency and the main lines? *Mâyā*—was an unfortunate word to express the idea that the "Transcendental one" is able to create beings who are not its substratum, although their existence depends upon it;—beings who are both *Swārtha* and *Parārtha*. I beg you to accept my best thanks and to believe that I very strongly sympathise with your work."

6. Prof. J. H. Muirhead, M A . LL D , University of Birmingham—

"... I have read the Central Chapter on the 'Pure Ego as Active Power' and find it so entirely on the line of my own thought in connexion with what I am at present writing that even although the book had not been your gift I should have desired to write to thank you for the valuable help I have got from it. I think that now we have from Professor Radhakrishnan and others competent *historians* of Indian philosophy as a whole, the next step is *more detailed work* such as yours, and I think nothing could be more valuable than your book. I hope you will pursue your admirable researches and publish them as opportunities come."

7. Professor Rudolph Otto, Ph D . of Marburg, Germany—

"Many thanks for your very interesting book. You emphasise correctly those elements in Sankara which people had so long very much neglected. On the whole, it appears to me that the standpoint which you have taken is that of Bheda bheda which also Chaitanya adopted. I have just studied Sankara's commentaries on the Gita and Māndukya and am filled with wonder at the extent of his thought which comes out more clear and prominent than in the Vedānta Sūtra alone."

8. Dr. P. K. Roy, D Sc. (London and Edinburgh), late Professor and Principal, Presidency College, Calcutta—

"The Preface is well conceived as well as well written, and the book bears evidence of your labour and thought to give correct interpretations and to remove misinterpretations in all disputed and difficult points. You have done a very great service to the cause of the true Religion of the Hindus by publishing this English version. I hope it will have an extensive circulation not only in India but also in England, Germany and America. In my old age there cannot be a greater joy than in witnessing the success of my old pupil and his devotion to the subject of my devotion."

9. Professor S. Radhakrishnan, King George V Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta—

"I thank you for your valuable gift of Advaita Philosophy which I read with the greatest interest. As you may imagine, I appreciate very much your strenuous attempt to repudiate the popular view of the world-negating character of Sankara's Philosophy. (Though your representation of the Advaita Vedānta brings it very near Rāmānuja's view, you have made out a very strong case for it. What struck me most in your book, apart from its wealth of learning, was your independence of mind which is rather rare among Indian thinkers of the present day.)"

10. **Sir George A. Grierson, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., LL.D.**—late Vice-President, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland—

"..... I have read a good deal of it and found it very interesting and instructive..... your book shows evidence of much original research, and I hope that you will continue your studies of this and other important Systems of Indian Philosophy."

11. **Professor M. Winternitz, Ph.D.**,—University of Prague. Czecho-Slovakia—

"..... It seems to me to be an excellent Introduction to the system of Sankara in its different aspects. As I am specially interested in the Ethics of the Indian systems, I have read the IVth Chapter on the 'Place of Ethics and Religion in Vedanta' more attentively. You have very well shown that for the Adwaita, altruistic *Karma* is required as a means for purification of mind, and that Sankara endeavours to harmonize कर्मकाण्ड and ज्ञानकाण्ड. I am not sure that this subordination of moral action to ज्ञान is the best way to strengthen social and ethical feelings in the masses and in mankind generally. But there is something in the idea of Adwaita which seems to me of high ethical value—the idea of *unity of all that is*, which may lead to the idea that there is no difference between my own self and that of my neighbour, whence there is no reason why I should care more for myself than for another. This has well come out in Maháyána Buddhism—in my opinion under the influence of Vedanta.....Your book, as you see from my remarks, is *very suggestive*."

12. **Dr. L. D. Barnett**—Oriental Studies, London Institution (University of London).

"..... Your book is a work of considerable merit."

13. **Professor J. Wackernagel, Basil, Switzerland**—

"..... 'Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy' is a valuable book.....I shall not fail to make it known and accessible to fellow-workers interested in Indian Philosophy, and hope it will be appreciated universally according to its merits."

14. **Professor Hermann Jacobi, Ph.D.**—University of Bonn, Germany—

"..... A look into the book convinced me that it is a work of much thought and deep reasoning. I determined, instead of simply acknowledging it with some complimentary remarks to regularly study it. I am reading your book now and hope to write you at more length..... I have read this novel exposition of Sankara's system with interest and profit, whether one entirely agrees with the author's theory or not, one will admire his ingenuity and be grateful for many valuable suggestions..... It is an admirable book..... I have the highest esteem for you personally." (The learned Professor writes here a long criticism mainly on the Unreality of God and the

World. This has been printed *separately* and incorporated in the second edition.)

15. Rev. W. S. Urquhart, M.A., Ph.D.—Principal, Scottish Churches College, and Fellow of the Calcutta University—

"...It is an exceedingly useful treatment of the subject from your point of view and will, no doubt, have the effect of removing certain misunderstandings and reconciling contradictions which are a puzzle to many students of Sankara's Philosophy. But it seems to me, that in some cases you have transferred your allegiance from Sankara to Rāminuja. I.e., is it that there is no fundamental difference between them?"

16. Professor W. Caland, M.A., Ph.D., University of Utrecht, Holland—

"... I can assure you that I have read your very clear exposition of the Advaita Philosophy with profit."

17. Professor Richard Schmidt, Ph.D.—University of Munster, Germany—

"... I do not hesitate to furnish you with the expression of my warmest appreciation of your work on Advaita Philosophy. I am not able, it is true, to say whether or not the great commentator and philosopher Sankara will satisfy to modern Indian or European aims, but surely your book is an admirably suitable introduction to that most magnificent achievement of Indian thought, the knowledge of which will be very useful to all those students and general readers who are interested not only in the system of Advaita, but in the evolution of human mind generally spoken. From this point of view, your book is not only a highly interesting contribution to the interpretation of Sankara's writings, but also in every way a new argument of the justness of the "Ex Oriente lux." I therefore wish you best success.—

“ अभिवर्षन्ति योऽनुपालयन्, विविद्वोजानि विवेकधारिणा ।

स सदा कल्पमानिषो क्रिया, शरदंभीकशक्तिविरति ॥ ”

18. Professor Otto Jespersen, M.A., Ph.D., University of Copenhagen, Denmark—

"Allow me to thank you most cordially for your extreme kindness in sending me your valuable "Introduction to Advaita Philosophy." I am not an expert in Indian Philosophy, but I have seen enough of your book to say that it is a most painstaking and thorough work which I very greatly appreciate....."

19. Professor Alfred Hillebrandt, M.A., Ph.D., University of Breslau, Germany—

"I beg to express my best thanks for your very interesting— 'Introduction to Advaita Philosophy.' A temporary disease of eyes

prevented me from answering sooner and congratulating you on this elucidation of the views of the great champion and interpreter of the Vedanta—Sankara.....It is obvious that your work marks a great progress by the brilliant exposition which Sankara's views have found therein, by your painstaking labour and judicious treatment. Every one, who will make himself acquainted with his philosophy and has no time to go through all his various works, finds now the way opened and will be indebted to you for this masterly introduction.

..... I fully appreciate the value of your scholarly work which I think a *perfect success*. Allow me to repeat my opinion that your work represents a high standard of Indian scholarship."

20. Professor Dr. L. Stcherbatsky, University of Leningrad, Russia—

"I have received your valuable book about Adwaita. Please accept my greatest thanks. I am full of admiration for your wonderful knowledge of Sankara, and have profited a great deal from its perusalThe attacks on Sankara from the stand-point of Christian missionaries are never regarded very much, it is biassed and official stand-point.....In reading your book I got the impression that you wish to protect Sankara against aggressors who are much below him....."

21. Professor James H. Woods, Ph.D., University of Harvard, America—

"Your book on the Vedanta has given me the greatest pleasure. It is coherently written and the arguments move forward with logical precision and at the same time keep close to the text of the Vedanta. I found the book extremely valuable and I hope it will be the first one of a series. Your work has impressed me so much that I am sending you an invitation....."

22. Professor Richard Garbe, Ph.D., University of Tübingen, Germany—

"I thank you much for your valuable work—'An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy.' It is more than the title indicates: not only an able introduction, but a very important contribution to the history of Indian Philosophy. Especially Chapter III—'On the falsity of the world' with its sharp distinctions seems to me to be of particular importance, as, according to it, the current notions about Sankara's conception of the world *have to be corrected*. Inaccuracies in the transliteration of Sanskrit words may easily be removed in a second edition of your book which I hope will be necessary in a short time..... I have always been a stern and modest worker in the field of Indian philosophy and philology, but I am glad to find that my endeavours are acknowledged in the land of my studies. I wish you all success which your learning and diligence deserve."

23. M. E. Senart, Esq., Ph.D. Paris—

I have indeed read enough of your book to value your thorough knowledge of Sankara's writings and your inconceivable industry in bringing together scattered utterings of his doctrines and presenting them in clear translation. Of course we cannot forget that the illustrations thence has expressed his ideas in the garb of commentaries to many works which although different in age and origin and diversely influenced in our opinion by independent speculations are nevertheless all considered by him as equally authoritative. So appear several of his discussions less a spontaneous expression of his doctrine than a secondary adaptation to it through subtle commentaries of tenets originally derived from other currents of thought. anyhow your deep justice to the old master Sankara and your remarkable command of the difficult literary materials cannot but meet the grateful acknowledgment of all interested in this line of research.

24. Professor Maurice Bloomfield, Johns Hopkins University, America—

You must not think of me at all disregarding your kind letters, you must do so least of all as regards your valuable book on Sankara's Advaita. I have had time to read it but not enough time to comment upon it in print. I am glad to say to you that your book is, I am convinced, a most valuable contribution to our knowledge of India's high thought, your exposition of Sankara is that of a loving disciple, but, at the same time critical as well as sympathetic. Your Chapter on Māyā is especially illuminating but I remember every page of the book as full of clarifying information. No Indologist can possibly read it without being grateful to you for your first hand, trustworthy help in this difficult field—a field which shows Hindu thought on its very pinnacle. I hope that you will continue to send me your valuable writings. Even if I should not find occasion to review them formally, I shall without doubt sooner or later refer to them in print.

25. Dr. Sylvain Lévi, Ph.D., Professor, Collège de France, Paris—

I am sorry, very sorry that I have been so slow in thanking you for your excellent work—An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy. Could you realise what kind of life I am living here, you would be ready to excuse me. Your book is of a lasting value. You have mastered Sankara's works as a real Pandit, and you know to expose his doctrines perfectly as a modern scholar. Never did I realise before so fully the perfect unity of Sankara's teachings. Your book is a Concordance, a Cyclopædia of Sankara's philosophy. The quotations are well selected, thoroughly clear, conclusive, a glance over the notes at the foot of the pages shows they are a substantial reading, affording the *spirit* of Sankara's thoughts. It was indeed

safe and wise to exclude from your expositions any *other* source than Sankara himself;—here we have him genuine, telling his own tale in his own words, not having to carry on his powerful shoulders the burden of another's responsibility. I hope you will publish some more essays of the same value."

26. Professor Carlo Formichi, M.A., Ph.D., University of Rome, Italy—

"..... I thank you most sincerely for the very valuable gift of your book on Adwaita Philosophy. I myself shall review it in one of the next numbers of our journal. In the meantime, I congratulate you on your excellent work, the offspring both of knowledge and of love."

27. Dr. G. Tucci, University of Rome—

"..... I know you are the author of a very interesting book on the Adwaita Philosophy, which competent scholars have judged the *best exposition* we have of Sankara school. As particularly interested in Indian philosophical thought, and Director of "Studi E. Materiali de Storia Delle Religion" and Colabourator for Indian section of the "Recista Dept.—Study Oriental" edited by the professors of the University of Rome, I shall be very grateful to you, if you would be so kind as to send me a copy of your book. I shall be very glad to publish a review of it in our journals so that it will be presented to our public."

28. The Honourable Dr. Justice W. Ewart Greaves, Kt.—Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University—

"As Europe is proud of Kant, so is India proud of Sankara—the have received such high praise from Dr. Keith of Edinburgh University, and this University is proud of the honour which comes to it from your association with it..... I am sure Sir Asutosh, had he been alive, would have been proud of your work."

29. The Prager Presse (A German Periodical), No. 169—July, 1925.

"As Europe is proud of Kant, so is India proud of Sankara—the great teacher and philosopher of the end of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th Century. There appears every year a good number of books which represents and expounds the philosophy of Sankara. One of the most important of such publications is "An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy" by Kokileswar Sastri that appeared in Calcutta last year. This Introduction distinguishes itself from the average publications of its kind in a considerable measure. The author is conversant with all the minutest details of the subject, interprets it correctly and intelligently in a scientific method; and his book is therefore a valuable contribution towards the right understanding of India's national philosophy. One of the great merits of the book is the clearness of the representations and the synoptical arrangement of

greatest thinker, bids fair to hold a prominent place among those scholarly productions of the premier University of India.

Pandit Kokileswar Sastri is already known among the *savants* of the East and the West and we are glad to see that he has well maintained the high tradition of scholarship for which his family is famous in Bengal.

It is not possible to overestimate the value of a book like this to the students of Philosophy who will surely find much help in properly appreciating Sankara's true philosophical position in Pandit Sastri's exposition and interpretation so thorough, lucid and elaborate, and in his method, as scientific.

The quotations of text and citations from commentaries are so generously extensive that the book will serve to many busy scholars as a storehouse of ready reference. Another merit of the book is due to the author's extraordinary power of co-ordinating the individual scattered passages found in Sankara's voluminous works (especially his extensive Commentaries) with the masterly ease of a real scholar. One, perhaps, may just wish that more reference had been made to treatises like *Aparokshānubhūti*, *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi*, *Advaita-kaustubham*, *Vedānta-muktabālī* and *Vivekādarśha*.

Another distinct advantage is that the author is deeply versed in both Eastern and Western philosophical lore. This knowledge has stood him in good stead in the elucidation in Western terminology or in terms of modern philosophical ideas of many an abstruse point of the Sankara-school of Vedantism and some of the baffling technical expressions used in his various Commentaries.

The ably written preface throws light on a number of controversial points besides precisely indicating the scope of the volume. Rightly does it claim that "an endeavour has been made to discover the real teaching of Sankara," though the author's innate modesty leads him to describe his work as only a "suitable introduction to the proper study of the originals." Happily, he does not permit this modesty to interfere with the strong conviction with which he has put forward his new interpretation and defence of Sankara without any halting hesitancy in the face of the formidable body of very adverse criticism made by Western writers some of whom make up the deficiency of their qualification as competent judges by their reckless audacity.

We do not pretend to attempt within our space limit anything like a detailed criticism of the volume before us and have to rest content for the present with a rapid survey of the work divided (as it is) into only four well-defined and comprehensive chapters.

The first chapter "On Brahma as Creator" tackles very ably the much-vexed problem of the true relation between Brahma and Iswara and attempts to present in a clear and undisputed light the character

In this important chapter the author repeatedly emphasises the absolute need of carefully bearing in mind that the individual (Brahma) has a distinct "nature" of his own—his स्वरूप or धर्म or सामान्य (कूटस्थकारण) which is permanent (नित्य) and which maintains its "unity" amidst all diversities and equally preserves its identity in the midst of the phenomenal changes which it underlies and which are transient and impermanent (pp. 54-66-68).

The conclusion arrived at (p. 64) is that to Sankara the character of the Pure Ego is not merely a being or a knowledge, but an active power and a source of activities (सामर्थ्य) which, again, can be reduced to or resolved into its manifested activities (i.e. pantheism).

In the *third* chapter the principle of causality (सत्कार्य) is thoroughly investigated (pp. 98-101) with a view to particularise the erroneous charge of pantheism brought so often against Śaṅkara's *Advaita* philosophy and as a result it shows the true significance of the idea of the falsity of the world. The conclusion here (pp. 103-104 and p. 113) is that the world of phenomenal changes is the manifestation of the "NATURE" (स्वरूप) of the self which serves to gradually reveal this स्वरूप, but when these changes (the many) are erroneously *separated* (as something independent of) Brahma (the One), then and only then, they become unreal (vide, pp. 103-104, 113 and 121). In Sankara's language—अनृतत्वं. If Brahma is erroneously resolved into the world and the world is made identical, the world becomes unreal or false. The interpretation of Sankara is that Brahma *realises* itself in the midst of the world which is never identical with Brahma but must be as the means through which the 'nature' (स्वरूप) of Brahma is being realised in a higher and higher form." "The world can be looked upon as unreal or false" as such (p. 107). There is an elaboration of this conclusion in the re-statement of Sankara's position regarding the falsity or otherwise of the world on pp.

* * *

The exposition given by the author and the interpretation by him are represented as logically resulting from a correct application of the Vedantic theory of causality as also of Sankara's vigorous refutation of Pantheism (vide pp. 98-101 and footnote to p. 102). The puzzling technical term अनृत्य explained by the Tikā-Kāra in (p. 101) and rendered by Western scholars as "identical" has been sought to be properly explained by our author at some length on pages 25, 26, 52, 72, 83, 100 and 109.

* * *

The end systematically kept in view in these three chapters practically constitute the book itself is to remove the miscon-

and impulsive proclivities, passions and inclination to self-gratification. Even if good work is done as an end in itself it proves to be a bondage—good work must be done as a *means* of spiritual regeneration (विद्योत्पत्तिः). Thus "ethical or moral progress" in Sankara's system "points to a transcendental goal" (p. 161).

“अयमात्मा सर्वलौकिक-प्रियंभ्यः प्रियतमो भवति” * * “आत्मतत्त्वमेव

ज्ञेयम् अनद्वित्य अन्यत् * * आत्मविषयं ज्ञानं * * तस्मिन् निव्यभावः ॥

Sankara definitely and positively avers that man is a free agent (p. 155) and the Sāstric injunctions (whether as prescriptions of duties or prohibitions) are not, therefore, a mandate from the outside imposed on man—the Sāstras only indicating the course of action to be adopted (*vide* footnote to p. 155). According to the present author's interpretation, Sankara does not consider *Jnana* and *Karma* as antagonistic (pp. 172-173), for he has attempted a reconciliation of *Karmakānda* with *Jnanakānda* and *Karma* is needless only in the case of those who have realised *Brahma*—आत्मविदः.

Finally, Sankara's position with regard to *Adwaita* or *Arca* (i.e., extirpation of the notion of difference and separateness between *Brahma* and the empirical world of नामरूप is that the idea of such difference (भेदबुद्धि) is the work of *Avidya* which is destroyed by the idea of taking all emergent activities as *higher and higher expressions* of the Divine Purpose (सर्वज्ञात्मभाव) which supplants the sense of separateness (अन्यत्वबोध). This सर्वज्ञात्मभाव leads to emancipation (मुक्ति) which, again, is not absorption of the *Ego* in *Brahma* (pp. 182-184).

By way of general criticism we may say that the author has rightly started his whole investigation with an enquiry about the real significance of *Prana-spandan* which forms the subject-matter of the fourth section of the second chapter of *Vedantadarsanam* and is also referred to in I. 1. 23, 28-31 and which is considered in Sankara's system to be the primal and earliest manifestation of *Brahma's* nature—*Brahma* being प्राणस्य प्राणः—*viz.*, that which differentiates itself as the phenomena of the world (*cf.* *Chandyogya* and *Isha Bhashya*). Section 4 of Chapter I contains an original interpretative contribution to the discussion of the true nature of *Brahma* often misunderstood and represented as "pure undifferentenced being." In that view, *Brahma* is not regarded in both the transcendental and immanent aspects which, again, are inseparable. Here the author has very rightly and properly laid great stress on *Brahma's* underlying nature (स्वरूप). Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter III are equally important in this respect with regard to the much-vexed question which has long baffled and often misled Western critics as to Sankara's true attitude towards the empirical world.

Even when we fail to see eye to eye with our author's interpretation, supported though it is by closely-reasoned arguments and exten-



the book is an attempt to refute the interpretation authoritatively given to Sankara's system by a number of distinguished Western scholars of great repute who so justly carry so much weight and hence the present writer may have felt, we presume, the need of making his own stand-point and exposition as elaborate and convincing as possible. There is an apology for his method implied in the author's remarks in section 5, page 118, paragraph 1."
